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ABSTRACT

Anonymity has long been discussed as a source of disinhibition. The myth of the Ring of
Gyges illustrates how a person may act immorally solely because they know they will not be
caught (Plato, 375/2017). Incorporating perspectives of rational choice and deterrence,
anonymity serves as a form of risk reduction within hedonistic calculus (Beccaria, 1764/1963;
Bentham, 1781/2000). Analogous to the myth of the Ring of Gyges (Plato, 375/2017),
techniques of anonymity “hide” users from others while online. These techniques serve as a form
of risk reduction, reducing the certainty of punishment (Becarria 1764/1963). Additionally, there
are many ways by which a person can obscure their identity online (Scott, 1998).
The goals of this dissertation are threefold:
Goal 1: Contribute to cybercrime/deviance literature by identifying correlates predicting
perceptions of online anonymity and legitimacy.
Goal 2: Examine the impact of individual anonymity providing behaviors on the
willingness to offend, both independently and in interaction with each other, across
various acts of cybercrime/deviance, net of other factors.
Goal 3: Expand on existing deterrence literature in relation to cybercrime/deviance to
gain a better understanding of the influence of informal and formal controls on the
willingness to offend.
Data was collected on a nationally reflective sample of 374 American adults using a
factorial survey experimental design with three vignettes covering four cyber-enabled crimes or
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deviance: the purchase of illicit prescriptions online, the illicit sale of prescriptions online,
cyberbullying, and doxing. Respondents were randomly assigned three types of anonymity
providing behaviors of varying strength in the vignettes and were asked their willingness to
commit the act based off the assigned conditions. They were also asked to indicate their level of
concern about arrest, loss of account, and deanonymization to their friends and family or
employer.
Anonymity providing behaviors alone were generally not predictive of a higher
willingness to offend. While rational choice and deterrence were not fully supported by the
results of this study, there is some evidence of the responses being informed by rational choice.
More serious offenses were found to have statistically significant relationships with different
combinations of technologically provided anonymity behaviors in the expected direction,
indicating that participants were responding considering the risks involved with offending.
Sources of informal and formal sanctions were not consistently related to the outcome of
offending; the different sources of sanctions did behave differently from each other and by
scenario.
Future research should incorporate measures from the Pavlou’s (2003) TAM model,
including trust, perceived risk, perceived usefulness, and ease of use in addition to Hite and
colleagues (2014) measure of perceived anonymity specific to the scenario to capture other
factors that influence respondents’ feelings towards the anonymity technologies and behaviors
that not captured in the models. Additionally, future research should parse out sources of
sanction further to identify the best vectors for intervention.

x

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

The Scope of Cybercrime
The development of the World Wide Web and improvements in computer hardware
(regarding both user-friendliness and affordability) have revolutionized communication
(Newman & Clarke, 2003; Wall, 2005). A novelty at its public introduction nearly three decades
ago, the Internet has become a ubiquitous part of modern society. Currently, there are an
estimated 4.8 billion Internet users worldwide (Internet Live Stats, 2021). In 2010, it was
reported that 60% of Americans purchased goods online at least once per fiscal quarter
(Anderson, 2010). At that time, e-commerce accounted for less than five percent of total retail
sales in the United States; at its peak in 2020, e-commerce accounted for almost 16 percent of
total retail sales nationally. Admittedly, a four percent spike occurred between the first and
second quarter of 2020, as the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and its related lockdowns made
e-commerce a necessity rather than a choice (U.S. Census, 2021).
Factoring in the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of computing networks for business and
socialization has expanded, increasing the number of individuals who will be targeted by
cybercriminals. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received a record number of
complaints in 2020, with 791,790 incidents reporting losses in excess of $4.1 billion. Of those
cases, over 20 thousand involved harassment or threats of violence, over 35 thousand utilized
social media. Over 35 thousand incidents were reported to involve virtual currency, totally over
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$246 million of losses (IC3, 2021). These reports are likely low estimates of cybercrime overall
due to underreporting (Bidgoli & Grossklags, 2016).
Even online crimes reported to authorities are likely to be unsolved because offenders can
hunt, target, and attack victims anonymously. Anonymity can be achieved through various
methods, requiring different levels of skill, and providing various levels of protection.
Anonymity in communications is achieved through methods which obscure the source of a
communication, such as pseudonyms or the lack of visual clues (Scott, 1998). There are various
technological sources of anonymity as well, such as encrypted browsing and proxies (Li et al.,
2016) or cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008). While these technological sources of
anonymity may have legitimate uses, current events such as recent ransomware attack of the
Colonial Pipeline, have renewed discussions of the threats posed by anonymous technologies
(Department of Justice, 2021).
Anonymity & Offending
Why should anonymity matter? The myth of the Ring of Gyges is a story of a shepherd,
who when given a magic ring that makes the wearer invisible and anonymous, used the ring to
seduce a queen, kill her king, and take over the kingdom. Discussed in Book II of Plato’s
Republic (375/2017), the question posited by Glaucon was, did the shepherd Gyges act
immorally because he was immoral, or would even a just man behave in a way that contrasted
with social mores simply because they were anonymous? The concept of anonymity as a form of
risk reduction is not new; to be punished for a crime, you need to be identified. Criminal
offenders will reduce or change their behaviors in avoidance of punishment (Gibbs, 1975). While
physical anonymity is possible (e.g., the archetype of the masked robber, or the use of false
identities in fraud), the advent of the Internet opened opportunities for cyber offenders to take
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advantage of environments with lower risk of identification (Scott, 1998). Analogous to the myth
of the Ring of Gyges (Plato, 375/2017), techniques of anonymity “hide” users from others while
online. As Glaucon asked, with no way to attribute unjust behavior to an invisible source, what
keeps such a person from committing unjust acts?
The Psychology of Online Anonymity
Even in cases where an individual may not typically be willing to commit offenses in
terrestrial environments, they may be subject to psychological forces that encourage behaviors in
online spaces. One such psychological phenomenon called the online disinhibition effect. Online
disinhibition occurs when the social expectations and inhibitions that usually exist during faceto-face interactions and help control behavior are loosened in online spaces (Suler, 2004).
Individuals see themselves as an anonymous entity nested in an anonymous whole,
disconnecting themselves from personal responsibility for the actions they take online (Suler,
2004).
Another psychological phenomenon explaining cybercrime is deindividuation.
Traditional deindividuation theory argues that individuals may lose their sense of individuality
and personal responsibility when they belong to a group where they are relatively anonymous,
leading to a decrease in self-regulation and self-evaluation (Diener, 1979). Applied to online
environments, the group would be other users in the same online environment. In both cases, the
anonymity provided in these online spaces results in the loss of social and self-imposed controls
that would otherwise regulate behavior, increasing the likelihood that an individual will commit
cybercrime (Diener, 1979; Suler, 2004). Research has supported the role of anonymity in various
cybercrimes, such as cyberbullying (Huang et al., 2020; Udris, 2014; Wachs et al., 2019; Wright
et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2017).
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Key to this is the belief that you are anonymous while online (Hite et al., 2014; Scott,
1998). Without the perception of anonymity, the mechanisms of disinhibition and
deindividuation will not be engaged and behavior will remain at the individual’s baseline
(Diener, 1979; Suler, 2004). Objective anonymity and the perception of anonymity are not
necessarily the same, though objective reality does inform perception (Chen & Li, 2016;
Tsikerdekis, 2013; Wu & Atkin, 2018).
Anonymity, Rational Choice, & Deterrence Theory
Anonymity can also serve as a form of risk reduction as part of rational choice hedonistic
calculus (Beccaria, 1764/1963; Bentham, 1781/2000). The rational choice perspective can be
summarized as the belief that humans are rational actors who assess the risks and benefits of an
act before choosing a behavior that works in their best interest (Kubrin et al., 2009). Deterrence
extends this concept a bit further, using the risk component as vector for intervention by using
punishment and the threats of punishment to increase the perception of risk. By doing so,
individuals who would otherwise be interested in committing the crime would decide to abstain
(Beccaria, 1764/1963). For deterrence strategies to be effective in reducing criminal behavior,
three elements are required: certainty, severity, and celerity (Becarria, 1764/1963).
Contemporary perspectives of deterrence include discussions of restrictive deterrence and risk
avoidance (Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 1996) as well as the roles of formal and informal sanctions as
deterrents to anti-social behaviors (Paternoster, 1985).
While not originally designed to be applied to online environments (Holt & Bossler,
2016), these perspectives can be applied to cybercrime and anonymity. Following the logic of
rational choice, anonymity reduces the risk of attribution for offenders, allowing them to avoid
consequence while reaping the benefits of the behavior. From a deterrence perspective,

4

anonymity reduces the certainty that a punishment is imminent. This is supported in digital
piracy literature where certainty of punishment was the strongest element of deterrence (Higgins
et al., 2005; Holt & Copes, 2010; Kos Koklic et al., 2014; Yoon, 2011). Studies of cyberbullying
and cryptomarkets have also shown support for rational choice and deterrence perspectives
(Barratt et al., 2016; Holt et al., 2015; Lianos & McGrath, 2018; Martin et al., 2019; Martin et
al., 2020; Patchin & Hinduja, 2018).
With the understanding of how anonymity may operate as a mechanism for cyber
offending, several questions remain. Do certain anonymity providing behaviors have a stronger
impact on the willingness to offend? What happens if multiple forms of anonymity are engaged
in simultaneously? Following the logic of rational choice and deterrence, and psychological
perspectives of anonymity, each anonymity providing behavior should be independently related
to an increased rate of cybercrime and deviance perpetration. When used simultaneously the
level of anonymity should increase, therefore the risk should decrease and lead to a higher
likelihood that the cybercrime will be committed. The current study is designed to test these
relationships across several forms of cybercrime and deviance.
Current Study
In this study, I analyzed the role of anonymity in cybercrime and deviance through the
application of a factorial survey experimental design on a sample of 374 American adults. There
are several benefits of utilizing this methodological design. The use of random assignment
characteristic of experimental designs increases the internal validity of the study. The treatment
effects can be observed and interpreted with minimal concern about spurious variables. Unlike
traditional experiments, the survey design can be utilized on large samples, and therefore a larger
number of experimental factors can be used in a single design (Ausburg & Hinz, 2015; Mutz,
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2011). Another benefit of this methodological design is that the hypothetical scenarios allow for
the manipulation of variables that may not currently exist in the reality of the participant
(Abraham et al., 2010; Rossi & Anderson, 1982). For example, in this study, it will allow
assignment of browsing software (e.g., VPN, Tor) that the respondent may not have used before.
Guiding this research and three broad goals and their related research questions. First,
does technological skill-level and participation in activities online predict perceptions of online
anonymity and social media legitimacy? Establishing the characteristics of individuals correlated
to the belief that anonymizing behaviors will obscure their identity as well as identifying the
correlates of the belief that online service providers are legitimate serve as the foundation for the
rest of the dissertation.
Second, what impact do various anonymity providing behaviors have on the willingness
to offend, net of other factors? The goal here is to determine the impact of individual anonymity
providing behaviors on the willingness to offend, both independently and in interaction with each
other, across various acts of cybercrime/deviance, net of other factors. These acts include drug ecommerce (both buying and selling behaviors), cyberbullying, and doxing (i.e., the publication
of personal identifying information (PII) about someone on the Internet without their consent).
The experimental vignettes allow for the assessment of the anonymizing behaviors
independently as well as in interaction. Prior anonymity research has acknowledged that
anonymity exists on a spectrum from fully anonymous to fully exposed (Scott, 1998). However,
this research has not assessed the impact of user participation in various combinations of
communication and technological anonymity behaviors. This study intends to assess the
influence of layered protections provided by anonymizing behaviors.
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Third, does the impact of anonymizing behaviors on the willingness to offend vary
between types of cybercrime/deviance? By assessing multiple forms of cybercrime and deviance
that vary in severity, the study will be able to assess if the impact of anonymity varies across
severity of offenses.
Finally, the study asks do informal and formal controls moderate the effect of anonymity
providing behaviors on the willingness to offend? Here, the goal is to expand on contemporary
deterrence literature by gaining a better understanding of the influence of informal and formal
controls on the willingness to offend in online settings. While the levels of anonymity are
hypothesized to impact the willingness to offend, individual concerns about formal and informal
consequences are hypothesized to moderate these relationships.
Overview of the Dissertation
Chapter Two includes and comprehensive literature review covering cybercrime
generally, the role of anonymity in cybercrime and cyber deviance, specific anonymizing
behaviors associated with cybercrime, and a focused review of literature on the cybercrimes
addressed in this study (drug trade, cyberbullying and harassment, and doxing). Chapter Three
establishes the theoretical framework guiding this study, specifically rational choice and
deterrence theories. Chapter Four is a brief overview of the goals, research questions, and
hypotheses of this study to clearly connect the prior literature to the methodology. Chapter Five
outlines the methodology, sample, data collection plan, measures, and analytic plan. Chapter Six
presents the results of the analyses, including descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses used
to address the study’s four research questions. Finally, Chapter Seven discusses the implications
of the results of the dissertation. This includes a general discussion of the results, the study’s
implications, and its limitations.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received a record number of complaints in
2020, with 791,790 incidents reporting losses in excess of $4.1 billion. Of those cases, over 20
thousand involved harassment or threats of violence, over 35 thousand utilized social media, and
13 hundred involved healthcare (including pharmaceutical scams) (IC3, 2021). Cyber-enabled
crimes of harassment and healthcare-related crimes accounted for 14% of all monetary losses
reported to IC3 in 2020 (IC3, 2021). One of the potential reasons for choosing to commit these
crimes is the anonymity online technologies provide to those motivated to use them (Grabosky,
2001).
New innovations in technology and computing anonymity often are created and
maintained with good intentions (The Tor Project, n.d.). Unfortunately, if there is any benefit to
be had from adopting these innovations, criminals may commandeer the technology to improve
upon existing modes of offending or in the development of new forms of criminal behavior. For
example, onion routing software was created in the 1990s by members of the U.S. Naval
Research Lab (NRL) in order to protect U.S. military intelligence communications (The Tor
Project, n.d.). The onion routing proxy system, Tor, became available for civilian use in the
2000s, and is advertised to serve several legitimate uses such as facilitating communication for
victims of crime or help circumvent government censorship (The Tor Project, n.d.). However,
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Tor has also been associated with the use of cryptomarkets such as the Silk Road, which was
responsible for facilitating sales of illicit products accounting for nearly 2 million dollars of
revenue per month (Christin, 2013). Not all anonymity providing behaviors are complicated
technologically. Communication-based anonymity may be as simple as using an alias or
removing visual cues of personal identity (Scott, 1998). This study intends to assess the impact
of various anonymity providing behaviors on offenses of illicit prescription drug purchasing and
selling, cyberbullying, and doxing.
This chapter reviews existing research relevant to this dissertation, beginning by defining
cybercrime, why it is important to study cybercrime as a unique subset of criminology, and how
cybercrime offenders differ from offenders who operate in terrestrial spaces. It then reviews prior
literature on the cybercrimes specific to the current study: illicit e-commerce, cyberbullying, and
doxing. The following section covers prior research on anonymity in cyberspace, from
communication science and technology-driven perspectives, including discussions regarding
online disinhibition and deindividuation, as well as perceptions of anonymity. The final section
synthesizes the prior material into its applicability into the current research.
Cybercrime Defined
Discussions of cybercrime can be traced back to the 1970s, where “computer crime”
referred to the misuse of computing systems and their associated data (Parker, 1976). This
terminology persisted through the early 1990s, at which point the introduction of the World
Wide Web and the development of more affordable and user-friendly software encouraged the
greater public to begin using the Internet (Holt & Bossler, 2016). Around this time, David Wall
(1998) began using the term “cybercrime” to refer to any crime performed online. The term
“computer crime” continued to be used to indicate crimes of computer misuse (Gabosky, 2001).
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While these terms were often used interchangeably, there was an intentional differentiation
between the cybercrime and computer crime. Furnell (2002) categorized cybercimes as those in
which “the perpetrator uses special knowledge of cyberspace” and computer crimes as those
where “the perpetrator uses special knowledge of computer technology” (p. 21).
Various terms have been used to describe these crimes in scholarly work, including ecrime, Internet crime, digital crime, and online crime (Holt & Bossler, 2016; McGuire, 2020).
Between 1995 and 2000, “computer crime” was the most common terminology used. However,
the term began to fall out of favor as the evolution of computer technologies has resulted in
many computing systems becoming Internet-enabled, blurring the lines between these
differentiations. As of 2018, cybercrime was the standard term used in scholarly research in this
area of study (McGuire, 2020). Another commonly used term in adjacent research is cyberdeviance. Cyber-deviance is defined as using technology to participate in behavior that may be
legal but is in violation of societal norms (Holt & Bossler, 2016; Stalans & Finn, 2016).
Examples of cyber-deviance include the viewing of pornographic material, engaging in deviant
or offensive discourse on discussion boards, and minor cyberbullying behavior.
Following the definitions used by Furnell (2002), the integration of Internet capabilities
in most computing systems means that perpetrators of computer crimes would also be
committing cybercrimes by default, though not all cybercrimes would also be computer crimes.
Therefore, in more recent scholarly research, cybercrimes have been broken down further into
three broad categories: cyber-enabled, cyber-assisted, and cyber-dependent (McGuire, 2020;
McGuire & Dowling, 2013). Cyber-enabled crimes are those where the computer or network is
used as a tool in the commission of the offense but is otherwise comparable to traditional crimes
that take place in the terrestrial environment. Simply, the crime could still occur if the digital
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tools and context were removed. An example of this would be fraud. A computer network is not
required to acquire money through deceptive practices; though it cannot be argued that computer
networking does make this practice much easier and potentially more lucrative. Cyber-assisted
crime is like cyber-enabled in that the crime could still occur without the use of technology;
however, the technology utilized in these crimes are incidental. For example, using digital
messaging to facilitate communication related to a crime would be considered cyber-assisted
crime. Cyber-dependent crime cannot exist without computer technology, and usually takes
place completely within digital space. Computers and digital spaces account for the tool, target,
and environment of the act. Examples of this include hacking or the use of malware (Holt &
Bossler, 2016; McGuire, 2020; McGuire & Dowling, 2013; Weulen Kranenbarg et al., 2018).
Why Study Cybercrime?
Twenty years ago, Peter Grabosky (2001) argued while the evolution of technology is
opening new opportunities for cybercrime, at their core, these crimes and criminals are no
different than those committed in terrestrial spaces apart from the medium by which they occur.
From his perspective, the study of cybercrime is a case of “old wine in new bottles.”
If this is the case, then why should researchers address cybercrime as a separate field of
research? First, at the time this argument was made, there were approximately half a billion
Internet users worldwide. This number has increased by over 800% in the last twenty years
(Internet Live Stats, 2021). The ubiquity of technology, and therefore cybercrime, has become
too large and too integrated with modern society to ignore.
Second, the population of Internet users twenty years ago were primarily digital
immigrants, those born prior to the introduction of consumer digital technologies. These
individuals had to learn and adapt to these technologies as they developed. Internet users today
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include a greater number of digital natives, those born and raised with digital technology as a
standard part of their lives (Holt & Bossler, 2016; Prensky, 2001). In his argument, Grabosky
(2001) stated:
Technologies of anonymity and pseudonymity such as remailers and cryptography can
provide a modicum of cover for someone wishing to mask his or her identity and the
content of his or her communication. But not everyone avails themselves of such
technologies, and capacities of surveillance exceed all but the most determined users (p.
245).
While the argument is sound, digital technologies and methodologies have become easier to
navigate over the last two decades. For example, the Tor browsing software provided by the Tor
Project in its default settings just like a normal Internet browser, and clearly communicates if it is
successfully connected to the Tor network at start up. The software has developed to the point
that it is available for Windows, Mac OS, Linux, and Android operating systems (Tor Project,
n.d.). This is not to say that Tor is popular among all Internet users; in the first six months of
2021, the Tor Project reported between 2 and 2.5 million users directly connected to the Tor
relay on any given day. This accounts for approximately 0.04% of Internet users worldwide
(Internet Stats Live, 2021; Tor Project, n.d.). However, this represents an 300% increase in
usership from January 2012 (Tor Project, n.d.). While it includes only a small proportion of all
Internet users, use has expanded.
In addition to improvements in useability, digital natives may be more technologically
inclined, meaning these individuals may have skillsets or at least a better understanding of the
capabilities and limitations of these techniques (Grabosky, 2001). While the motivations to
offend may be the same, the willingness to participate and the methods used to facilitate the
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crime may differ. Research that concentrates on these components of cybercrime, such as the
current study, are important contributions to the existing literature.
Finally, it would be problematic to assume offender and victim characteristics of
cybercrimes are the same as terrestrial crimes without comparing them empirically. Weulen
Kranenbarg and colleagues (2018) did so by completing a longitudinal comparison of suspected
offenders of cyber-dependent crime (n = 870) to those suspected of “traditional” crime (n =
1,144,740) between 2000-2012 in the Netherlands. Traditional crime was defined as terrestrial
crime plus cyber-enabled crime as the researchers assume perpetrators of the analogous crimes
do not differ characteristically. The study was intended to assess if differences in life
circumstances were differentially related to terrestrial and cyber-dependent crime over the lifecourse. They found that circumstances in the private lives of offenders are similar between both
crime types; in particular, the presence of significant others and children predicted lower
involvement in crime as compared to other times in their lives in both the traditional and cyberdependent groups (Weulen Kranenbarg et al., 2018). What did vary between the groups were
professional life circumstances. Employment and education were significant in reducing
traditional crime behavior; however, education had the opposite, though not significant, impact
on cyber-dependent crime. Employment’s impact was dependent on whether it was in the IT
sector, which was related to an increased odds of committing cybercrime, or non-IT
employment, which lowered the odds of both traditional and cyber-dependent crime (Weulen
Kranenbarg et al., 2018).
Weulen Kranenbarg and colleagues expanded on the comparison between cyberdependent crime and traditional crime in 2019, testing if traditional correlates of offending and
victimization were also related to cyber-dependent offending and victimization. This time, a
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sample of 535 suspects of crime (240 cyber-dependent and 219 traditional) were compared on
victimization, offending, and victimization-offending characteristics. They found considerable
victim-offender overlap in both the cyber-dependent and traditional crime groups. Further
analyses into the cyber-dependent group indicated that more technical cybercrimes were
correlated with the offender-only group, as were IT-skills and online routine activities. This is
logical in that individual offenders with these skills could not only complete this more technical
crimes, but also had the skills to protect themselves from victimization (Weulen Kranenbarg et
al., 2019). This also aligns with their previous findings relating education and IT-employment to
offending. The findings of both studies appear to support the idea that cyber-dependent offenders
are unique in their need for and exposure to specialized skillsets which facilitate offending.
Shifting to comparisons of cyber-enabled crime versus their terrestrial counterparts,
cyberbullying could easily be seen solely as an extension of traditional bullying behavior
(Kowalski & Limber, 2013). However, research comparing cyberbullying and traditional
bullying perpetration and victimization have shown cyberbullying to have some variation in
characteristics (Beckman et al., 2013; Kowalski & Limber, 2013; Schultze-Krumbholz et al.,
2015; Waasdorp & Bradshaw, 2015). Females experience higher rates of cyberbullying
victimization than males when traditional bullying victimization is more evenly distributed
between genders, whereas cyberbullying perpetration is equally likely to be committed by males
and females as opposed to male dominating traditional bullying perpetration (Beckman et al.,
2013). Waasdorp and Bradshaw (2015) found that cyberbullying victims were more likely to
experience multiple forms of bullying than traditional bullying victims and reported higher levels
of negative psychological outcomes. This was consistent with prior literature, finding while
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similar the groups were similar, victims of cyberbullying scored worse on measures of
psychological and physical health, as well as academic performance (Kowalski & Limber, 2013).
Schultze-Krumbholz and colleagues (2015) used latent class analysis to compare
statistical classes of both traditional and cyberbullying victims and offenders. The analyses
identified three classes of cyberbullying (noninvolved, bully-victims, and perpetrators with mild
victimization) and four traditional (noninvolved, mild bully-victims, bully-victims, and
perpetrators). The cybercrime bully-victim and traditional mild-victim classes were comparable
in structure and representation. The traditional perpetration class accounted for a larger
proportion of the sample than cyberbullying perpetration with mild victimization group. The
variation between the remaining classes indicated structural differences which could potentially
reflect differences in motivation for perpetration (Schultze-Krumbholz et al., 2015).
Overall, offender and victim characteristics of cybercrimes do share similarities with
traditional offending. However, differences between traditional/terrestrial and cybercrime do
exist. Between these differences, changes in technological innovations, and a growing population
of digital natives, cybercrime should continue to be studied as its own subset of crime and
deviance.
Cybercrimes of Interest
As outlined above, it is important to study cybercrime as a separate entity than terrestrial
crime. For the sake of brevity, this portion of the literature review will focus on the cybercrimes
specific to the current research: illicit e-commerce, cyberbullying, and doxing. This is by no
means a comprehensive review of all cybercrimes which may be influenced by anonymity.
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Cryptomarkets & Rogue Pharmacies
Before a discussion of cryptomarkets begins, there needs to be an understanding of how
the Internet is structured. Multiple terms are used interchangeably when discussing the complex
structure of the Internet and its separate pieces. The surface web is any website that can be
indexed and found through search engines on standard Internet browsing software. The deep web
is any website that has not been indexed by standard search engines but can be accessed through
standard software (Finklea, 2017). For example, an individual bank account is not publicly
accessible to through a search engine; however, it is accessible through the bank’s website once
security credentials are provided. The dark web is “a small portion of the deep web that has been
intentionally hidden and is inaccessible through standard web browsers” (Brightplanet.com,
2014, n.p.). There is nothing inherently illicit about the dark web; it is not illegal to access dark
web sites even if some actions facilitated by this environment are illegal (Finklea, 2017). One
such environment that facilitates illegal commerce are dark web cryptomarkets.
A cryptomarket is defined as “a marketplace that hosts multiple sellers or ‘vendors’,
provides participants with anonymity via its location on the hidden web and use of
cryptocurrencies for payment, and aggregates and displays customer feedback ratings and
comments” (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016, p. 1). This definition is consistent with most research in
this area except for the requirement to occur on the hidden, or dark web. While the majority of
cryptomarkets operate in dark web spaces, some markets do operate on the surface or deep web
(see Holt et al., 2015; Mackey et al., 2018).
One of the most infamous cryptomarkets was the Silk Road. Operational from 2011 to
2013, the Silk Road was known for facilitating sales of illicit products, namely drugs (Hout &
Bingham, 2013; Christin, 2013). Vendor revenue was reported to be approximately 1.9 million
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dollars per month (Christin, 2013). Ross Ulbricht, also known as the Dread Pirate Roberts, made
more than 13 million dollars through the website’s mandatory escrow system during his
ownership of the website (U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2015).
Participation in cryptomarkets, as defined by Barratt and Aldridge (2016), require a
device capable of accessing the Internet using anonymizing browser software, knowledge of the
marketplace URL, cryptocurrency (defined at length below), a cryptomarket vendor willing to
send the purchases to an address where the package can be sent. To be clear, these purchases
may be illegal to purchase, ship, or possess. As a part of the transaction, many cryptomarkets
offer third-party escrow services. The administrator of the market will charge a fee to accept the
funds on behalf of the buyer and hold them until the transaction is finalized, at which point they
are released to the vendor. This is intended to ensure prevent buyers and sellers from falling
victim to scams where either payment or product are withheld (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016; Hout
& Bingham, 2013). Some cryptomarkets have opted into using multi signature escrow systems
after high-profile incidents where the market administrator arbitrarily shut down the website and
escaped with the escrow funds, a type of fraud known as an exit scam. For example, the escrow
accounts used by the Silk Road 2.0, the replacement for Ulbricht’s original marketplace, were
hacked in 2014. The result was a loss of cryptocurrency valued at 2.7 million dollars USD
(Brandom, 2014). The more secure multi signature system requires at least two of the three
participants (the buyer, vendor, and administrator) to agree on the completion status of the
transaction before the funds are released to the seller (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016).
To reduce the risk of being identified as a participant in illicit trade successfully, the user
has to become an expert with cryptomarket technologies and processes (Barratt & Aldridge,
2016; Brezo & Bringas, 2012; Hout & Bingham, 2013). This, arguably, would reduce the
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perceived benefit of online trade because of the increased difficultly. It also is a risk onto itself,
especially for those unfamiliar with the proper use of the platforms, as they could mistakenly
identify themselves through poor practices.
Hout and Bingham (2013) conducted observations, discussions, and interviews with Silk
Road users prior to its dissolution following Ulbricht’s arrest in 2013. The self-proclaimed
ethno-pharmacological approach was used to discover how commerce worked on the Silk Road,
what appeal it had to users, experiences within the community, and possible displacement of
street drug markets to the dark web. Users were found to be primarily professionals and
educated, reflective of the technical expertise required to access and navigate the dark web. The
users indicated a preference for Silk Road transactions due to its comparative safety to street
vendors; the escrow system helped protect from scams, the drug quality was perceived as purer,
and the buyers were protected from physical assaults (Hout & Bingham, 2013).
Many of drugs made available on cryptomarkets are recreational drugs such as cannabis,
MDNA, cocaine, methamphetamines, and opioids such as heroin (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016;
Martin et al., 2018b). However, controlled substances are also available in these markets such as
sedatives, steroids, stimulants, and prescription opioids, with the market demand for the last
increasing in recent years (Martin et al., 2018a). While there are legitimate sources of these
controlled substances, legal regulations and pharmaceutical costs have pushed the demand to
these illicit markets (Martin et al., 2018a; Orsolini et al., 2015). Following the 2014 ruling by the
US Drug Enforcement Administration to reschedule hydrocodone combination drugs,
prescription opioid sales significantly increased in US cryptomarkets, which also resulting in an
increase in product availability (Martin et al., 2018a).
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Traditional cryptomarkets are not the only source of illicit prescriptions. Unlicensed,
illegal “rogue” online pharmacies are a common source of for illicit prescriptions, available to
find on the surface web and often do not require valid prescriptions (FDA, 2021; Monteith et al.,
2016; Orsolini et al., 2015). Some of these websites appear legitimate, falsely claiming
certification from organizations such as Canadian International Pharmacy Association (CIPA)
(Montieth et al., 2016; Penley et al., 2021) actual membership in CIPA would categorize the
pharmacy as an unapproved pharmacy in the United States, but not rogue (Monteith et al., 2016).
One of the primary motivations for outsourcing prescriptions purchases to unapproved or rogue
pharmacies is financial (CIPA, 2015; Orsolini et al., 2015). A 2015 survey by CIPA of
approximately 2,700 Americans indicated that the primary reason for using Canadian pharmacies
was the costs of the medications in the United States. Approximately 30% of respondents
reported having to take actions such as skipping doses or splitting pills as cost saving measures
(CIPA, 2015). Rogue pharmacies take advantage of the financial needs of potential clients by
advertising cost savings such as discounts and coupons (Monteith & Glenn, 2018; Penley et al.,
2021). While potentially more affordable and easier to access, the drugs offered by these rogue
pharmacies are may be poorly manufactured, expired, damaged, contaminated, or fake
(Outterson & Smith, 2006). Purchasing medications from rogue pharmacies may endanger
consumers safety as these drugs may be dangerous to use or may not work at all (Mackey &
Nayyar, 2016). Threats aside, the sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals is lucrative; in 2015
counterfeit drugs were estimated to earn distributers approximately 75 billion dollars annually
(Bairu, 2015).
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Cyberbullying & Cyber Harassment
A simple definition of cyberbullying is when an individual is intentionally harassed using
technology (Hutson, 2016). It can include behaviors of “flaming” (i.e., posting of offensive
messages), harassment, exclusion, stalking, impersonation, outing (i.e., revealing sexual
orientation and/or gender identity), trickery, and sexting (Willard, 2007). Patchin and Hinduja
(2015) take the conceptualization of cyberbullying a step further, indicating that acts of
cyberbullying are characterized as repetitive, intentional acts that cause harm to the victim.
These interactions are carried out by aggressors with perceived or actual power over the victim.
While the terms cyberbullying and harassment are often used interchangeably in this area (see
Deschamps & McNutt, 2016; Jenaro et al., 2018; Lowry et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2012; Willard,
2007), Patchin and Hinduja (2015) warn that not all forms of harmful behaviors online should be
categorized as cyberbullying. For example, they argue that sending repeated unsolicited
obscenities as an attack against a woman should be considered sexual harassment, not
cyberbullying (Patchin & Hinduja, 2015).
While bullying and harassment can occur face-to-face, cyberbullying is unique in several
ways. Cyberbullying communications can be, but are not necessarily, anonymous (Moore et al.,
2012; Pacheco & Melhuish, 2021; Wright et al., 2019). They can be communicated in public
forums via a fully identified account as easily as it could be a private message from a generic
user account. These attacks are not limited to a single or small number of offenders. The nature
of cyberbullying encourages mob-style harassment, where multiple individuals may choose to
join the attack, even if they had no original motive to do so (Deschamps & McNutt, 2016). The
attacks are not limited to communication; they can also be technical in nature (Moore et al.,
2012). For example, cyberbullies may hack victim accounts to post embarrassing content to the
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victim’s social network. Due to the ubiquity of networked devices, attacks can occur at any time
and can be accessed from anywhere. Unlike face-to-face bullying, there is no safe place to avoid
the harassment unless the victim foregoes using the Internet (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009). Finally,
cyberbullying attacks can be permanent. Bullying content may not be removed or can be
redistributed after initial removal, resulting in extended or repeated victimization (Moore et al.,
2012).
Cyberbullying is most often studied using juvenile samples because it is seen as an issue
experienced by youths (Jenaro et al., 2018; Lowry et al., 2016; Udris, 2014; Wachs et al., 2019;
Wright et al., 2019). However, this characterization is not only untrue, but is problematic from a
research perspective. This misconception about perpetrators of cyberbullying is reflected in the
lack of research utilizing adult populations. In their systematic review of cyberbullying research
between 2004 and 2016 that used adult samples, Jenaro and colleagues (2018) were able to
identify 90 studies of cyberbullying (victimization and perpetration) using adult samples, though
only 19 used non-student samples. Of interest to this dissertation are the discussions of
perpetration of cyberbullying by adults; Lowry and colleagues (2016) completed a similar
systematic analysis and identified 64 empirical studies of cyberbullying perpetration. Of this
group, only one studied a non-student adult sample; eleven college students ages 18 to 24 for
their samples (Lowry et al., 2016).
There has been some development of research on cyberbullying and harassment looking
at non-student adult samples since these reviews were completed. As part of their systematic
review, Lowry et al. (2016) completed a study on a sample of 1,003 adults to test a proposed
social media and cyberbullying model (SMCBM) of structure and social learning behavior
modified from Akers’ (2011) social learning and social structure (SSSL) theoretical model of
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deviance. The SMCBM added measures of anonymity and social media structure to better apply
the SSSL model to cyberspace. They found that high levels or social media engagement and
anonymity were facilitating factors in the social learning process in a manner that increased
participation in cyberbullying (Lowry et al., 2016). Pacheco and Melhuish (2021) used a
nationally representative sample of adult 1,161 New Zealanders to determine common
characteristics of offenders and the acts of cyberbullying. Of the sample, 11.4% of participants
indicated that they participated in cyberbullying at least once in the previous 12 months, with
8.9% admitting they had done so multiple times. Demographic findings indicated that males
were more likely to offend, consistent with prior research on cyberbullying (Henry et al., 2019;
Wick et al., 2017). They also found that cyberbullying perpetration was most often committed by
young adults age 18 through 29 (19.8%), closely followed by 30-39 year olds (19.4%) (Pacheco
& Melhuish, 2021). Their findings regarding typical age demographics of offenders reiterates the
importance of studying non-student adult offenders as a large proportion of adult cyberbullying
offenders are omitted in student samples.
Doxing
A specific subset of cyberbullying and harassment behavior, the term ‘doxing’ originates
from the phrase “dropping documents” or “dropping dox.” It originated in 1990s hacking culture,
where it was a used as a form of retaliation. It involved discovering and publishing the identity of
individuals who are otherwise anonymous (Honan, 2014). The consensus definition of doxing is
the search for, and the publication of, private or personal identifying information (PII) about
someone on the Internet without their consent (Chen et al., 2019; Douglas, 2016). A technique
utilized in cyberbullying and harassment, the publication of PII facilitates further harassment
(Chen et al., 2019). Motivations for doxing are numerous. It may be done as a sort of online

22

vigilantism, exposing wrongdoing or even as a form of retaliation to hold victim accountable for
their perceived wrongs (Solove, 2007). It can also be used to facilitate cyberstalking (Citron,
2014).
In his conceptual analysis of doxing, Douglas (2016) proposed three categorizations of
doxing based on the loss experienced by the victim. The first category, deanonymization,
describes to the victim’s loss of anonymity as the result of the exposure of any kind of
identifying information (e.g., legal name). Of the three typologies, this presents the least harm to
the victim, depending on the reason they chose to be anonymous in the first place. Targeting
refers to the loss of obscurity, namely the exposure of information that can be used to pinpoint
the victim’s physical location. This type of doxing can present the greatest threat of physical
harm, as the publication of the location data could be follow-ed up in terrestrial spaces (Douglas,
2016). “Swatting,” a form of harassment where police are directed to the victim’s location under
false pretenses, is one example consequences of targeting-based doxing (Mantilla, 2015). The
final category, delegitimization, involves the loss of the victim’s credibility (Douglas, 2016). A
recent example of delegitimization doxing includes the case of Ashley Grames, an oncology
nurse who posted a video proclaiming her disregard for COVID-19 mitigation measures on the
social networking site, TikTok. Users managed to identity Grames and her employer. She was
fired shortly thereafter (Salcedo, 2020).
Doxing is a particularly egregious form of cyberbullying for several reasons. First, the
power imbalance between the perpetrator and victim is increased; the perpetrator remains
protected by a level of anonymity whereas the act itself is characterized as the forceable removal
of anonymity on the part of the victim. Second, if the published PII includes information about
where the victim lives and works, it may link the cyberspace harassment to harassment terrestrial
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spaces, potentially threatening physical violence to the victim and their families (Chen et al.,
2019). Finally, any person can act on the PII provided, meaning subsequent harassment in either
cyberspace or in person can be committed by numerous offenders above and beyond the original
perpetrator. The victims are subject to significant mental trauma, threats to livelihood, and
potentially physical harm.
The website “Nuremburg Files,” created by Neal Horsley in 1997 is arguably an example
of doxing en masse. The website consisted of a list of approximately 200 abortion providers
originally compiled by the American Coalition of Life Activists. The list included the names of
the providers, their family members, addresses, legal records, and photos. While Horsley claimed
that the website was not intended to result in harm to the abortion providers, the list’s fonts were
coded to indicate if the provider was still actively working, if they were injured, or dead. Horsley
was named as a co-conspirator in the civil suit Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, and the website was ordered by the courts to be taken down in 2002, as it presented a
“true threat” and therefore was not protected by the first amendment (Cohen & Connon, 2015).
There is little empirical research on the act of doxing as its own entity as it is typically
included with discussions of cyberbullying and harassment, if it is mentioned at all. Much of the
research on doxing has been primarily qualitative in nature, which has been able to paint a
picture of what doxing is but does not address prevalence and correlates of offending behavior
(Douglas, 2016; Snyder et al., 2017). One of the few exceptions is the work of Chen and
colleagues (2019), who surveyed 2120 secondary students, age 13 to 17, from Hong Kong. Of
their original sample, 12 percent of participants admitted to engaging in doxing behavior.
Perpetrators were more likely to be young females, and preferred social networking sites as their
platform for sharing the data. Male offenders who were categorized as motivated by hostility
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targeted PPI and physical location more frequently than their counterparts. Consistent with
general cyberbullying literature, there was also a significant victim-offender overlap (Chen et al.,
2019).
Anonymity
In July of 1993, the New Yorker published a simple cartoon by Peter Steiner of two dogs
in front of a computer along with the caption, “On the Internet, no one knows you are a dog.”
This image summarized one of the greatest benefits of communicating through the Internet:
anonymity. In the simplest of terms, anonymity is defined as a state of being unidentified or
unknown (Hite et al., 2014). This anonymity may result in the loss of social restrictions and
sense of individuality, and subsequently individuals may disconnect their sense of personal
responsibility for their actions online, psychological phenomena called online disinhibition and
deindividuation (Diener, 1979; Suler, 2004).
However, as with most issues in cybercrime, the issue of achieving anonymity and the
methods used are much more complicated and varies depending on the perspective of the
research. There are multiple vectors by which a person could be identified online. When
participating in online communication, such as on social networking sites, users are given the
choice of presenting their true identity online or they can obscure their identities. This can be
achieved through relatively simple means such as using a pseudonym or using an avatar instead
of an actual image of the user (Scott, 1998). However, anonymity is much harder to achieve
technologically speaking, as computer networks record an infinite amount of data which can be
used to identify users even if communication protections are engaged (Gold, 2014). For example,
the router you use to connect to the Internet at your home will be assigned a unique Internet
Protocol (IP) address by your Internet service provider (ISP). Any Internet activity from your
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router goes through your ISP and will be routed back to your device by using your IP address
(Kaspersky, n.d.). Since your router is the exit point of your home network to connecting to the
Internet at large the IP address assigned to that router is public so all devices outside of your
network that you communicate with will use that address to communicate with your personal
computer network (Kaspersky, n.d.). If exposed, an IP address can be used to identify the general
geographic location of the device as well as the ISP (McIntyre, 2010). In cases of law
enforcement investigations, service providers can be subpoenaed for user information,
specifically for identifying information of the customer who is assigned that IP address
(McIntyre, 2010). When reviewing scholarly research regarding online anonymity, it becomes
apparent that these perspectives of anonymity, communication and technological, dominate the
conversation about anonymity online, but are rarely integrated (Sardá et al., 2019).
The following sections summarize these two approaches to anonymity research and their
impact on behavior online, as well as the psychological mechanisms through which anonymity is
perceived and acted upon.
Anonymity in Communications
Communications scholar, Craig Scott (1998) defined anonymity as “the degree to which
a communicator perceives the message source is unknown and unspecified.” (p. 387). Privacy is
not a requirement for anonymity, as this refers to the visibility of the content of the messaging.
Anonymous communication can be public or private, though the degree of anonymity is on a
continuum from fully anonymous to fully identified. Several types of anonymity were described
in his theoretical model; five are of specific relevance to the current research: pseudonymity,
visual anonymity, discursive anonymity, self-anonymity, and other-anonymity (Scott, 1998).
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Pseudonymity is a unique type of anonymity. Rather than the message source being
unknown, it is assigned a fictitious source. Scott (1998) acknowledged the different
communications dynamics created by pseudonyms, dependent particularly on the observer’s
knowledge of the pseudonym’s fictional status. For example, communication with a user on a
social network who uses an obvious nom de plume will be characterized differently than if the
user was using a believable alias. Visual anonymity refers to the lack of evidence for the physical
source of communication. Discursive anonymity refers to the inability to ascribe communication
to a specific source. The final types are dependent on which side of the communication the
anonymity occurs. When a communicator attempts to send an anonymous message, they will
have a perception of what they believe their anonymity to be in the eyes of others. This is called
self-anonymity. Other-anonymity is the actual perception of anonymity experiences when
receiving communication from an unidentified source (Scott, 1998). Calling back to the
discussion of cyberbullying, perpetrators may use a social network account with a fake or
generic username (pseudonymity), without a profile picture (visual), and no textual clues to their
identity or relationship to the victim (discursive). With each of these types of anonymity already
performed, the offender’s perception of their anonymity is high (self-anonymity). Meanwhile,
the victim of the bullying may have no idea who the bully is, or they may have narrowed down
the source (other-anonymity).
While Scott (1998) was adamant about anonymity existing on a scale, a universal model
used to assess these different levels of anonymity has not been established (Keipi & Oksanen,
2014). Keipi and Oksanen’s (2014) functional scale of anonymity ran from less to fully
anonymous, categorized as three typologies: visual, pseudonymity, and full anonymity. Visual
anonymity referred to situations where the user’s features were hidden or unavailable. In this
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case, those communicating with the user would be aware of the anonymity but were unable to
attribute the communication to a specific person. Pseudonymity was described as users with
fabricated identities which were held for a prolonged period. In this case, there is no suspicion
regarding the anonymity of the user because the fact they are not who they claim to be is
unknown. This is considered less anonymous, however, because the long-term use of the alias
has an increased risk of discovery. The fully anonymous users still used aliases, but these false
identities were used in the short-term, so users were not constrained by reputation or labeling
(Joinson 2001; Keipi & Oksanen, 2014; Pfitzmann & Köhntopp 2000).
Technological Sources of Anonymity
Technologically provided anonymity services are often perceived dichotomously: it
either provides legitimate services (e.g., protecting privacy, freedom of speech, anti-censorship,
protection for whistle blowers, etc.) or it is perceived to facilitate cybercrimes. In Sardá et al.’s
(2019) words, “Online anonymity can be arguably compared to a weapon: on one hand it can be
used to harm; but on the other hand, it is an instrument for self-defense” (p. 560). They
characterized anonymity both technologically and socially. The former refers to how anonymity
is developed (e.g., VPN, TOR, cryptocurrency, etc.), whereas the latter refers to the purpose for
which it is employed for (Sardá et al., 2019). Anonymity technologies allow for a level of
privacy for Internet users through the prevention of recording identifying information, or by
providing false identifying information on behalf of the user (Li et al., 2013). The categories of
technological sources of anonymity covered in this study are anonymous browsing technologies
and cryptocurrency, which are discussed at length below.
Anonymous Browsing Technology. In technological discussions of anonymity,
anonymity refers to the ability of various technologies to prevent the collection of identifying
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data, such as IP addresses. In very simple terms, typical communications between computer
networks and devices begin with a request from the source system for data, such as a website.
This communication is labeled with the originating IP address, so the requested data has an
address to the data return to. If this network traffic is intercepted, the source of the request can be
identified and the contents of the request may be compromised (Kaspersky, n.d.). Anonymous
browsing technologies use a variety of methods to both protect the intercepted communications
through encryption, as well as obscuring the source IP address through the use of proxies (i.e.,
servers unrelated to the source network which pose as the originator of the communication).
These proxies may be available through commercial means or volunteer-owned servers (Li et al.,
2016). While there are multiple technological options for anonymous browsing (e.g., remailers,
Invisible Internet Project, mix networks), the following section reviews the most commonly used
technical anonymizing techniques, proxies, virtual private networks, and Tor (Li et al., 2016).
Simple third-party proxy systems are the easiest anonymizing system to utilize, but they
are also the most unsecure. While the anonymizing proxy removes user IP addresses before
relaying the communication request to the destination address, these systems do not provide
encryption, so outside observers can monitor traffic coming into and out of the server.
Depending on overall traffic levels, a determined observer may be able to figure out which
originating IP address is communicating to the destination through the intermediary (Li et al.,
2016).
A more secure option may be virtual private networks (VPN). Similar to proxy servers,
the VPN server acts as an intermediary to the destination address, so the network traffic is
associated with the VPN and not the originating network. Some VPN providers allow users to
select the preferred geographic location of the VPN server. This feature may be desirable to users
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who are inhibited by regional restrictions to websites (Sardá et al., 2019). A major difference
between proxies and VPNs is encryption security. The network traffic between the originating
network and the VPN is routed through a secure, encrypted tunnel. In other words, any
communication between the originating system and the VPN is protected from interception and
observation (Peters, 2020; Sardá et al., 2019). However, communications between the VPN and
the destination address are not necessarily encrypted. The contents may be visible if intercepted,
but it is not attributed to the originating system (Peters, 2020).
A third option is the Onion Router, a software package that allows users to browse the
internet while protecting them from surveillance and traffic analysis. Arguably, one of the most
well-known and popular of these software packages is Tor (Li et al., 2016). Tor also utilizes
third-party proxy servers; however, instead of using a single proxy, it utilizes several. The first
proxy (called the onion proxy) connects to the Tor overlay network. Instead of connecting with
the destination address immediately, the request is routed through multiple other proxies before
connecting with the exit node. At this point, the request is sent to the destination address. Each of
the connections within the Tor overlay network are encrypted, though the connection between
the exit node and destination is not (Li et al., 2016). “The idea is similar to using a twisty, hardto-follow route in order to throw off somebody who is tailing you — and then periodically
erasing your footprints” (The Tor Project, n.d., n.p.). Designed for web browsing and instant
messaging, Tor has several legitimate applications such as sensitive communication, intelligence
gathering, and law enforcement operations (Li et al., 2013; The Tor Project, n.d.).
Cryptocurrency. Utilizing anonymous browsing software may require a certain level of
expertise to navigate; however, less computer-savvy individuals can still benefit from the use of
cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrency is a broad term encompassing multiple types of digital money
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in the form of intangible tokens. They operate as decentralized monetary systems (i.e., they are
not connected to government backed banking systems) and utilize cryptography in the creation
of the currency and in the processing of transactions. While there are numerous examples of
cryptocurrency (e.g., Dogecoin, Zcash, Litecoin, etc.), the most well-known is Bitcoin.
Meiklejohn and colleagues (2013) define Bitcoin as “a purely online virtual currency,
unbacked by either physical commodities or sovereign obligation; instead, it relies on a
combination of cryptographic protection and a peer-to-peer protocol for witnessing settlements”
(p. 1). Proposed in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto (presumed to be a pseudonym), and adopted in
2009, Bitcoin was formed as an alternative to trust-based models of Internet commerce. A major
complaint about standard electronic payment systems was that they could not offer a nonreversible transaction; third parties could not guarantee that the money earmarked for the
exchange was not previously spent or that it even existed (Nakamoto, 2008). For example, in the
realm of physical currencies, when cash is exchanged for services, there is a certainty that the
money is real, and it cannot be spent twice by the same person. A check, however, is not a
guaranteed form of payment; the check can bounce, which leaves the seller to dispute the fraud.
This is paralleled in electronic currency systems. Nakamoto’s proposal involved creating a peerto-peer virtual currency that would be built and coded in a way that would guarantee against
double spending using public transaction records. This would remove the need for a trusted third
party (e.g., banks, credit card companies, etc.) (Nakamoto, 2008; Moore & Christin, 2013).
Bitcoins are added into circulation through a process referred to as “mining;” new
Bitcoins are distributed randomly to nodes, any device with an IP address, which were involved
with the completion of a complex mathematical coding equation. This process is adjusted every
two weeks, resulting in 6 distribution sets an hour. In other words, new Bitcoin are made
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available based off a specific, calculated pattern. With the help of coders, they are added to
circulation. The mining operation is complex and involves a certain level of coding and hardware
knowledge; most laymen become involved in mining by offering computational power, allowing
their devices to be used to help solve the mathematical equation though programs running in the
background, also known pool mining (Brezo & Bringas, 2012).
Bitcoin in of itself is not illegal in the United States, though it is not recognized as legal
tender. In fact, it has gained recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of the U.S. government; the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report acknowledging that Bitcoin and
other virtual currencies were being used to purchase real goods and services, and could be
exchanged for U.S. currency (GAO, 2013). As a result of that report, the IRS declared Bitcoin as
taxable property in 2014 (IRS, 2014). This does not mean the U.S. government is unaware of the
problems Bitcoin raises when considering criminal enterprising. The Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) acknowledged concerns about the decentralized nature of
Bitcoin, irrevocable transactions, and anonymity it provides as they make Bitcoin a desirable
technology supplementing criminal activities (FinCEN, 2013).
While the goal of Bitcoin was to remove dependence on a third party, most users are not
skilled enough to earn Bitcoin outside of an exchange. These exchange systems allow users to
convert traditional currencies into Bitcoin. Other common third-party services include Bitcoin
wallets, services that offer to host Bitcoin storage in the cloud rather than on the user’s hard drive
so they can access it at any time (Brezo & Bringas, 2012; Meiklejohn et al. 2013). Some Bitcoin
exchanges require users to register with personal identifying information in a similar fashion as
mainstream e-wallet companies, such as PayPal. For clientele that prioritize their anonymity,
some exchange companies do not require the use of identification; however, the client is at a
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higher risk of being victimized. The irrevocable nature of Bitcoin transactions leaves no room for
recourse for victims of Bitcoin theft (Moore & Christin, 2013).
Bitcoin transactions are permanently and publicly logged; recording the chain of
transactions stemming from its entrance into circulation is necessary feature of its design
(Nakamoto, 2008; Meiklejohn et al., 2013). Anonymity was not a goal in the development of
Bitcoin; however, the protocol does not include specific identifying information about the user
outside of the public key (Nakamoto, 2008; Brezo & Bringas, 2012; Meiklejohn et al., 2013).
This affords the user a level of privacy, but “the risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed,
linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner” (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 6),
which can be especially problematic if the other public key in the transaction is a known or
suspected vender. Meiklejohn et al. (2013) accurately describes the currency at pseudoanonymous, stating that “while not explicitly tied to real-world individuals or organizations, all
transactions are completely transparent” (p. 1).
The combination of irrevocable transactions with the pseudo-anonymity makes Bitcoin
particularly appealing to criminals looking to steal from other users or use Bitcoin for illicit
activity. Nevertheless, large scale thefts are not feasible as the theft is visible and traceable
through the Bitcoin block chain. One example of the traceability of such crimes involved theft of
923 Bitcoin from the mining pool, Ozcoin. The amount was transferred into a Bitcoin wallet,
where it was intercepted and returned to the mining pool (Meiklejohn et al., 2013). Other largescale operations are traced with the same logic. In order to avoid detection, users may utilize
multiple public keys; the transactions would appear as separate and unrelated to one another
(Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Nakamoto, 2008). Other methods of increasing anonymity while using
Bitcoin include using anonymous browsing techniques, as previously discussed, or conducting
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multiple transfers as to not draw attention. Small scale operations attract little attention; there is
no visible difference between legitimate and illicit transactions on the block chain. Admittedly,
avoiding traceability “would require a significant effort on the part of the user…this loss of
usability is unlikely to appeal to all but the most motivated users (such as criminals)”
(Meiklejohn et al., 2013, p.13). These users will have a strong knowledge of computing (Brezo
& Bringas, 2012), or are willing to put in the effort to learn how to use it (Hout & Bingham,
2013); law enforcement agencies face an uphill battle in identifying suspicious activity and
identifying owners of the public keys (Meiklejohn et al., 2013).
The Psychology of Online Anonymity
Online Disinhibition & Deindividuation. Up to this point, anonymity has been
identified as an influencing factor in the perpetration of acts of cybercrime and deviance, but the
question remains, why does anonymity matter? Why does it affect behavior online, especially in
ways that may not be present in analogous acts of terrestrial crime? One explanation is a
psychological phenomenon called the online disinhibition effect. Suler (2004) posited that online
disinhibition occurs when social expectations and inhibitions that usually exist during face-toface interaction are relaxed because individuals perceive themselves to be an anonymous entity
in an anonymous whole. As a result, these individuals disconnect themselves from responsibility
for the actions they take in these online environments. Negative behaviors resulting from this
psychological process is referred to as toxic disinhibition, positive or neutral behaviors are
benign (Suler, 2004). Several factors which may account for the loosening of inhibitions:
dissociative anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjection, dissociative
imagination, attenuated status and authority, and individual differences (Suler, 2004). Another
psychological explanation of negative behavior online is deindividuation. Originally a theory of
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group dynamics, deindividuation argues that individuals may lose their sense of individuality and
personal responsibility when afforded the anonymity of belonging to a group, leading to a
decrease in self-regulation and self-evaluation (Diener, 1979). Applied to online environments,
the group membership is implied to be that of other users in the online environment.
Both perspectives have been utilized in research on cyberbullying behavior to explain the
effect of anonymity on cyberbullying perpetration (Huang et al., 2020; Udris, 2014; Wachs et al.,
2019; Wright et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2017). Udris (2014) created an 11-item measurement to
assess online disinhibition levels of both the toxic and benign varieties. In the study of Japanese
high school students, it was found that both toxic and benign online disinhibition are positively
correlated with cyberbullying perpetration, though toxic disinhibition was more likely to result in
cyberbullying (Udris, 2014). Another study comparing junior high school, high school, and
university student responses to cyberbullying scenarios identified toxic disinhibition as a
consistent predictor of past cyberbullying perpetration (Huang et al., 2020). Wachs and collegues
(2019) studied the relationship between cyberbullying and toxic disinhibition on the perpetration
of cyberhate, which is bias-based cyberaggression. They found that prior cyberbullying behavior
and higher levels of online disinhibition were positively related to cyberhate perpetration,
especially in interaction with each other (Wachs et al., 2019).
Regarding how anonymity informs online disinhibition, there is some debate regarding
the importance of anonymity. In work on adolescent cyberbullying by Wright and colleagues
(2019), self-reported online disinhibition was found to be highly correlated with cyberbullying in
both scenarios where the cyberbully was fully identified and anonymous, indicating that
anonymity may not be as important that the psychological state of the individual (Wright et al.,
2019). On the other hand, in their analysis of a sample of 530 adults, Wu and colleagues (2017)

35

developed a structural equation model of toxic disinhibition, combining the elements of online
disinhibition and deindividuation. They found dissociative anonymity is partially mediated
through deindividuation, indicating that anonymity informs deindividuation, which in turn
informs toxic disinhibition.
Objective Versus Perceived Anonymity. Operationalizations of anonymity are most
often objective and dichotomous in nature; that is, an individual engagement in an anonymizing
behavior determines whether they are anonymous or not (Hite et al., 2014; Scott, 1998). A key
consideration often overlooked in anonymity research is the importance of individual perceptions
of anonymity acting as a moderator in the relationship between anonymity and offending
behaviors. In other words, objective reality indicates an individual’s actual anonymity or lack
thereof. This reality may inform an individual’s belief of what their anonymity status may be
(Chen & Li, 2016; Tsikerdekis, 2013; Wu & Atkin, 2018), but it is ultimately this internalized
belief which influences behavior (Hite et al., 2014; Scott, 1998). In his conceptual study of
anonymity as a research concept, Scott (1998) acknowledged, “Although certain processes and
technologies may claim to be anonymous (or not), usage behavior likely depends far more on the
extent to which communicators perceive anonymity” (p. 387). This does not mean that objective
anonymity has no impact on behavior, but it does raise questions about how objective reality
may be filtered through perception. From a risk reduction perspective, if an individual’s
perception of anonymity is low, it does not matter how much anonymity is provided objectively
– the risk will not be believed to be reduced and the individual will be less likely to commit the
act. In the same vein, over confidence in anonymity will lead an individual to offend when the
risk is still objectively high.
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One reason the perception and reality of anonymity may not align is a lack of knowledge.
According to Park (2011), “knowledge plays a critical role in privacy behavior, the levels of
understanding of surveillance practices common in websites remain minuscule among the
majority of users” (p. 232). For example, if someone does not understand how Bitcoin works,
they may believe the currency offers anonymity as a matter of course. The reality is Bitcoin is
only private insofar as the public key is not connected to the user (Nakamoto, 2008). Without
that knowledge, the user could negate their anonymity through human error. Like objective
anonymity, technological knowledge should inform the perception of anonymity. A significant
lack of understanding may dissuade individuals from trusting these behaviors because of a fear
of using them incorrectly or simply a belief that they are incapable of providing anonymity.
Alternatively, extensive knowledge may lead to a cynical perception of anonymity. Therefore, it
may be useful to assess low skill, mid-level skill, and highly skill users for comparative
differences in both perception of anonymity and offending behaviors.
The question then is, does perceived anonymity online impact behavior? Prior research
findings of studies utilizing measures of perceived anonymity have been mixed. Several studies
have shown no relationship between perceptions of anonymity and cyberbullying behavior (Kim,
2018; Kim et al., 2019; Lianos & McGrath, 2018) or conformity (Tsikerdekis, 2013). However,
in the work of Wu and Atkin (2018), perceived anonymity was predictive of willingness to post
personal opinions on news discussion boards. Existing research does support the indirect effects
of perceived anonymity, on the other hand. In their work on information sharing behaviors, Chen
and colleagues (2019) identified perceived anonymity’s impact on information sharing behaviors
as being fully mediated by intrinsic motivation. Work by Nguyen and colleagues (2019)
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identified perceived anonymity as playing an indirect role in the disengagement of behavior
(termination of social media accounts) through the factor of perceived credibility.
Application to Current Study
While physical anonymity is possible in terrestrial spaces (e.g., the archetype of the
masked robber, or the use of false identities in fraud) there is a greater risk of identification that
may limit the willingness of individuals to participate in the terrestrial counterparts of cyberenabled crimes (Scott, 1998). To be clear, this study does not intend to compare terrestrial crime
and cybercrime. Instead, it focuses on anonymity providing behaviors that may influence the
willingness to commit various acts of cyber-enabled crimes and deviance in the general
population. This is in part because one of the primary differences between crimes carried out
solely in terrestrial environments and cyber-enabled crimes is the increased level of anonymity
available, even to novice users (Barlett et al., 2016; Sticca & Perren, 2013).
The decision to exclude cyber-dependent crime perpetration from this study is due to the
specialized skillsets, knowledge, and education necessary to commit cyber-dependent crimes
(Chiesa et al., 2008; Holt, 2007; Weulen Kranenbarg et al., 2019; Weulen Kranenbarg et al.,
2018), making these types of cybercrimes inappropriate for study for this dissertation’s broad
target population. While several of the anonymity providing behaviors used in this study are
technologically based, their individual functions were explained in the appropriate vignettes.
This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
The current study analyzes anonymity as a form of risk reduction using a combination of
experimental variables from both communication and computer science perspectives. These
behaviors include the use of pseudonyms, use of various anonymous browsing applications or IP
blocking software, cryptocurrency, and escrow services. On their own, these behaviors provide a
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level of anonymity (Barlett et al., 2016); however, from a risk reduction perspective, the
combination of these practices could create a wall of anonymity to further protect the users from
identification. Combining these risk reduction strategies creates layered security, which may
increase individuals’ willingness to offend. This aligns with Scott’s (1998) theoretical model of
anonymity occurring on continuum of fully anonymous to fully identified.
The following chapter discusses the theories of rational choice and deterrence which may
explain how and why the availability of anonymizing behaviors may operate as risk reduction
strategies, and therefore could increase the willingness to participate in drug cryptomarkets,
cyberbullying, and doxing as compared to scenarios where these protections are not available.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction
This chapter outlines the theoretical perspectives that inform this dissertation’s
hypotheses and measures. It begins with a discussion of classical criminology, then outlines the
historical context of rational choice and deterrence before addressing contemporary models of
both. It then shifts prior applications of rational choice and deterrence theories on cybercrime
and cyberdeviance. The chapter will conclude with an outline of how these theoretical
perspectives apply to the current study.
Classical Criminology, Rational Choice, & Deterrence
The Classical School of criminology rose as a part of the Enlightenment Era. It is rooted
in the idea that man acts upon “a kind of free-will rationalistic hedonism” (Bernard et al., 2010,
p. 14). The main perspectives of the Classical School include separate, but intertwined areas of
study focused on the free-will of offenders and the decision-making processes that result in
antisocial behavior: rational choice and deterrence (Bernard et al., 2010). Its rise to popularity in
the mid-18th century aligned with major social changes, particularly the French and American
Revolutions. As a result, the underlying philosophies informed much of the criminal justice
policies developed at that time. The influence of Classical criminology can be seen to this day,
even as positivist theories have rose in popularity. The rational choice component of Classical
criminology focuses on the process by which offenders calculate costs and benefits of a criminal
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or deviant act. By understanding this process and what factors strongly influence the decision to
offend, policies could be developed to manipulate these calculations in favor of prosocial
behavior (Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009). The following sections discuss the
intellectual history of rational choice and deterrence perspectives, their contemporary evolution,
and how these perspectives have been utilized in studies of cybercrime. The chapter will
conclude with a discussion of how these perspectives apply to the current study.
Intellectual History of Rational Choice & Deterrence
Often referred to as a theory, rational choice may be better described as a philosophical
perspective or paradigm (Wright & Decker, 1996). The idea of rational choice follows the
assumption that human behavior is the result of free will and choice. It has been argued that man
chooses to act pro-socially not out of moral obligation, but out of a desire to avoid consequences.
We can see this as early as the writings of Plato (375/2017). In Book II of Plato's Republic,
Plato's brother, Glaucon led a debate on the subject of the nature of man. He argued that man
only does the right thing because it is required of them. If an individual had the power to do
otherwise, they would act in their best favor, regardless of if the act were just or unjust. He then
goes on to tell the myth of the Ring of Gyges. In the story, the ring had the power to provide the
wearer with true invisibility, and Gyges used this power to commit multiple unjust acts. One
could argue the Gyges was an inherently unjust individual. However, Glaucon went on to
propose a thought experiment: if there were two rings, one worn by an unjust man and one worn
by a just man, would the just man act righteously or in a manner that benefits his own selfinterest, like the unjust man? For example, if he was hungry would he steal food when no one
would know he did it? According to Glaucon’s perspective, the behaviors of both men would be
the same. An individual’s decision to behave in a way that is acceptable to society is
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intentionally made. With the absence of individual consequence, there is nothing stopping a
person from behaving in the way that best suits them, regardless of it hurt or damage it may
cause. Individual consequence, ranging from corporal punishment to loss of reputation, prevents
deviation from societal expectations of behavior (Plato, 375/2017).
This philosophical perspective fell out of favor for some time, replaced with religious
philosophies of deviance (Kubrin et al., 2009). It began to see a resurgence in the 1600s when
there was a philosophical shift to more naturalistic views of behavior as opposed to viewing
deviance as a sign of a sinful nature. Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) reflected similar
sentiments as Glaucon: people will naturally act in a manner favorable to their own interests
without consideration of how it may affect others. Hobbes expanded this further, acknowledging
the “war of all against all” would become untenable, as no one would be safe if they were to only
lookout for themselves. Therefore, there was a need for what he called a “social contract”.
Fundamentally, a social contract is an informal agreement by individuals to follow the rules of
their society, as long as others within that society follow the same rules as well. Members of the
society may have to sacrifice some freedom, but they gain safety and security in exchange
(Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009). However, for the social contract to work, there also
needed to be an enforcement mechanism. According to Hobbes (1651), the responsibility of
enforcement belongs to the state. This enforcement is achieved through law and punishment
(Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009, Tibbets, 2015).
Utilitarian philosophers and penal reformists, Cesare Beccaria (1764/1963) and Jeremy
Bentham (1781/2000), took these ideas a step further and applied them to the hedonistic
calculous of criminal behavior. The foundation of their perspective regarding rational choice is
that man will act in a way to maximize pleasure and reduce pain, even if the act is criminal.
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Crime occurs when the potential benefits outweigh the potential consequences or when
committing the crime is easier than abiding the law (Beccaria, 1764/1963; Bentham, 1781/2000;
Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009). To prevent crime, the threat of punishment for
wrongdoing needed to be strong enough to outweigh the benefits of participating in the crime.
Like Hobbes, Beccaria and Bentham saw the threat and follow through of punishment was the
responsibility of the state. This is the foundation of deterrence theory.
Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments (1764/1963) outlined both his conceptualization
of crime, namely that crime should be defined by the harm the act does to society, as well and his
perspectives on what constitutes effective deterrence policy. It is important to reiterate that
Beccaria was a utilitarian philosopher and penal reformist. He believed that society should
operate in a way that provided the greatest good for the greatest number of people, and while the
government had the right to punish members of its community, this punishment should be
proportional to the severity of the offense. Additionally, the punishment should serve two
purposes: the deterrence of future offenses by the perpetrator (specific deterrence), and
deterrence of similar acts by other members of society (general deterrence) (Beccaria,
1764/1963).
According to Beccaria (1764/1963), for deterrence policies to be effective in reducing
criminal behavior, three elements are required: certainty, severity, and celerity. Certainty refers
to the belief that punishment is a forgone conclusion or there is a chance of impunity. If the
chance of punishment is high or guaranteed, the risk may be high enough to negate the perceived
benefit. However, if the certainty is low, the deterrent effect of the sanction will be negated as
there will be a low impact on risk.
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As alluded to earlier, Beccaria’s (1764/1963) position on proportional punishment is
founded in his perspectives of penal reform. He felt that if a punishment was not severe enough,
it will not deter the crime. Additionally, he noted that if the threatened punishment is too severe,
the offender may be motivated to commit a greater crime as well as they have nothing additional
to lose.
Celerity, also known as swiftness, refers to the speed by which the punishment is
delivered in response to the act. Beccaria (1764/1963) believed that in order for punishments to
have a lasting and stronger impact on the psyche, the punishment needs to occur within a
timeframe where the cause-and-effect relationship between crime and punishment is clear. In
practice, this effects two components of the criminal justice system: time to arrest, and time from
arrest to conviction. Significant delays undermine the deterrent effect of a certain and severe
punishment. Each of these components applied to individual offenders serves the purpose of
deterring future offenses by that person, referred to as specific deterrence. Key to deterring other
members of society from committing similar offenses, referred to as general deterrence, is the
communication of these punishments to the public (Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009).
Bentham (1781/2000) expanded on the rational choice and deterrence framework by
focusing on the concepts of pleasure and pain. More specifically, he discussed the sources of
pleasure and pain, the circumstances that determine the value that is placed on that pleasure or
pain, as well as describing 14 types of pleasure and 12 types of pain that may motivate behavior.
The four sources’ sanctions were broken down as follows: physical, political, moral, religious.
Physical sanction referred to the immediate or expected pleasure or pain associated with an act,
such as sensation. Political sanction refers to the formal source of reward or punishment from
authority figures such as a judge or official entity. Moral sanctions are responses from informal
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sources within the community. Religious sanction is reward or punishment for an act by a divine
being. This can be perceived as immediate or as a future response, including that of the afterlife
(Bentham, 1781/2000). Notably, in traditional deterrence theory, it is only political sanctions that
are considered (Akers et al., 2017). Sources of informal sanctions were not incorporated into the
theory until Paternoster incorporated them in 1985.
Important to the discussion of hedonistic calculus is the value an individual places on
types of pain or pleasure associated with the act. According to Bentham (1781/2000) these
values will be higher or lower depending on four circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty or
uncertainty, and propinquity or remoteness. He goes further to note that the likelihood the act
will produce sensations of the same variety (fecundity) and the likelihood the act will not be
followed by sensations of the opposite kind (purity) may also affect the values associated with
the action. These pleasures and pains include, but are not limited to, pleasures of sense, skill,
wealth, and power or pains of senses, awkwardness, and an ill name. By understanding the
source of these factors, as well as how their importance is determined, more specific deterrence
interventions can be developed.
Contemporary Perspectives of Rational Choice & Deterrence
Classical criminology and rational choice fell out of favor in the late 19th century as
positivist perspectives began to rise in popularity. Rather than criminal behavior being a choice
based on rational hedonistic calculous, it is believed there is something different about criminals
versus non-criminals, whether those differences were internal or the result of societal structures
(Akers et al. 2017; Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009). Concerns about rising crime rates in
the later 20th century prompted a shift back towards classical perspectives, with new research
expanding on the concepts (Cullen & Agnew, 2011; Tibbetts, 2015).
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Rational Choice Perspective. Clarke and Cornish (1985) criticized economic models of
rational choice, such as Becker’s (1968), as too idealized and abstract to test and therefore
developed their own model, which they referred to as a rational choice perspective rather than a
theory. Underpinning Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) perspective was:
the assumption that offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal behaviour; that
this involves the making of decisions and of choices, however rudimentary on occasion
these processes might be; and that these processes exhibit a measure of rationality, albeit
constrained by limits of time and ability and the availability of relevant information (p.
1).
Their perspective broke the process down into two parts: criminal involvement and criminal
events. Criminal involvement is the discussion of what factors influence certain individuals
choose to participate in crime as well as the rational thought process that leads to the decision to
act. For example, background demographic factors and prior experience may impact the
decision-making process when individual needs arise. The calculus for a solution to meet those
needs will indicate if the decision to act could be made. It is important to note that Clarke and
Cornish acknowledged that criminal involvement be parsed out further into three decision stages
(initial, continuance, and desistance) to understand criminal careers and how new knowledge
may be incorporated into the process.
Criminal event refers to the circumstances of the potential crime. For example, their own
study posited a scenario with residential burglary. Part of the decision-making process was
choosing a residence that was easily accessed and did not have anyone home. Additionally, the
cognitive processes used in the criminal decision-making process may vary between different
crimes. So according to this rational choice perspective, empirical studies of the decision-making
process need to be specific to the crime (Braga, 2012; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cullen & Agnew,
2011; Tibbetts, 2015).
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Contemporary Deterrence Theory. Like discussions of rational choice, deterrence
regained popularity in the 1970s, in part due to the perceived failure of rehabilitation programs
informed by deterministic theories of criminality (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Kubrin et al., 2009).
The modern interpretation of deterrence did not deviate far from the version first posited by
Beccaria and Bentham. Crime was still seen as a choice following the weighing of potential risk
and reward. Additionally, the elements of certainty, severity, and celerity were still considered
key elements of deterrence. However, Gibbs (1986) considered this too simplistic and posited
three premises and two corollaries of a contemporary model of deterrence.
Premise I: A direct relationship obtains between the objective properties of punishment
and their perceptual properties.
Premise II: A direct relationship obtains between the perceptual properties of punishment
and deterrence.
Premise III: An inverse relationship obtains between deterrence and some kind of crime
rate.
Corollary I: An inverse relationship obtains between the perceptual properties of
punishments and some kind of crime rate.
Corollary II: An inverse relationship obtains between the objective properties of
punishments and some kind of crime rate (p. 324).
To put this in simpler terms, the reality of punishment informs the perception of punishment. It is
this perception that informs the effectiveness of deterrence. As deterrence increases, the crime
rate should decrease. Logically, this should also mean that perceptual and objective properties of
punishment should also be negatively correlated with crime rates (Gibbs, 1986; Kubrin et al.,
2009). Arguably, the most important component of this expansion is the acknowledgement of
perception. Within the deterrence rational choice framework, an act only happens following the
intentional thought process of the individual offender. How they perceive the punishment is more
important than the objective reality of that punishment in informing their rational calculus
(Geerken & Gove, 1975). For example, individuals who are unaware of official sanctions for an
act cannot and will not include those risks in their consideration. Alternatively, individuals may
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believe a sanction to be much worse than it is objectively, and therefore decide the act is not
worth the punishment, even if that perceived punishment is not reflective of reality.
Discussions of deterrence were also expanded beyond the concept of absolute deterrence,
the decision to either abstain or engage in behavior (Andenaes, 1952), to also include
conversations about restrictive deterrence, or the reduction of criminal behavior as the result of
punishment or the threat thereof (Gibbs, 1975). In other words, deterrence can work on a
spectrum from no impact, to partial impact, to full curtailment of behavior (Gibbs, 1975).
Offenders change their behavior as a type of risk avoidance, evading detection while still
receiving some benefit of participating in the act (Jacobs, 1996). Some of the changes in criminal
behavior identified in restrictive deterrence literature have included changes in tactics or duration
of behavior (Maimon et al., 2014) and changes in the size of operations (Nguyen et al., 2015).
An additional change being incorporated into some contemporary studies of deterrence is
the inclusion of deterrence from sources other than legal entities. Informal deterrence is defined
as the “actual or anticipated social sanctions and other consequences of crime and deviance that
prevent their occurrence or reoccurrence” (Akers et al., 2017, p. 22). Research by Paternoster
(1985) found that informal sanctions, such as censure by family and friends, does have a
deterrent effect on behavior. Additional research on informal sanctions has shown in some cases,
informal controls have a greater deterrent effect than formal sources of punishment (Green,
1989; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Pratt et al., 2006). This effect can work hand in hand with
formal punishment when the formal punishment activates the informal sanction as well,
reinforcing the impact of the direct punishment (Williams & Hawkins, 1989; Zimring &
Hawkins, 1973). However, research on the cumulative effect of formal and informal sanctions
has been mixed (Akers et al., 2017; Nagin & Paternoster, 1991).
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Some criminological researchers are critical of the inclusion of variables from positivist
criminological theories such as social bonding and social learning. They view deterrence theory
solely as a measure of the impact of legal sanctions on the willingness to offend (Akers et al.,
2017; Gibbs 1986). They believe any findings in deterrence research that uses these variables
should be interpreted as supporting other theories rather than representing an expansion of
deterrence theory (Akers et al., 2017). However, this ignores studies of general deviance, where
acts may not be socially acceptable, but are not illegal. If only the impact of legal sanctions can
be studied using deterrence theory, this type of deviance cannot be addressed using the theory.
While informal and formal-nonlegal sanctions could be argued as reflections of positivist
theories, Bentham’s work An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1781/2000) clearly states that sanctions come from a variety of sources. Informal sanctions were
categorized as physical, moral, and/or religious as the original theory was formed. Threats of
sanctions, regardless of the source, may serve in the role of deterrent. If these sources of
sanctions are seen as legitimate and important, they should have an impact regardless of the
mechanism.
Much of contemporary deterrence and rational choice research focuses on the impact of
punishment risk on the decision to offend; that is not to say none of the contemporary research
discusses the impact of rewards on the decision-making process (Kubrin et al., 2009). For
example, Shover’s (1996) qualitative study of theft offenders indicated that participants’ who
perceived an act of armed robbery as having high intrinsic rewards versus an act of burglary
having low intrinsic rewards would choose to commit the robbery, even though the severity of
the offense was greater. This trend was reversed when the perception of the rewards changed
(Shover, 1996). Baker and Piquero (2010) organized benefits into two distinct concepts: psychic
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and material. Psychic benefits are the intangible rewards for participating in an act such as
excitement, pleasure, or reputation (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993) whereas material benefits refer
to the perception that the act will result in gains of tangible items or money (Fagan & Piquero,
2007). In their meta-analysis of research studying psychic and material benefits impact on
offending, Baker and Piquero (2010) identified 13 studies estimating the impact of 40 types of
rewards on offenses such as theft, physical assault, and corporate crime. Of those 40 estimates,
70% reported a positive significant relationship between rewards and the decision to offend
(Baker & Piquero, 2010).
Application of Rational Choice and Deterrence Theory on Cybercrime and Deviance
One of the issues faced by cybercrime researchers is that traditional criminal logical
theories were designed before the Internet. Unfortunately, this means that there is very little
guidance as to how it can it be applied when discussing virtual spaces and interactions (Holt &
Bossler, 2016). Additionally, there is very few secondary data sources, official or otherwise, that
pertain to cybercrime. Much of cybercrime research is based off data collected through
interviews with hackers, data collection from online forums, and student surveys. As a result,
some cyber-enabled crime research is focused on low-level offenses (such as digital piracy and
cyberbullying) and tends to have low generalizability (Bossler, 2017; Holt & Bossler, 2016).
Therefore, application and testing of theoretical perspectives on cybercrime, including rational
choice and deterrence frameworks, has been challenging. The lack of empirical evidence has not
stopped governments from implementing legislation intended to deter offenses. For example, the
CAN SPAM Act was designed to impact the total amount of spam communication sent within
the United States. However, research indicated the law had no impact on spam distribution
within the United States (Kigerl, 2009). It is important, then, to understand the mechanisms that
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may actually impact and deter behavior. Cyber-enabled crimes such as digital piracy and
cyberbullying compose the majority of existing empirical discussions in this area, though several
research studies have also evaluated risk calculus within rational choice and deterrence
frameworks of cryptomarket trade. A discussion of these studies is included below.
Digital Piracy
Digital piracy, a crime characterized as the act of acquiring digital copies of intellectual
property without payment to the creator, owner, or producer of the content (Holt & Brown,
2018). The illicitly obtained property can be music, visual media, books, software, and more.
The logic behind the application of deterrence theory of studies of digital piracy follows that
offenders commit piracy because the gratification of immediate desires, namely access to the
pirated materials for free, outweighs the risks of punishment in part because the certainty of
being caught is low due to the difficulty law enforcement faces in identifying offenders (Higgins,
2007; Lowry et al., 2017; Wall, 2005; Vida et al., 2012). Digital pirates may utilize anonymizing
tactics, such as IP obscuring software discussed in chapter two, to disconnect their real location
from the information recorded (Larsson et al., 2013). Much like its terrestrial counterpart,
research has found the element of certainty to have the strongest deterrent impact on behavior
rather than increased threat of severity (Higgins et al., 2005; Kos Koklic et al., 2014; Yoon,
2011).
Incorporation of the informal sanctions into deterrence research on digital piracy have
also resulted in findings similar to crimes committed in terrestrial spaces. Namely, informal
controls appear to have a greater impact on the decision to participate in digital piracy than the
threat of formal punishment (Wang & McClung, 2012; Wolfe et al., 2008). However, this impact
decreases when the sources of informal sanctions, such as family and peers, are supportive of
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digital piracy (Al-Rafee & Cronan, 2006). Some researchers contend that this may be an issue of
differential reinforcement (Edwards & Bossler, 2018). However, within the deterrence
framework, it could be argued this is related to the elements of certainty and severity. If you are
not likely to be censured, there is no deterrent increasing the risk calculus. This interpretation
aligns with qualitative research on digital piracy by Holt and Copes (2010), whose study
participants reported a low perception of risk for formal sanctions generally, with one participant
comparing the likelihood of being caught offending to the change of being hit by lightning (Holt
& Copes, 2010). Even with the low perception of formal risk, the study participants reported
engaging in risk reduction behaviors such as limiting the number of active downloads or using
encryption software, in alignment with restrictive deterrence frameworks (Holt & Copes, 2010).
Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying is defined as any “willful and repeated harm inflicted through computers,
cell phones, and other electronic devices” (Hinduja & Patchin, 2015, p. 11). This can include
stalking and harassment behaviors, and is not limited to juvenile offenders (Li, 2006; Lowry et
al., 2016). Application of rational choice and deterrence frameworks to cyberbullying and
harassment is less common than the previously discussed subjects of hacking and digital piracy.
In part this is due to a focus on cyberbullying victimization rather than perpetration (Patchin &
Hinduja, 2018), as well as research in this area favoring positivist theories such as strain (see
Hay et al., 2010, Lianos & McGrath, 2018). A notable exception is the work of Patchin and
Hinduja (2018). A sample of 1,091 middle school students were surveyed regarding their
perceptions of punishment from both informal and formal sources as well as their participation in
bullying and cyberbullying. The results indicated that informal sources of sanction, such as those
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from their parents and school, were more effective in deterring bullying behavior than threats of
formal sanctions from police.
While Lianos and McGrath’s (2018) cyberbullying research focused on testing the impact
of self-control and strain on cyberbullying perpetration, they included measures of anonymity
perception. They found that higher levels of perceived anonymity were associated with a greater
level of cyberbullying. Through the lens of rational choice, it would appear lower risks of
attribution of behavior encourages bullying behavior.
Cryptomarket Trade
As stated in Holt, et al. (2015), cyber offenders “do not passively accept risk” (p. 81).
Their research focused on risk reduction strategies used by both buyers and vendors in illegal
data markets, which found several common risk reduction techniques, such as hosting markets
on discrete websites, the use of forum moderation, solicitation and publishing of buyer feedback,
and the availability of escrow services (Holt et al., 2015; see also Martin et al., 2019). Each of
these different strategies address different types of risks involved in illicit transactions, whether it
is protection from detection by law enforcement or protection from being scammed in the
financial transaction (Holt et al., 2015). Qualitative interviews with cryptomarket drug vendors
revealed active risk-benefit calculus as an influence on choosing to participate in online markets
rather than terrestrial trade. Specifically, respondents reported greater monetary benefits while
vending in online spaces and perceptions of lower detection risks (Martin et al., 2020). The
monetary rewards were not the only benefit identified; psychic rewards of empowerment, thrill,
and freedom were all described by respondents (Martin et al., 2020).
Research on customers in cryptomarkets has also shown support for theories of risk
reduction and rational choice. Buyers of cryptomarket sourced drugs were surveyed also reported
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reduced risk in cryptomarkets versus terrestrial drug markets. Participants were six times more
likely to experience threats to their safety or experiences of violence when purchasing drugs
through alternative means as compared to cryptomarkets (Barratt et al., 2016). Alternative
markets also put them at higher risk for receiving poorer quality product and detection by law
enforcement (Barratt et al., 2016).
Application to Current Study
Established above, the underlying concept behind rational choice and the role of
deterrence is the hedonistic calculus of pain versus pleasure, risk versus benefit (Beccaria,
1764/1963; Bentham, 1781/2000; Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009). Typical discussions
of deterrence focus on activating risk avoidance through the threat of punishment to prevent
unwanted behavior (Jacobs, 1996). However, using this logic, it is safe to assume the effect of
protective measures available to or taken by potential offenders will alter this calculus in favor of
the offense. Specific to this study is the protective role various anonymizing behaviors can
create. As discussed in the previous chapter, anonymity providing technologies and
pseudonymity practices have been demonstrated to have some impact on cyberdeviance (Barlett
et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2017) and are advocated for due to the privacy they
provide (Tor Project, n.d.). Participation benefits may be constant, but the risk in scenarios where
anonymizing behaviors are in practice may shift the calculus where the risk is low enough to
pursue the benefit. This reduction of risk potentially can be increased if multiple behaviors are
used in unison. This is the underlying logic that forms the theoretical framework of the current
study. Additionally, this study incorporates measures of fear of various informal and formal
sanctions as outlined in contemporary deterrence theory.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
CURRENT STUDY

Introduction
As discussed in Chapter Two, previous research regarding the role of anonymity in cyber
deviance has primarily been approached as either a discussion of anonymity providing
technology from a computer science perspective or has focused on communication anonymity
(pseudonymity) as being present or absent. Additionally, few studies have compared the effects
of anonymity across various types of cyber deviance simultaneously. This study intends to
expand on this research by testing the independent and combined effects of various anonymizing
behaviors, both technical and communicative, on four types of cyber deviance: the illicit
purchase of prescription medication, the illicit selling of prescription medication, cyberbullying,
and doxing. The current research is guided by three primary goals and their associated research
questions and hypotheses. The goals are:
•

Goal 1: Contribute to cybercrime/deviance literature by identifying correlates of
perceptions of online anonymity and legitimacy.

•

Goal 2: Examine the impact of individual anonymity providing behaviors,
independently and multiplicatively, on the willingness to offend across various
acts of cybercrime/deviance, net of other factors.
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•

Goal 3: Expand on existing deterrence literature in relation to
cybercrime/deviance to gain a better understanding of the influence of informal
and formal controls on the willingness to offend.

A factorial survey experiment will be utilized to address these goals using a national opt-in
sample. The associated research questions and hypotheses are discussed in more detail below.
Research Goal 1
The first research goal in this dissertation is foundational as trust in anonymity serves as a
starting point for individuals rational choice calculus in deciding to participate in or avoid
behaviors online. This is important to determine going forward, as it will help identify who
should experience the greatest impact from the presence of anonymizing behaviors.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Before the impact of anonymizing behaviors can be addressed, we must first determine
the characteristics of individuals who believe these acts will protect them from identification as
well as their perceptions of service providers in control of the environment:
•

RQ1: Does technological skill-level and participation in activities online predict
perceptions of online anonymity and social media legitimacy?

Individuals with low amounts of online activity and technological skill may not trust their own
abilities to perform anonymizing behaviors correctly or may not be aware of the capabilities of
these protective behaviors. Alternatively, individuals with high levels of skill and familiarity may
be more aware of the shortcomings of anonymizing behaviors, namely that they are imperfect
forms of anonymity, and will have low levels of trust. As such, it is believed there will be
evidence of a curvilinear relationship between online skill/participation and trust in online
anonymity. More specifically, those with low and high skill and participation levels will be
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associated with low trust, whereas mid-level skill and participation will be associated with a
higher level of trust. Stated as a hypothesis:
•

H1.a: Technological skill-level and participation in online activities will have a
curvilinear relationship with trust in online anonymity.
While not intuitively related to anonymity and cyberdeviance, perceptions of service

provider legitimacy is important to assess as users who do not perceive the provider as legitimate
may be less inclined to recognize and follow the terms of service intended to regulate behavior
on the platform. Online skill-level and participation in online activities may be related to the
perception of legitimacy of social media service providers. Individuals with more technological
skill and familiarity with activities online may have a better understanding of the standards and
practices guiding the management of social media platforms, increasing the perceptions on
legitimacy of the provider. Stated as a hypothesis:
•

H1.b: Technological skill-level and participation in online activities will have a positive
linear relationship with perceptions of social media legitimacy.

Research Goal 2
The second goal of this dissertation is to add to existing to cyber deviance literature
focused on anonymity. To accomplish this, I will analyze the direct effects of individual
anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to offend as well as examine the effects of
these strategies in combination. Furthermore, I intend to assess these effects across a variety of
cybercrimes and deviance. Within a rational choice and deterrence framework, the anonymity
behaviors represent risk reduction strategies in the rational calculous. The benefits of the acts are
implied in the vignettes (e.g., monetary gains in the buying and selling scenarios) and are open to
the subjective interpretation of the respondents. As the respondents are randomly assigned
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vignette scenarios, the variation in interpretation of benefits should not cause internal validity
issues.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The overarching research question guiding this dissertation addresses the impact of
anonymizing behaviors on the willingness to offend:
•

RQ2: What impact do various anonymity providing behaviors have on the willingness
to offend, net of other factors?

The behaviors in question vary between the three vignettes, though three manipulation categories
are utilized in each. For example, participants in the drug purchasing vignettes will be assigned a
type of web browser, a currency type, and the presence or absence of an escrow service, while
the cyberbullying/doxing vignette manipulates the victim/respondent relationship, whether or not
the respondent account is fake or real, and if anonymous browsing software is utilized. While
prior research has acknowledged these behaviors as providers of anonymity, little has been done
to research the impact these have on the willingness to offend, either independently or in
interaction with each other. Within this research question, two hypotheses are made:
•

H2.a: The presence of anonymizing behaviors is positively related to the willingness to
offend.

•

H2.b: Anonymizing behaviors will interact with each other to increase the willingness to
offend.
Furthermore, I acknowledge the impact of anonymizing behaviors may vary depending

on the seriousness of the act in question, bringing us to the third research question:
•

RQ3: Does the impact of anonymizing behaviors on the willingness to offend vary
between types of cybercrime/deviance?

By using variations of related deviant behaviors the significance and magnitude of relationships
between the anonymizing behaviors and the willingness to offend can be compared between
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models. From a rational choice perspective, it stands to reason that more serious offenses will
have higher risks associated with them, reducing the impact of the risk reduction provided by the
anonymizing behaviors. Stated as a hypothesis:
•

H3:

The impact of anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to offend will be
weaker the more serious the cyber offense.

Research Goal 3
Contemporary deterrence theory has expanded beyond the traditional discussions of
certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment to include discussions of the impact of informal
and formal sanctions as the deterrent. I intend to expand on existing deterrence literature in
relation to cyber deviance to gain a better understanding of the influence of informal and formal
controls on the willingness to offend.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Beyond the effects of anonymizing behaviors on the willingness to offend, prior
deterrence research has found that concerns regarding formal and informal sanctions have been
correlated with participation in various forms of deviance, both cyber and traditional. Following
that logic, with anonymity remaining the variable of interest, I will assess the respondents’
response regarding identification of their behavior to a variety of sources of informal and formal
controls. Stated as a research question:
•

RQ4: Do informal and formal controls moderate the effect of anonymity providing
behaviors on the willingness to offend?

While the sanctions themselves will not be addressed, the respondents’ concern over
identification to family and friends, employers, law enforcement, and service providers could
reduce the impact the anonymizing behaviors have on the willingness to offend. Stated as
hypotheses:
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•

H4.a: Higher concern regarding formal controls will moderate the anonymizing
behaviors impact on the willingness to offend.

•

H4.b: Higher concern regarding informal will moderate the anonymizing behaviors
impact on the willingness to offend.
The following chapter will outline the specifics regarding the design of this study,

including descriptions of the experimental methodology and specifics of this study’s design, such
as the data collection and sampling procedures, measures, and analytic procedure.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology and analytic procedure for this dissertation. The
chapter begins with a description of factorial survey experiments as a methodology. The
discussion then shifts to the current study’s design, including the pilot testing of the survey
instrument and data collection and sampling procedures. Next, the study measures will be
addressed, including an explanation of the independent variables specific to each research
question and vignette, the moderating variables of informal and formal control, the dependent
variables (trust in anonymity and willingness to offend), and the controls. Finally, I will describe
the analytic procedure.
Factorial Survey Experiments
Factorial survey experiments methods have been used across a diverse number of
subfields ranging from sociology, political science, law, nursing, and criminology. It is a hybrid
of survey and experimental research which allows for detailed descriptions of scenarios that lead
to greater standardization of scenario context across respondents. A benefit of this integration is
the increased internal validity as compared to survey research alone. External validity is also
increased if a large, representative sample is utilized (Mutz, 2011). While random sampling
would be ideal, the experimental logic of factorial survey design does allow for general
conclusions to be made about causal mechanisms when using nonrandom samples. Additionally,
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hypothetical vignettes avoid issues with multicollinearity as the manipulations are uncorrelated
since they are randomly assigned (Rossi & Anderson, 1982). Another benefit of a factorial
survey experiment is that hypothetical scenarios allow researchers to present manipulations that
may not currently exist in the reality of the participant, or if they do are rare circumstances that
are rarely captured in research. While the scenarios may be unfamiliar to respondents, with
proper preparation and inclusion of measures of perceived plausibility, the hypothetical scenarios
allow researchers to record hard to capture phenomena (Abraham et al., 2010; Rossi &
Anderson, 1982).
Of critical importance to this dissertation is that factorial survey experiments require
respondents to consider multiple manipulations simultaneously. This is more representative of
reality as actions rarely exist in a vacuum, and specific to this research, it will also allow for a
comparison of the impact of multiple anonymizing behaviors when used in concert. This
methodology also has the advantage of assisting in avoiding social desirability bias when it is
designed correctly. Prior comparative research between survey and factorial survey
methodologies showed that respondents were less likely to display socially desirable responses
when utilizing the factorial survey method versus single item questions (Auspurg et al., 2014).
Current Study Design & Procedure
Data was collected using a factorial survey experiment with three vignettes covering four
cyber-enabled crimes or deviance: the purchase of illicit prescriptions online, the illicit sale of
prescriptions online, cyberbullying, and doxing. These acts were chosen as they may be less
likely to activate social desirability effects. Social desirability response bias refers to research
respondents’ inclination to report socially desirable behaviors and beliefs over undesirable
behaviors due to a desire to conform or avoid shame (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). The types of
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cybercrime and deviance selected for this study are lower-level acts as more serious crimes, such
as the distribution of recreational drugs, may automatically invoke a negative response.
The survey began with a series of survey questions covering demographic, theoretical
controls, and cyber-specific variables. Then the respondents will be asked to imagine the various
scenarios with the randomly assigned manipulations. The first and second vignettes capture
property-based deviance, specifically the buying and selling of prescription medication through
an illicit or unauthorized pharmaceutical market. These vignettes will use 3 x 2 x 2 fully crossed
factorial designs with 12 conditions, manipulating browser type (“normal” vs “VPN” vs “TOR”),
payment method (“electronic payment platform” vs “cryptocurrency”), and escrow service (”no”
vs “yes”). Respondents will be assigned both a scenario where they are the buyer and the seller
of prescription medication, though both scenarios will have matching manipulations to reduce
threats to the internal validity of the measures. The third vignette covers online interpersonal
interactions which could result in cyberbullying and doxing. This vignette will use a 2 x 2 x 2
fully crossed factorial design with 8 conditions manipulating victim/respondent relationship
(“known” vs “unknown”), respondent account information (“real” vs “fake”), and browser
settings (“IP blocking disabled” vs “IP blocking enabled”). After each vignette, respondents will
be asked a series of questions to assess the likelihood they will participate in the act described, as
well as their fear of various informal and formal sanctions. Each of these variables are described
in more detail under the measures heading below.
Vignette Pilot Study Process
While great effort was made in the design process to ensure the concepts were clearly
defined in the vignettes, variability in computing familiarity does present a challenge when
attempting to describe the anonymizing behaviors concisely. Therefore, before implementing the
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survey on the final study participants, the vignettes were pilot tested by students in the
Department of Criminology at the University of South Florida. Thirty-three students completed
the pilot test and were given an opportunity to give feedback to identify any confusion they
experienced with the vignettes, with particular attention paid to the descriptions of the
manipulations, as well as questions regarding the believability of the individual vignettes. The
identified issues were addressed before releasing the survey for formal data collection.
Data Collection
Data for this dissertation consists of a national sample of American adults gathered using
Qualtrics’ online survey service. The anonymous survey was estimated to take a maximum of
20-25 minutes to complete, and respondents were paid approximately $2 by Qualtrics to
complete the survey1. Potential respondents were selected for participation from Qualtrics’ list of
survey participants using sampling procedures stratified on demographic variables of age, race,
sex, and income to attempt to gather a sample reflective of the composition of American adults
as reported in the 2010 United States Census. This is not a truly representative sample as the
participants were not randomly selected from a sampling frame of all adult Internet users in the
United States. Additionally, while the attempt was made to stratify participant recruitment on
age, race, sex, and income, the average participant demographics on these variables differ from
those reported in the 2010 US Census. For example, the mean age of participants in the study is
50.04 with a median age of 48, whereas the median age in the United States is reported as 37.2
(U.S. Census, 2011). These differences are important to note for future discussions of
generalizability and external validity but should not be problematic for internal validity of the

1

Payment for subjects was funded through a grant provided by the Association of Doctoral Programs in
Criminology & Criminal Justice.
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experimental findings due to random assignment of participants. These differences are discussed
in more detail in the following chapter.
While the sample is skewed older, this may benefit research. The ubiquity of online
interactions requires understanding how anonymity affects different demographic groups that are
not necessarily present in student populations. Older subjects will have slowly acclimated to
online interactions as technology and online platforms evolved while younger subjects (e.g.,
millennials, Generation Z) will have had a different experience with online communication. The
differences in expectations about anonymity, privacy, and online norms are likely to be different
by age groups, socio-economic status, and access to technology. Additionally, bias concerns
regarding using this sample are reduced as the study is intended to measure hypothetical
behaviors of Internet users; the portion of the national population automatically excluded from
this sample (those not online) are not of interest in the current research. Admittedly, the sample
respondents may be affected by self-selection bias considering their choice to participate in an
online anonymous survey, which may reflect a higher perception of anonymity. This issue is
discussed at length in Chapter Seven. IRB approval for this protocol was obtained (Study
#002357), and the data collection occurred between April 8th and 26th, 2021.
Sample
In preparation for data collection, it is important to determine the necessary sample size
needed to have sufficient power to detect relationships of an expected effect size between the
study’s variables. Prior to data collection, an a priori statistical power analysis (specifically an
ANCOVA fixed effects, main effects, and interactions f-test) was completed. The analysis used
an alpha of 0.05, a beta of 0.80, a small effect size of 0.1 for a group of 12 with 2 degrees of
freedom (based off the largest vignette). In other words, the maximum risk of making a Type 1
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error (i.e., rejecting a true null) was set at 5%, the probability of avoiding a Type II error (i.e.,
accepting a null when an effect exists) is 80%, and the relationship between variables is small
(Hedberg, 2018). Using these parameters, the ideal sample size would be 967. However, due to
financial limitations, this study could only collect a maximum sample of 375 respondents. A
subsequent sensitivity power analysis was completed and indicated the effect size for a sample of
375 with the same parameters for power and significance level is approximately 0.161. Thus, the
magnitude of the differences detectable with this sample fall between the medium (0.25) and
small (0.10) effect size standards. The smallest relationships between variables may not be
detectable with this sample, but the effect size is acceptable for this study (Auspurg & Hinz,
2015; Hedberg, 2018).
Missing Data. Inspection of the survey responses showed several instances of missing
data. Of these, only one respondent did not have responses recorded to the variables of interest
consistently. Therefore, the observation was dropped from the analysis, resulting in a final
maximum sample of 374. As depicted in Tables 1 and 2, several other variables reported missing
data, reporting no more than 2.1% missing for the individual variables. However, as these
missing values were distributed across multiple respondents, this did result in a reduction of the
sample size in the various analyses. The lowest sample used for any analysis is 337, which only
increased the effect size to 0.18, meaning the analyses should be capable of identifying
relationships between variables of a similar size as the full sample.
Measures
Computing Skills, Habits, and Perceptions of Anonymity and Legitimacy
It is likely that a respondent’s level of computer familiarity and competency may be
related to their perception of anonymity online. For example, novice users may not trust their
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own skills enough to overcome the fear of being caught regardless of the anonymizing behaviors
available. On the other hand, experts may be more aware of the potential weakness and failings
of various anonymizing behaviors, also reducing their trust in anonymity. To test this hypothesis,
several measures of technological competency and familiarity as well as perceptions of
anonymity and legitimacy. While these variables are utilized specifically to address the first
research question, they will also serve as control variables for the experimental component of
this dissertation.
Dependent Variables.
Perceived Anonymity. The actual anonymity a technique provided may not impact
behavior if the respondent does not believe the method works. The perception of the anonymity
should be directly reflective of the trust they have in the behavior. Adapted from Hite and
colleagues (2014), the measure of perceived anonymity, asked to indicate the level of agreement
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) with each of the following: (a) I am confident
that others do not know who I am; (b) I believe that my personal identity remains unknown to
others; (c) I am easily identified as an individual by others (reverse coded); (d) others are likely
to know who I am (reverse coded); (e) my personal identity is known to others (reverse coded);
(f) someone with technical skills could easily find out my true identity (reverse coded); (g)
someone with technical skills could easily find out sensitive information about me (reverse
coded). These were measured twice, once with a scenario involving shopping online, the other
regarding communication on social media. This was done to ensure the measures were reflective
of the vignette scenarios and to assess if there is a greater or lower perception of anonymity
across behaviors. The scales were tested for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha; the
standard for and acceptable alpha to establish internal reliability is 0.70 (George & Mallery,
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2003). The perception of anonymity while shopping online reported an alpha of 0.776, social
media reported an alpha of 0.778, and the combined scale reported an alpha of 0.849. The scales
were combined into composite score variables for each, with higher scores indicating greater
perceptions of anonymity.
Legitimacy of Social Media. Also, potentially reflective of trust is the perception of
legitimacy of the service providers. Within this study, respondents are asked to indicate their
level of agreement on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale about the legitimacy of
social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok). The statements are as follows: (a)
social media platforms treat people fairly; (b) social media platforms make decisions based on
facts; (c) social media platforms treat people with respect; (d) I have confidence in social media
platforms; (e) I trust social media platforms; (f) most social media platforms do their job well;
(g) social media platforms generally can be trusted to make decisions that are right for your
community; (h) social media platforms moderate content differently depending on the political
affiliation of the content creator; (i) social media platforms should be allowed to moderate
content however they see fit; (j) I am obligated to follow the community guidelines of social
media platforms I use even if I do not agree with them. The legitimacy scale was tested for
internal consistency with a reported Cronbach’s alpha of 0.911. The scale was calculated as a
composite score with the higher values indicating greater perceptions of legitimacy.
Independent Variables.
Technological Skill Self-Evaluation. Respondents are asked to rank their knowledge of
various technological issues on a scale of very low (1) to very high (5): (a) dealing with software
problems; (b) removing malware from your computing devices (e.g., computer viruses); (c)
dealing with computer hardware problems; (d) identifying if your computer is infected with
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malware; (e) modifying the firewall on your computing devices; (f) establishing a virtual private
network (VPN) on your computing devices; (g) identifying a phishing e-mail (a fake e-mail from
unknown sender); (h) identifying misleading or false information online using validated sources;
(i) securing digital information (files, documents) through encryption; (j) surfing the web
through anonymous browsers (e.g., TOR). Responses were combined into a composite variable,
technological skill self-evaluation, as the Cronbach’s alpha was reported to be 0.934. Higher
scores indicate higher levels of technological competency.
Online Routine Activities. As technological skill is a self-reported measure of
competency, there are concerns about over and under estimation of those skills. Online routine
activities parses out regular participation in online activities by asking respondents about the
number of hours in an average week did they spend on the following activities: (a)
sending/responding to email; (b) social networking (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, TikTok); (c)
communicating through instant messaging; (d) video chatting (e.g., FaceTime, Zoom); (e)
blogging (reading or writing); (f) downloading media (music, films, podcasts); (g)
communicating in chat rooms of forums; (h) streaming TV or film (e.g. YouTube, Netflix); (i)
participating in online discussions (e.g., commenting on news sites); (j) visiting pornographic
websites; (k) playing online video games; (l) using online dating apps. Responses are recorded
on a seven-point ordinal scale from not at all (1) to more than 25 hours (7). The scale was tested
for internal reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, reporting an alpha of 0.912. A composite variable
of online routine activities was created, with lower scores indicating a lower level of activity
online.
Frequency of Use. Respondents are also asked about their computing habits over the last
12 months on a 4-point scale of never (1) to often (4): (a) browsed the Internet; (b) used social
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media; (c) purchased items online; (d) stored digital information on a cloud-based platform (e.g.,
Dropbox, Onedrive, Box, iCloud); (e) used cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin); (f) surfed on the
Darkweb. However, the internal reliability analyses of this scale initially reported a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.662. The alpha was calculated again after dropping the “browsing the Internet”
component, which did improve the alpha to 0.694, but this was still below the required threshold
of 0.70 (George & Mallery, 2016). As the routine activities variable captured the same
theoretical concept (Cronbach’s alpha 0.906), it was decided to disregard this variable in the
analyses.
Anonymizing Behaviors and Willingness to Offend
Dependent Variable.
Willingness to Offend. To examine the impact of anonymity on hypothetical behavior, a
ratio level variable of participation likelihood will be reported by respondents. Once they read
through the vignette with their assigned conditions, they were asked the likelihood they would
commit the deviant act (purchase, sell, harass, dox) on a scale of 0-100, with higher values
indicating a greater willingness to commit the act of cybercrime/deviance described in the
survey. However, due to the sample data violating the assumptions of OLS regression (discussed
further in the analytic plan section of this chapter), the variable had to be recoded for logistic
regression analyses. The decision was made to recode the dependent variable of willingness to
offend dichotomously as either unwilling to offend (0) or willing to offend (1 = any initial
response greater than zero) to ensure each outcome was comparable in size and did not present a
threat to statistical power. When coded in this manner, the unwilling to offend group represented
41.13% to 68.65% of the respondents.
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Independent Variables: Property & Transactional Deviance. In the first set of
vignettes, the respondents are randomly assigned manipulations in cyber deviance scenarios
related to the purchase and selling of illicit goods, specifically prescription medication. As part
of a 3x2x2 factorial design, there will be 12 possible combinations of the independent variables
for each vignette. The initial combination of the manipulations will be randomly assigned in the
first vignette. The second vignette with the same manipulations as the first will then be displayed
to avoid testing effects. For the purposes of discussion regarding the seriousness of these acts,
selling is perceived to be the greater offense.
Browser Type. The first manipulation regards the level of anonymity provided by the web
browser used during the transaction. This ordinal variable is scaled from the lowest provided
anonymity (a normal web browser), a medium level of anonymity (a virtual private network
(VPN)), and the highest level of browser-based anonymity (TOR). VPNs allow users to access
private networks as if they are directly connected to that network through their personal devices.
As a result, the IP address is logged as the connected server rather than the IP address of the user.
While it increases the level of anonymity, it is not difficult to trace if the effort is made. TOR
based browsing is specifically designed to conceal user location and usage (Bischoff, 2020). Due
to a likely lack of familiarity with VPNs and TOR, the manipulations are worded concisely,
where a VPN can hide your computer’s real location and TOR encrypts your online activities
and hides your computer’s location and the seller is using it too. While there is more nuance to
the technicalities of these methods, it is important to remember that these variables are intended
to capture the perception of the anonymity it provides rather than detail the software’s full
capabilities.
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Payment Method. The second manipulation regards the anonymity provided through
various payment methods which will be measured dichotomously. Respondents will be randomly
assigned to a scenario where the purchase can only be completed through the use of a secure
electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo) or through the use of cryptocurrency.
Respondents are also given a brief definition of cryptocurrency for clarity, “a digital file used as
money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin,
Zcash).” Mainstream peer-to-peer payment platforms are associated with centralized banking
industry, and are typically connected to user bank accounts, credit cards, and personal identifying
information. On the other hand, cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, are decentralized and are not
backed by a formal banking system (Heilman, et al., 2016; Peters et al., 2015; Swartz, 2014). It
needs to be acknowledged that all transactions made with Bitcoin are recorded and are public
record on the Bitcoin blockchain (Herbert & Litchfield, 2015). However, the only information
recorded are the Bitcoin addresses involved in the transaction. These addresses can be changed
between each transaction, increasing the difficulty of tracing funds. Efforts are being made in
using blockchain analyses to trace Bitcoin users (Al Jawaheri et al., 2020); however, again, the
perception of anonymity is the concern in this study rather than the actual anonymity provided.
Escrow. The final manipulation for the first set of vignettes is dichotomously recorded as
no and yes regarding whether the respondent would be using an escrow service. Third-party
escrow services in connection with cybercrime are usually associated with the use of
cryptocurrency in Darkweb markets. The underlying concept is to have monetary transactions to
occur through the third party to ensure neither the vendor nor the buyer are scammed. Once the
transaction is agreed upon, the buyer sends the payment to the escrow service, who then holds
the funds until receipt of goods is confirmed, at which point the funds are sent to the vendor
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(Lielacher, 2020). An additional benefit to these transactions is any record of payment, whether
through a traditional payment system or through cryptocurrency, is attached to the escrow
service and not directly between the buyer and vendor. Direct payments between the buyer and
seller forces create a direct record of the transaction, which could be used as evidence of
wrongdoing. An escrow service reduces the contact with the other party and increases plausible
deniability as the escrow service could be facilitating legitimate transactions as well.
Independent Variables: Interpersonal Deviance. In the third vignette, the respondents
are randomly assigned manipulations in cyber deviance scenarios related to cyberbullying and
doxing. The scenario sets up a situation where the respondent is offended by a social media post
which may result in cyberbullying on the part of the respondent. As part of a 2x2x2 factorial
design, there will be 8 possible combinations of the independent variables for the initial vignette
on cyberbullying. After respondents answer the first set of questions, they will be presented with
additional information where they have identifying information on the person who made the
original post, after which they will be asked to respond to questions regarding potential doxing
behavior. For the purposes of discussion regarding the seriousness of these acts, doxing to be the
greater offense as it is illegal in many states, as compared to cyberbullying being a deviant but
usually not illegal act.
Victim/Respondent Relationship. The first manipulation considers anonymity of the
victim in relationship to the respondent. This dichotomous variable is recorded as known or
unknown. While this is not a behavior actively selected by perpetrators of cyberbullying, it is a
form of protective anonymity in that if a victim is known by the offender, it is likely the victim
may also know the offender or will be able to identify them easier than if the parties were
strangers.
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Respondent Account Information. Reflective of the previous manipulation is the
anonymity of the respondent’s account information. In this case, the variable represents behavior
that could be selected by the perpetrators of real cyberbullying, namely using was referred to as a
“burner” or “catfish” account that uses identifying information that is not that of the perpetrator.
In this study, the variable is coded dichotomously as real vs fake, which fake representing the
anonymizing behavior.
Browser Settings. The final manipulation for vignette 3 regards software settings. This
variable follows a similar logic to the browser type variable from the previous vignette, though in
it is simplified to a dichotomous measurement of IP blocking software being disabled (lower
anonymity) or enabled (higher anonymity).
Moderating Variables. In contemporary deterrence theory research, it has been
acknowledged that social disapproval can serve as an inhibiting factor for criminal and deviant
behavior as the possibility that family, friends, and employers could discover participation in
these socially rejected acts. Ultimately, discovery could lead to unofficial punishment that would
vary in certainty and severity (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Cyber deviance research has found
support for this effect, noting informal sanctions appear to have the stronger influence on
deterrence from offending (Wolfe et al., 2008). In this study, it is hypothesized that concern over
identification to informal and formal sources of control should moderate, specifically decrease
the strength of, the impact of anonymizing behaviors on the willingness to offend.
Informal Controls. Informal controls are recorded through three ratio response measures
on a 0-100 scale, relating to concern about identification of the acts to the family and friends of
the respondent as well as to their employer. In the third vignette, concern regarding the
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suspension of the respondent’s account was also included. In all cases, higher values indicate a
greater concern.
Formal Controls. Falling in line with more traditional deterrence discussions is the role
of formal sanctions and punishment. Like the informal control variables, the formal control
variable is measured on a 0-100 ratio scale indicating the concern of the respondent being
arrested for participating in the cybercrime in question. Again, higher values indicate a greater
concern.
Control Variables. While the current study does utilize random assignment, it is
important to include demographic and theoretical control variables to determine if there are
additional correlates to the willingness to offend above and beyond anonymity. Therefore,
technological skill, online routine activities, perceptions of anonymity and legitimacy,
demographic variables, and theoretical variables are all included in this study in as control
variables. Each are discussed at length below. Descriptive summaries of all control variables are
reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Demographics. Demographic characteristics (i.e., educational attainment, relationship
status, ethnicity, race, sex, age, state, income, and political alignment) were collected both to
determine the reflectiveness of the sample as well as to serve as control variables. Educational
attainment is also ordinally measured from 1 (did not graduate high school) to 7 (advanced
degree – Ph.D., M.D., J.D., etc.). Relationship status was nominally coded (married, widowed,
divorced, separated, never married). However, initial analyses indicated that the only significant
correlate was never being married. To simplify the analyses, a dummy variable “Never Married”
(never married = 1) was used.

75

Ethnicity is a dichotomous variable measured as a yes or no to the question “Are you
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino/Latina?”. Race is measured nominally with the question “What race
do you consider yourself (check all that apply)?” with the possible options of white, black,
Asian, and other. Like the relationship status variable, it became apparent that race and ethnicity
overall was not impacting the outcome of the analyses, so a dummy variable “white” (white = 1)
was used. Sex is measured dichotomously as male or female (male = 1). Age is an interval
measurement recorded by the year the respondent was born; this was recoded for analysis as the
respondent’s age in 2021.
Respondents were asked “At the time of this survey, what state are you in?” with the
option to select a state through the use of a dropdown menu of the 50 U.S. states or the option to
select “not listed.” This was recoded to reflect regions established by the US Census Bureau
(2010) of "Northeast" (1) "South" (2) "Midwest" (3) and "West" (4). However, preliminary
analyses did not indicate a regional effect, so the variable was dropped for the final analyses.
Political alignment is measured through a seven-point scale ranging from extremely
liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). Income is coded as an ordinal variable ranging from 1
(less than $10,000) to 12 (more than $150,000). Again, these variables were determined to be
superfluous and were dropped from the final analysis.
Risk Taking. Individuals who are already prone to participating in risk taking behavior
may not be impacted as strongly by a lack of protective factors provided through anonymizing
behaviors. This study utilizes a variation of Gardner and Steinburg’s (2005) Risk Preference
Scale as used by Jaynes and Loughran (2019). The scale is intended to measure perceptions of
risks as relative to benefits. The Jaynes and Loughran (2019) variation is utilized as it adds a
measure of financially motivated behavior, which allows for parity in discussion of the property
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and transactional vignettes. Measured on a 5-point Likert scale, respondents are asked to rate six
risky behaviors (e.g., unprotected sex, gambling, etc.) where 1 indicated “risks are much greater
than benefits” and 5 indicated “benefits are much greater than risks.” The Cronbach’s alpha was
0.858, indicating strong internal reliability. The responses were transformed into a composite
scale. Higher values are associated with more risk-taking versus lower values being considered
more risk adverse.
Self-Control. Like concerns about risk taking, according to Gottfredson and Hirschi’s
(1990) General Theory of Crime, individuals with low self-control will be prone to participating
in deviant acts, regardless of the presence of risk. The small-scale self-control measure consists
of six items designed to measure the dimensions of self-control described by Gottfredson and
Hirschi (1990): self-centeredness, risk-taking, temper, physicality, impulsivity, ignoring; longterm consequences. The measure used in this study was designed by Cesar Rebellon, Murray A.
Straus and Rose Mederios (2008). Respondents are asked to rate their agreement with the
following statements from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4): (a) “I don't think about
how what I do will affect other people”; (b) “I often do things that other people think are
dangerous”; (c) “There is nothing I can do to control my feelings when someone hassles me”; (d)
“I often get hurt by things that I do”; (e) “I have trouble following the rules at work or in
school”; (f) “I have goals in life that I try to reach.” The initial test for internal consistency
reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.693. After dropping the responses for goals, the alpha rose to
0.770. The responses of the first five questions were combined into a composite score of selfcontrol, with higher scores indicating lower self-control.
Deviant Peer Association. According to Sutherland’s (1947) differential association
theory and Aker’s (1977) social learning theory, individuals who have delinquent peers are likely
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to participate in deviance themselves. Ultimately, that association results in the adoption of
similar definitions and reinforcement of the behavior. As the deviance in this study is specific to
cyber environments, a variation of Holt and colleagues (2012) deviant peer association scale will
be used. Respondents will be asked to respond on a five-point scale (0 = none; 1 = very few; 2 =
about half; 3 = more than half; 4 = all of them), about how many of their friends engaged in the
following eight types of cyber deviance in the past 12 months: (a) pirating media; (b) pirating
computer software; (c) viewing sexual explicit materials online; (d) followed an ex-romantic
partner on social media; (e) harassing others online; (f) engaging in computer hacking; (g)
posting conspiracy theories on social media platforms; and (h) following social media groups
opposed to mainstream news media, government, or politicians. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.909
indicated good internal reliability. The responses were summed and averaged, with higher scores
reflecting association with a greater number of deviant peers.
Strain. The strain measures capture two types of strain relevant to this study: financial
strain and prior cyber victimization. Regarding the first set of vignettes, financial strains may
increase the likelihood a respondent will be open to the idea of a transaction that will benefit
them financially. In relation to the cyber harassment and doxing vignette, research on prior cyber
victimization has indicated that past experiences of cyberbullying have been predictive of
cyberbullying perpetration (Xiao & Wong, 2013). The financial strain index utilizes an
adaptation of measures used by Selenko and Batinic (2011). Respondents are asked to rate their
agreement with the following statements from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5): (a) “I
often think about my current financial situation”; (b) “due to my financial situation, I have
difficulties paying for my home and utilities”; (c) “due to my financial situation, I have to save
considerably on food”; (d) “due to my financial situation, I have difficulties paying for health
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care”; (e) “due to my financial situation I am restricted in my leisure activities.” A Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.842 indicated good internal consistency, so the responses were summed and averaged,
with higher scores reflecting greater financial strain.
The prior cyber victimization measures are adapted from a 3-item scale utilized by Hay
and Meldrum (2010), with the addition of experience of doxing original to this study.
Participants are asked how frequently in the past 12 months they had been (a) “the target of
‘mean’ text messages,” (b) “sent threatening or hurtful statements or pictures in an email or text
message,” (c) “been made fun of on the internet”, (d) “had personal information made public
without consent,” with response options of “never,” “rarely,” “sometimes,” and “often.” A
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.866 indicated good internal consistency, so the responses were summed
and averaged, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of prior victimization.
Street Oriented Beliefs. Anderson (1999) proposed that street culture is developed
because of structural conditions of a neighborhood, resulting in an adaptation of behavior and
social mores that may be in opposition of traditionally accepted behavior. This is relevant to the
current study in because individuals who adhere to street code beliefs may be more willing to
participate in deviant communication, regardless of which anonymity protections are, or are not,
in place. The study utilizes the street code scale developed by Stewart and Simons (2006).
Respondents are asked their level of agreement from “strongly disagree (1)” to “strongly agree
(4)” on the following seven statements: (a) “when someone disrespects you, it is important that
you use physical force or aggression to teach him or her not to disrespect you”; (b) “if someone
uses violence against you, it is important that you use violence against him or her to get even”;
(c) “people will take advantage of you if you don’t let them know how tough you are”; (d)
“people do not respect a person who is afraid to fight physically for his/her rights”; (e)
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“sometimes you need to threaten people in order to get them to treat you fairly”; (f) “it is
important to show others that you cannot be intimidated”; (g) “people tend to respect a person
who is tough and aggressive.”
Additionally, this variable utilizes the measures developed by Henson and colleagues
(2016) to capture the Anderson’s (1999) code of the street ideology in a cyber context.
Respondents are asked their level of agreement with five statements: (a) “it is okay to attack
someone’s reputation online if they call you a dirty name. Otherwise I will look weak and like a
pushover to others”; (b) “in order to gain respect from your online peers it is sometimes
necessary to threaten others’ reputation and threaten the use of violence online”; (c) “it is okay to
post demeaning or damaging photos of someone if they have insulted you online”; (d)
“appearing tough or aggressive is a good way to keep others from messing with you online”; (e)
“if I appear tough online, people will be more likely to respect me offline.” A four-point Likert
scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4) is used.
The Cronbach’s alpha of the traditional measure of adherence to street code was 0.823,
while the cyber street code alpha was 0.897. The combined alpha of the traditional and cyberspecific measures was 0.906, so the values were be combined into a single street code variable
by summating the responses and calculating the average. Low scores indicate low adherence, and
high scores indicate high adherence.
Analytic Plan
Randomization
Randomization was automated through the Qualtrics survey platform. To ensure there
were no issues, the data collection process included a soft launch of 44 completed surveys. The
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preliminary data were checked to ensure the programming randomly assigned conditions at a
similar rate. Once confirmed, the survey was launched in full.
Attention Checks
To ensure participants are paying attention to the survey content, four mandatory
attention checks were included in the survey. Two of these attention checks instructed
participants to select a specific value. The additional two checks asked respondents to correctly
identify a detail from the vignette they had just completed. Failure to correctly respond to these
items results in immediate termination of the survey. Additionally, the Qualtrics system
automatically removes participants who proceed through the survey too quickly.
Regression Analyses
The first research question required non-experimental cross-sectional analyses of
technological skill and online routine activities on the perception of anonymity and legitimacy of
social media. Quadratic regression analyses were utilized to test for the quadratic relationships
between technological skill, online routine activities, and perceptions of anonymity online
related to hypothesis 1.a (total of 6 models). Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to
assess the linear relationship between technological skill, online routine activities, and perception
of anonymity. OLS regression was also used to assess the linear relationship between
technological skill, online routine activities and legitimacy hypothesized in hypothesis 1.b.
The remaining research questions regard the experimental component of the dissertation.
The standard approach to analysis when dealing with factorial survey experimental
methodologies is to use multivariate linear regression models with all vignette variables used
simultaneously (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015; Wallander, 2009). With a continuous, ratio-level
dependent variable (willingness to offend), the plan was to use a series of ordinary least squares
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(OLS) regression models. However, the regression diagnostics indicated that the data violated
the assumption of normal distribution of errors required for OLS regressions. Therefore, the
willingness to offend variables were recoded dichotomously as described above (not willing to
offend = 0, willing to offend = 1), and a series of logistic regressions were utilized to test the
research hypotheses.
Each cybercrime and deviance were first assessed in a baseline logistic regression model
of the experimental manipulations alone (4 models), followed by full model including the
demographic, theoretical, technological skill, perception, and moderation variables (4 models).
Next, two-way interaction and three-way interaction models were run for each type of
cybercrime/deviance (16 models in total) to assess if the individual anonymity providing
behaviors interacted to impact the willingness to offend. These were conducted with only the
baseline variables for ease of interpretation and comparison to the initial baseline models.
Finally, the moderating variables of concern over sources of formal and informal sanctions were
tested though logistic regressions analyzing the interaction between the moderating variables and
the anonymity providing behaviors (14 models).
Predictive margins plots assist interpretations of analyses by providing a visualization of
the model. Data points plotted from predictive margins represent the average predicted response
if all participants in the sample were in the group the data point represents (Graubard & Korn,
1999). In cases of significant results, predictive margin plots were completed. The following
chapter presents the results of these analyses.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS

Introduction
The current chapter presents the results of the study in four sections. First, the chapter
will present the descriptive statistics of the full sample. The next three sections will be organized
in alignment of the study’s three goals and their associated research questions: (1) identifying
correlates predicting perception of online anonymity and legitimacy, (2) examine the impact of
individual anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to offend, both independently and
in interaction with each other, across various acts of cybercrime/deviance, net of other factors
and (3) gain a better understanding of the influence of informal and formal controls on the
willingness to offend.
Descriptive Statistics2
Table 1 and 2 depict the descriptive statistics for the non-experimental variables in the
sample. Participants ages range from 18 to 88, with a mean age of 50.04 and a median age of 48.
This is higher than the US median age of 37.2 (U.S. Census, 2011). Similarly, the educational
attainment of the sample participants is skewed towards higher levels of education than the US
populations according to data from the US Census Bureau (2010). Nationally, approximately

2

The reference period for this measure captures the 12 months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Research has shown
that a significant number of Americans have relied of online services more often for items such as groceries (37%),
meals (40%) and household items (46%) during the pandemic. Additionally, approximately one-third of the
participants reported transitioning to telecommuting during the pandemic (Neely, 2021). Therefore, some of the
responses may be higher on average than reflected in prior literature.
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38% of Americans report having a college education of at least a bachelor’s degree. Over 50% of
the sample participants indicated they had attained a bachelor’s degree or higher. Unsurprisingly,
the reported income of participants also trends higher than the national median income of
$49,445 (U.S. Census, 2011), with a median income between $60,000-$69,000 represented. The
sex and race distributions are closer to the reported national averages, with 54% of the sample
reported as female and 72% of the sample identifying as white.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Frequencies (n=374)
Variable
Freq.
%
Income
Less than $10,000
18
4.81
$10,000 - $19,999
32
8.56
$20,000 - $29,999
37
9.89
$30,000 - $39,999
36
9.63
$40,000 - $49,999
25
6.68
$50,000 - $59,999
27
7.22
$60,000 - $69,999
20
5.35
$70,000 - $79,999
31
8.29
$80,000 - $89,999
21
5.61
$90,000 - $99,999
16
4.28
$100,000 - $149,999
74
19.79
More than $150,000
37
9.89
Education (0.3)
Less than HS
11
2.95
High School/GED
64
17.16
Some College
75
20.11
Associate’s Degree
36
9.65
Bachelor’s Degree
115
30.83
Master’s Degree
55
14.75
Advanced Degree
17
4.56
Marriage Status
Married
208
55.61
Widowed
18
4.81
Divorced
44
11.76
Separated
6
1.60
Never Married
98
26.20
Willingness to Buy Recode (0.5)
Unwilling
241
64.44
Willing
133
35.56
Willingness to Cyberbully Recode
Unwilling
153
41.13
Willing
219
58.87
% Missing in parentheses

Variable
Political Alignment
Extremely Conservative
Conservative
Slightly Conservative
Moderate
Slightly Liberal
Liberal
Extremely Liberal
Region (0.3)
Northeast
South
Midwest
West

Freq.

%

34
64
32
119
30
56
39

9.09
17.11
8.53
31.82
8.02
14.97
10.43

81
142
80
70

21.72
38.07
21.45
18.77

172
202

45.99
54.01

65
269
52
27
33

17.38
71.93
13.90
7.22
8.82

254
116

68.65
31.35

251
123

67.11
32.89

Sex
Male
Female
Ethnicity/Race
Hispanic
White
Black
Asian
Other Race

Willingness to Sell Recode (1.1)
Unwilling
Willing
Willingness to Dox Recode
Unwilling
Willing
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Summary
Variable
Obs
Age
374
Risk Taking
374
Self-Control
374
Deviant Peer Association (0.5)
372
Financial Strain (0.5)
372
Prior Cybervictimization (0.5)
372
Street Oriented Beliefs (1.9)
367
Computer Skill Self-Eval (1.1)
370
Online RAT (1.6)
368
Perceived Anonymity – Shopping (0.8) 371
Perceived Anonymity – SM (1.3)
369
Perceived Anonymity – Total (1.9)
367
Social Media Legitimacy (2.1)
366
Willingness to Buy (0.5)
372
Willingness to Sell (1.1)
370
Willingness to Cyberbully
374
Willingness to Dox
374
% Missing in parentheses

Mean
50.035
1.513
1.732
0.599
2.658
0.413
1.844
2.701
2.086
2.739
2.834
2.789
2.732
24.600
13.124
15.316
14.307

SD
18.47
0.74
0.567
0.801
1.031
0.661
0.562
0.949
0.926
0.692
0.674
0.604
0.893
31.018
25.739
27.288
27.864

Min
18
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1.143
1
0
0
0
0

Max
88
5
4
4
5
3
4
5
6.083
5
5
5
5
100
100
100
100

Goal 1: Correlates of Perception of Online Anonymity and Legitimacy
The related hypotheses are as follows:
H1.a: Technological skill-level and participation in online activities will have a
curvilinear relationship with trust in online anonymity.
H1.b: Technological skill-level and participation in online activities will have a positive
linear relationship with perceptions of social media legitimacy.
Research Question 1
Hypothesis 1.a. To test this hypothesis, the data were first visualized using a series of
two-way scatter plots with a quadratic fit line for each combination of the dependent (computer
skills self-evaluation, and online routine activities) and independent variables (perception of
anonymity when shopping, when using social media, and combined). As seen in Figures 1
through 3, there was a very weak quadratic curve, and subsequent quadratic regression analyses
indicated that there was not a significant quadratic relationship between the variables. This was
true for all variations of the dependent variables and independent variables.
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Panel A. Technology Skills Self Evaluation

Panel B. Online Routine Activities

Figure 1. Two-way Scatter Plots with Quadratic Fit Line on Perception of Anonymity – Shopping
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Panel A. Technology Skills Self Evaluation

Panel B. Online Routine Activities

Figure 2. Two-way Scatter Plots with Quadratic Fit Line on Perception of Anonymity – Social Media
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Panel A. Technology Skills Self Evaluation

Panel B. Online Routine Activities

Figure 3. Two-way Scatter Plots with Quadratic Fit Line on Total Perception of Anonymity
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Details can be seen in Table 3. As there was not a quadratic relationship indicated, additional
OLS regressions were completed to test for linear relationships between the independent and
dependent variables: there were no significant relationships between online skill variables and
perceptions of anonymity (see Tables 4 through 6).
Full models with controls did identify a few correlates of perceptions of anonymity on
social media platforms: age and financial strain. Increases in age are associated with a lower
perception of anonymity (b = -0.007, p < 0.01, adj. r2 = 0.052) and higher financial strain is
associated with a lower perception of anonymity (b = -0.098, p < 0.05, adj. r2 = 0.052). Details
are reported in Table 5. These correlations are not present in the models regarding perceptions of
anonymity while shopping online nor the combined perceptions model.
Table 3. Quadratic Regressions of Computer Skill and Use on Perceived Anonymity
Variables
b
SE
t
Beta
Adj. R2
Shopping
Computer Skill Self-Eval2 -0.009
0.007 -1.33
-0.069
0.0048
Online RAT2
0.002
0.007
0.31
0.016
0.0003
Social Media
Computer Skill Self-Eval2 0.002
0.007
0.33
0.017
0.0003
Online RAT2
0.006
0.006
0.99
0.052
0.0027
Total
Computer Skill Self-Eval2 -0.003
0.006 -0.47
0.036
0.0006
Online RAT2
0.004
0.006
0.68
0.036
0.0013
Notes: *p< .05; ** p< .01; ***p< .001
Table 4. OLS Regression on Perceived Anonymity – Shopping (n=350)
Variable
b
SE
t
Beta
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.020
0.046 -0.430 -0.028
Online RAT
0.024
0.056
0.430
0.032
Age
-0.002
0.003 -0.600 -0.045
Educational Attainment
-0.018
0.027 -0.650 -0.040
Never Married
0.156
0.097
1.610
0.101
Male
0.020
0.088
0.220
0.015
White
-0.151
0.087 -1.730 -0.101
Risk Taking
0.022
0.059
0.370
0.024
Self-Control
0.055
0.088
0.630
0.046
Deviant Peer Association
-0.019
0.074 -0.250 -0.022
Financial Strain
0.004
0.041
0.090
0.006
Prior Online Victimization -0.106
0.086 -1.240 -0.102
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.003
0.095
0.020
0.002
Adj. R2 = 0.076
Prob. > F = 0.2728
F (13, 336) = 1.21
Notes: *p< .05; ** p< .01; ***p< .001
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Table 5. OLS Regression on Perceived Anonymity – Social Media (n=350)
Variable
b
SE
t
Beta
Computer Skill Self-Eval
0.007
0.044
0.14
0.009
Online RAT
0.011
0.054
0.19
0.014
Age
-0.008** 0.003 -2.79
-0.201
Educational Attainment
-0.032
0.026 -1.23
-0.073
Never Married
0.154
0.093
1.66
0.102
Male
-0.016
0.083 -0.19
-0.012
White
-0.053
0.084 -0.63
-0.036
Risk Taking
-0.015
0.057 -0.25
-0.016
Self-Control
0.110
0.084
1.31
0.094
Deviant Peer Association
0.053
0.071
0.74
0.063
Financial Strain
-0.099* 0.039 -2.53
-0.152
Prior Online Victimization -0.120
0.082 -1.47
-0.118
Street Oriented Beliefs
-0.012
0.091 -0.13
-0.010
Adj. R2 = 0.052
Prob. > F = 0.003
F (13, 336) = 2.47
Notes: *p< .05; ** p< .01; ***p< .001
Table 6. OLS Regression on Perceived Anonymity – Total (n=348)
Variable
b
SE
t
Beta
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.003
0.039 -0.070 -0.005
Online RAT
0.016
0.048
0.320
0.024
Age
-0.005** 0.003 -1.840 -0.135
Educational Attainment
-0.026
0.023 -1.130 -0.068
Never Married
0.148
0.083
1.790
0.111
Male
-0.015
0.075 -0.200 -0.013
White
-0.105
0.075 -1.400 -0.081
Risk Taking
0.003
0.051
0.050
0.004
Self-Control
0.087
0.075
1.160
0.084
Deviant Peer Association
0.022
0.064
0.340
0.029
Financial Strain
-0.055* 0.035 -1.570 -0.096
Prior Online Victimization -0.109
0.074 -1.490 -0.121
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.001
0.082
0.000
0.001
Adj. R2 = 0.0347
Prob. > F = 0.0236
F (13, 334) = 1.96
Notes: *p< .05; ** p< .01; ***p< .001

Hypothesis 1.b. For hypotheses H1.b, the data were analyzed using OLS regression and
is reported in Table 7. The hypothesis was partially supported by the analyses. Higher online
routine activity scores are associated with higher legitimacy scores (b = 0.313, p < 0.000);
however, self-evaluation of skills was not significant. Other identified correlates included age (b
= -0.006, p < 0.05), which indicates a negative relationship between age and perceptions of
legitimacy, and adherence to street code (b = 0.216, p < 0.05) which indicates higher adherence
to street codes is associated with a higher perception of legitimacy.
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Table 7. OLS Regression on Social Media Legitimacy (n=348)
Variable
b
SE
t
Beta
Computer Skill Self-Eval
0.001
0.052
0.00
0.001
Online RAT
0.314*** 0.064
4.96
0.323
Age
-0.007* 0.004 -2.01
-0.131
Educational Attainment
-0.014
0.031 -0.44
-0.024
Never Married
-0.181
0.111 -1.63
-0.091
Male
-0.027
0.099 -0.27
-0.016
White
-0.171
0.100 -1.70
-0.088
Risk Taking
-0.003
0.068 -0.04
-0.003
Self-Control
0.003
0.100
0.03
0.002
Deviant Peer Association
0.080
0.085
0.94
0.071
Financial Strain
0.006
0.047
0.12
0.007
Prior Online Victimization -0.050
0.098 -0.51
-0.037
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.216* 0.109
1.99
0.138
Adj. R2 = 0.230
Prob. > F = 0.000
F (13, 334) = 8.98
Notes: *p< .05; ** p< .01; ***p< .001

Goal 2: Anonymity and Willingness of Offend
The second goal of this dissertation is to examine the impact of various anonymity
providing behaviors on the willingness to commit various acts of cybercrime and deviance and
determine if these impacts vary between these crimes. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the
assumption of OLS regarding the normal distribution of residuals for the dependent variable
(willingness to offend) was violated in each of the vignettes. Violation of this assumption means
that the model’s standard errors estimates are unreliable, and the confidence intervals may be too
wide or narrow (Breen, 1996). Therefore, logistic regressions3 were utilized for the analyses for
goals 2 and 3. The dependent variables were recoded to capture those unwilling to offend at all
(0) versus those who indicated some willingness to offend (1). The results from these analyses
are organized below by the associated research question, then by vignette and crime categories.

3

Logistic regression estimation models in Stata provide pseudo R2 values as measures of model fit. However, is
cannot be used to interpret proportions of variation in the dependent variable by the independent variables went the
dependent variable is coded on a binary (Walsh, 1987). Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve estimations
are a more appropriate measure of model fit for logistic regressions and are more intuitive to understand. The area
under the ROC curve estimate represents the probability the model will report a true positive rather than a false
positive in a range between 0 and 1. It reflects the accuracy of the model (Gorsevski et al., 2006). If multiplied by
100, it equals the percentage of accuracy represented. For example, if area under ROC curve value of 0.807 means
the model is 80.7% accurate in classifying cases into the binary categories of the dependent variable. The area under
the ROC curve estimate is reported in each of the regression models.
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Research Question 2
The second research question addresses the impact individual anonymity providing
behaviors have on participants willingness to offend. These behaviors were randomly assigned to
the participants as part of the experimental model. Direct effects of the behaviors were analyzed
to test hypothesis H2.a while interaction effects were used to test hypothesis H2.b. The
hypotheses are as follows:
H2.a: The presence of anonymizing behaviors is positively related to the willingness to
offend.
H2.b: Anonymizing behaviors will interact with each other to increase the willingness to
offend.
Vignette 1: Buying Illicit Prescriptions.
Hypothesis 2.a. The results of the logistic regression model of the willingness to
participate in the purchase of illicit prescriptions on the categorical experimental manipulations
of browser type, currency type, and use of escrow services are reported in Table 8 (pseudo R2 =
0.037, lroc = 0.626). The baseline model indicates a significant negative relationship between the
use of VPN (b = -0.58, p < 0.05) and the willingness to offend as well as a significant negative
relationship between the use of Bitcoin (b = -0.7976, p < 0.001) and the willingness to offend.
When run as a full model with controls (see Table 9; pseudo R2 = 0.204, lroc = 0.791), the VPN
variable approaches significance (b = -0.6340, p = 0.055) and the Bitcoin variable maintains
significance (b = -1.074, p < 0.000). While these experimentally manipulated variables were
significant, the results indicate the reverse of the hypothesized effect. Namely, it appears that
behaviors associated with higher levels of user anonymity are associated with less willingness to
offend (the use of VPN is associated with 46.95% lower odds of being willing to offend as
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compared to using a standard browser; the use of Bitcoin is associated with 65.84% lower odds
of being willing to offend as compared to using standard peer-to-peer payment services).
Table 8. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Buying Baseline Model on Willingness to Offend (n=372)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
-0.578* 0.272
0.561
0.329
0.955
TOR
-0.084
0.259
0.919
0.553
1.529
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.798*** 0.218
0.450
0.294
0.691
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.146
0.217
1.157
0.757
1.768
Pseudo R2
0.037
Area Under ROC Curve
0.626
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 9. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Buying Full Model on Willingness to Offend (n=339)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
-0.634
0.330
0.530
0.278 1.014
TOR
-0.065
0.308
0.937
0.512 1.713
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-1.07*** 0.268
0.342
0.202 0.578
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.388
0.267
1.474
0.874 2.486
Age
-0.031** 0.010
0.969
0.950 0.988
Educational Attainment
0.070
0.093
1.073
0.895 1.286
Never Married
-1.084** 0.346
0.338
0.172 0.665
Male
0.337
0.314
1.401
0.757 2.593
White
0.199
0.317
1.220
0.655 2.271
Risk Taking
0.127
0.236
1.135
0.714 1.804
Self-Control
0.546
0.315
1.727
0.932 3.202
Deviant Peer Association
0.308
0.288
1.360
0.647 2.390
Financial Strain
-0.021
0.147
0.980
0.735 2.390
Prior Online Victimization
0.168
0.337
1.183
0.610 1.306
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.237
0.343
1.268
0.647 2.484
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.305
0.163
0.737
0.535 1.015
Online RAT
0.296
0.243
1.345
0.835 2.166
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
-0.083
0.196
0.920
0.627 1.351
Social Media Legitimacy
0.184
0.175
1.202
0.854 1.692
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.003
0.004
1.003
0.994 1.013
Informal Control: Employer
0.001
0.005
1.001
0.991 1.011
Formal Control: Arrest
-0.002
0.004
0.998
0.989 1.007
Pseudo R2
0.204
Area Under ROC Curve
0.791
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Of the control variables, age (b = -0.032, p < 0.01) and never married (b = -1.085, p <
0.01) were also significant. Each one-year increase in age is associated with a 3.10% decrease in
odds of being willing to offend, and individuals who have never been married have 66.20%
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lower odds of offending as compared to those who have been married previously or are currently
married. The predictive margins plot comparing the browser variable on willingness to offend
and age, displayed in Figure 4, illustrates the consistent negative relationship between
willingness and age across all variations of the experimental variable as well as the lack of
significant difference between the manipulations. The predictive margin plot comparing the
currency variable on willingness to offend and age, displayed in Figure 5, illustrates the
statistical difference between the currency manipulations across age. Like the browser variable,
there is a negative linear relationship between age and willingness to offend. Of note, there is no
statistical difference between the use of standard peer-to-peer payment services and Bitcoin
across age.

Figure 4. Predictive Margins Plot of Browser Type on Willingness to Offend – Buying Across Age

94

Figure 5. Predictive Margins Plot of Currency Type on Willingness to Offend – Buying Across Age

Hypothesis 2b. A series of two-way and one three-way interaction model were completed
to test this hypothesis. In all four models, there was no evidence of a significant interaction
effect. However, the direct effects of using Bitcoin remained in all models (b = -1.049, p <0.01,
pseudo R2 = 0.039, lroc = 0.631; b = -0.779, p <0.001, pseudo R2 = 0.038, lroc = 0.628; b = 0.963, p <0.05, pseudo R2 = 0.044, lroc = 0.63; b = -1.447, p <0.01; pseudo R2 = 0.055, lroc =
0.65). VPN use had direct effects in the model of currency and escrow interaction (b = -0.566, p
<0.05, pseudo R2 = 0.039, lroc = 0.631) as well as in the browser and currency interaction model
(b= -0.965, p < 0.05, pseudo R2 = 0.044, lroc = 0.63). These results are reported in Tables 10
through 13.
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Table 10. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Two-way Interaction Bitcoin/Escrow Model on Willingness to Offend (n=372)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
-0.566* 0.273
0.569
0.333
0.970
TOR
-0.054
0.262
0.948
0.568
1.583
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-1.049** 0.315
0.351
0.190
0.650
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
-0.116
0.319
0.892
0.478
1.663
Interaction
Bitcoin/Escrow
0.490
0.437
1.631
0.694
3.838
2
Pseudo R
0.039
Area Under ROC Curve
0.631
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 11. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Two-way Interaction Browser/Escrow Model on Willingness to Offend (n=372)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
-0.728
0.384
0.484
0.228
1.025
TOR
-0.312
0.371
0.733
0.355
1.513
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.779*** 0.220
0.460
0.299
0.706
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
-0.109
0.370
0.898
0.435
1.852
Interaction
VPN/Escrow
0.311
0.541
1.365
0.474
3.936
TOR/Escrow
0.453
0.521
1.573
0.568
4.360
Pseudo R2
0.038
Area Under ROC Curve
0.628
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 12. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Two-way Interaction Browser/Bitcoin Model on Willingness to Offend (n=372)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
-0.965* 0.402
0.382
0.174
0.838
TOR
0.017
0.408
1.017
0.457
2.261
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.963* 0.384
0.382
0.181
0.810
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.137
0.219
1.147
0.747
1.761
Interaction
VPN/Bitcoin
0.776
0.546
2.172
0.746
6.326
TOR/Bitcoin
-0.217
0.536
0.806
0.282
2.302
Pseudo R2
0.044
Area Under ROC Curve
0.630
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 13. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Three-way Interaction Browser/Bitcoin/Escrow Model on Willingness to Offend
(n=372)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
-1.099
0.570
0.334
0.110
1.018
TOR
-0.640
0.586
0.528
0.168
1.662
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-1.447** 0.548
0.236
0.081
0.689
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
-0.758
0.609
0.469
0.143
1.545
Two-way Interaction
VPN/Bitcoin
0.649
0.790
1.913
0.407
8.990
TOR/Bitcoin
0.575
0.768
1.777
0.395
7.996
VPN/Escrow
0.402
0.809
1.494
0.306
7.289
TOR/Escrow
1.369
0.821
3.930
0.787 19.635
Bitcoin/Escrow
1.077
0.772
2.934
0.647 13.318
Three-way Interaction
VPN/Bitcoin/Escrow
0.102
1.103
1.107
0.128
9.603
TOR/Bitcoin/Escrow
-1.627
1.075
0.197
0.024
1.615
Pseudo R2
0.055
Area Under ROC Curve
0.650
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Vignette 2: Selling Prescriptions
Hypothesis 2.a. The results of the logistic regression model of the willingness to
participate in the sale of illicit prescriptions on the categorical experimental manipulations of
browser type, currency type, and use of escrow services are reported in Table 14. The baseline
model analyzing the experimental manipulations of browser type, currency type, and escrow use
did not indicate any significant predictors in the model. The experimental variables were also not
significant in the fully controlled model. However, the control variables of age (b= -0.035. p <
0.01), never married (b = -1.634, p < 0.000), deviant peer association (b = 0.903, p < 0.01),
perceptions of social media legitimacy (b = 0.577, p < 0.01), and concern about family and
friends (b = -0.016, p < 0.05) were all significant predictors of a willingness to offend (see Table
15; pseudo R2 = 0.351, lroc = 0.866). These relationships can be interpreted as follows: a year
increase in age is associated with a 3.46% decrease in the odds a participant will be willing to
commit the offense of selling prescriptions online; participants who have never been married
have a 80.49% lower odds of being willing to offend compared to those who have been married
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previously or are currently married; for every increase of one in deviant peers association score,
there is a 146.71% increase in odds a participant will be willing to offend; for every increase of
one in social media legitimacy score, there is a 78.10% increase in odds a participant will be
willing to offend; and for every increase of one in concern about family or friends finding out
about the offense is associated with a 1.56% decrease in odds a participant will be willing to
offend.
Table 14. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Selling Baseline Model on Willingness to Offend (n=370)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
0.281
0.281
1.325
0.764
2.298
TOR
-0.003
0.271
0.997
0.586
1.697
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.091
0.226
0.913
0.587
1.420
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.041
0.225
1.042
0.670
1.621
Pseudo R2
0.003
Area Under ROC Curve
0.543
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Hypothesis 2b. The two-way interaction models for willingness to sell were not
significant (see Tables 16 through 18). However, the three-way interaction model between the
use of VPN, Bitcoin, and escrow services was significant (b = 2.456, p < 0.05, OR = 11.657).
The regression model results are seen in Table 19 (pseudo R2 = 0.02, lroc = 0.592). Figure 6 is a
visualization of predictive margins of the three-way interaction on the willingness to sell. As
seen, the group with the combination of VPN, Bitcoin, and escrow services is predicted to have
the highest willingness to offend, though the predictions are not statistically significant.
Vignette 3: Cyber Harassment & Bullying
Hypothesis 2.a. The results of the logistic regression model of the willingness to
participate in cyberbullying on the categorical experimental manipulations of victim/respondent
relationship, respondent account information, and browser settings are reported in Table 20 (
pseudo R2 = 0.004, lroc = 0.545). The baseline model analyzing the experimental manipulations
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did not indicate any significant predictors in the model. The experimental variables were also not
significant in the fully controlled model. However, the control variables of education (b= 0.246,
p < 0.05), prior victimization strain (b = 0.854, p < 0.05), computer skill self-evaluation (b = 0.482, p < 0.01), and concern about employers (b = 0.018, p < 0.01) were all significant
Table 15. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Selling Full Model on Willingness to Offend (n=337)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
0.569
0.390
1.766
0.822 3.797
TOR
-0.085
0.387
0.919
0.431 1.961
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.076
0.323
0.927
0.492 1.745
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.376
0.325
1.457
0.771 2.755
Age
-0.035** 0.012
0.965
0.942 0.989
Educational Attainment
-0.013
0.115
0.987
0.789 1.236
Never Married
-1.634*** 0.440
0.195
0.082 0.462
Male
0.676
0.370
1.966
0.952 4.058
White
-0.249
0.350
0.779
0.392 1.548
Risk Taking
0.080
0.246
1.083
0.669 1.753
Self-Control
0.304
0.365
1.356
0.663 2.774
Deviant Peer Association
0.903** 0.311
2.467
1.341 4.540
Financial Strain
0.127
0.175
1.136
0.806 1.601
Prior Online Victimization
0.199
0.330
1.220
0.639 2.329
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.424
0.394
1.527
0.706 3.306
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.023
0.194
0.977
0.668 1.430
Online RAT
0.085
0.251
1.088
0.666 1.778
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
0.011
0.233
1.011
0.641 1.596
Social Media Legitimacy
0.577** 0.210
1.781
1.179 2.690
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.016* 0.007
0.984
0.972 0.997
Informal Control: Employer
0.013
0.007
1.013
1.000 1.026
Formal Control: Arrest
0.003
0.006
1.004
0.993 1.014
Pseudo R2
0.351
Area Under ROC Curve
0.866
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 16. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Two-way Interaction Bitcoin/Escrow Model on Willingness to Offend (n=370)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
0.292
0.282
1.339
0.772
2.325
TOR
0.018
0.273
1.018
0.596
1.737
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.252
0.324
0.778
0.413
1.467
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
-0.111
0.315
0.896
0.484
1.659
Interaction
Bitcoin/Escrow
0.314
0.453
1.368
0.564
3.323
2
Pseudo R
0.005
Area Under ROC Curve
0.539
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 17. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Two-way Interaction Browser/Escrow Model on Willingness to Offend (n=370)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
0.208
0.394
1.231
0.569
2.663
TOR
0.033
0.388
1.034
0.484
2.210
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.094
0.227
0.911
0.584
1.421
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.018
0.389
1.018
0.476
2.179
Interaction
VPN/Escrow
0.147
0.562
1.159
0.386
3.481
TOR/Escrow
-0.061
0.545
0.942
0.324
2.738
Pseudo R2
0.004
Area Under ROC Curve
0.547
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 18. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Two-way Interaction Browser/Bitcoin Model on Willingness to Offend (n=370)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
0.077
0.400
1.08
0.494
2.360
TOR
0.099
0.382
1.104
0.523
2.331
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
-0.143
0.389
0.868
0.405
1.859
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.032
0.228
1.033
0.662
1.612
Interaction
VPN/Bitcoin
0.439
0.563
1.551
0.515
4.670
TOR/Bitcoin
-0.239
0.548
0.788
0.270
2.304
2
Pseudo R
0.007
Area Under ROC Curve
0.550
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 19. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Three-way Interaction Browser/Bitcoin/Escrow Model on Willingness to Offend
(n=370)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Browser Treatment
VPN
0.569
0.545
1.766
0.608
5.129
TOR
0.626
0.548
1.870
0.640
5.463
Currency Treatment
Bitcoin
0.368** 0.535
1.445
0.507
4.120
Escrow Treatment
Escrow
0.620
0.577
1.858
0.601
5.747
Two-way Interaction
VPN/Bitcoin
-0.763
0.797
0.467
0.098
2.222
TOR/Bitcoin
-1.206
0.787
0.300
0.065
1.400
VPN/Escrow
-1.092
0.807
0.336
0.070
1.633
TOR/Escrow
-1.053
0.769
0.349
0.078
1.575
Bitcoin/Escrow
-1.096
0.784
0.335
0.072
1.553
Three-way Interaction
VPN/Bitcoin/Escrow
2.456* 1.141 11.657
1.246 109.057
TOR/Bitcoin/Escrow
1.909
1.102
6.746
0.780 58.378
2
Pseudo R
0.020
Area Under ROC Curve
0.592
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 6. Predictive Margins of Three-way interaction of Anonymity Variables on Willingness of Offend – Sell

predictors of a willingness to offend (see Table 21; pseudo R2 = 0.351, lroc = 0.866). These
relationships can be interpreted as follows: a one-point increase in education attainment level is
associated with a 27.89% increase in the odds of being willing to commit cyberbullying; a onepoint increase in prior cyber victimization score is associated with a 134.85% increase in the
odds of being willing to commit cyberbullying; a one-point increase in self-reported computer
skill is associated with a 38.23% decrease in odds of being willing to offend; and a one-point
increase in concern about employers discovering participation in the act of cyberbullying is
associated with a 1.82% increase in odds of being willing to offend.
Hypothesis 2b. Interaction analyses between the experimental manipulations on the
willingness to cyberbully did not identify and direct nor interactive effects in any of the two-way
or three-way models. Full details of the analyses are displayed in Tables 22 through 25.
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Table 20. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Cyberbullying Baseline Model on Willingness to Offend (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.294
0.218
0.745
0.486
1.144
Account Information
Fake
-0.038
0.217
0.962
0.629
1.473
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.123
0.217
1.131
0.739
1.732
Pseudo R2
0.004
Area Under ROC Curve
0.545
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 21. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Cyberbullying Full Model on Willingness to Offend (n=341)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.407
0.300
0.666
0.370
1.199
Account Information
Fake
0.036
0.300
1.037
0.576
1.867
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.562
0.307
1.755
0.962
3.201
Age
-0.018
0.011
0.982
0.961
1.003
Educational Attainment
0.246* 0.109
1.279
1.033
1.583
Never Married
-0.579
0.390
0.561
0.261
1.205
Male
0.606
0.342
1.832
0.937
3.584
White
0.279
0.331
1.322
0.690
2.530
Risk Taking
-0.221
0.268
0.802
0.474
1.356
Self-Control
0.482
0.360
1.620
0.800
3.281
Deviant Peer Association
0.454
0.301
1.575
0.874
2.839
Financial Strain
0.038
0.170
1.039
0.744
1.451
Prior Online Victimization
0.854* 0.332
2.349
1.225
4.503
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.702
0.383
2.019
0.953
4.274
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.482** 0.184
0.618
0.431
0.886
Online RAT
0.322
0.240
1.380
0.862
2.210
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.146
0.230
1.157
0.738
1.814
Social Media Legitimacy
0.102
0.202
1.108
0.745
1.646
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.009
0.006
0.991
0.979
1.004
Informal Control: Employer
0.018** 0.006
1.018
1.007
1.029
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.001
0.005
0.999
0.988
1.009
Formal Control: Arrest
0.006
0.006
1.006
0.995
1.018
2
Pseudo R
0.351
Area Under ROC Curve
0.866
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 22. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Two-way Interaction Fake/IP Block Model on Willingness to Cyberbully (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.286
0.219
0.752
0.490
1.155
Account Information
Fake
-0.166
0.305
0.848
0.467
1.540
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.004
0.305
0.997
0.549
1.810
Interaction
Fake/IP Block
0.260
0.435
1.296
0.553
3.040
Pseudo R2
0.005
Area Under ROC Curve
0.550
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 23. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Two-way Interaction Fake/Unknown Model on Willingness to Cyberbully (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
0.050
0.304
1.052
0.58
1.907
Account Information
Fake
0.272
0.291
1.312
0.743
2.317
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.102
0.219
1.107
0.722
1.698
Interaction
Fake/Unknown
-0.715
0.442
0.490
0.207
1.164
Pseudo R2
0.010
Area Under ROC Curve
0.564
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 24. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Two-way Interaction Unknown/IP Block Model on Willingness to Cyberbully
(n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
0.05
0.304
1.052
0.58
1.907
Account Information
Fake
0.272
0.291
1.312
0.743
2.317
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.102
0.219
1.107
0.722
1.698
Interaction
Fake/Unknown
-0.715 0.442
0.49
0.207
1.164
Pseudo R2
0.004
Area Under ROC Curve
0.545
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 25. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Three-way Interaction Unknown/Fake/IP Block Model on Willingness to
Cyberbully (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.293
0.443
0.747
0.314 1.779
Account Information
Fake
-0.173
0.405
0.842
0.381 1.859
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.351
0.424
0.705
0.308 1.616
Interaction
Unknown/Fake
0.017
0.616
1.017
0.305 3.393
Unknown/IP Block
0.676
0.614
1.966
0.591 6.543
Fake/IP Block
0.921
0.585
2.511
0.798 7.899
Unknown/Fake/IP Block
-1.538
0.897
0.216
0.038 1.247
Pseudo R2
0.017
Area Under ROC Curve
0.585
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Vignette 3: Doxing
Hypothesis 2.a. The results of the logistic regression model of the willingness to
participate in doxing on the categorical experimental manipulations of victim/respondent
relationship, respondent account information, and browser settings are reported in Table 26
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Table 26. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Doxing Baseline Model on Willingness to Offend (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.273
0.223
0.761
0.492
1.177
Account Information
Fake
0.063
0.222
1.065
0.690
1.643
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.224
0.221
1.252
0.811
1.932
Pseudo R2
0.006
Area Under ROC Curve
0.548
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 27. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Doxing Full Model on Willingness to Offend (n=338)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.512
0.309
0.600
0.328
1.097
Account Information
Fake
-0.205
0.312
0.816
0.443
1.501
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.660* 0.316
1.934
1.042
3.588
Age
-0.018
0.012
0.983
0.961
1.005
Educational Attainment
0.349* 0.116
1.417
1.130
1.778
Never Married
0.006
0.384
1.006
0.475
2.131
Male
0.147
0.352
1.159
0.582
2.308
White
0.271
0.332
1.312
0.685
2.511
Risk Taking
0.351
0.240
1.420
0.888
2.272
Self-Control
0.505
0.369
1.657
0.806
3.409
Deviant Peer Association
0.222
0.309
1.249
0.683
2.284
Financial Strain
0.027
0.175
1.027
0.730
1.446
Prior Online Victimization
0.468* 0.323
1.596
0.849
3.002
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.858
0.401
2.358
1.076
5.167
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.014** 0.182
0.987
0.691
1.409
Online RAT
0.467
0.241
1.595
0.996
2.554
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.181
0.227
1.199
0.769
1.870
Social Media Legitimacy
-0.093
0.202
0.912
0.615
1.353
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.014
0.007
1.015
1.001
1.028
Informal Control: Employer
-0.002** 0.007
0.999
0.987
1.012
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.007
0.007
0.994
0.981
1.006
Formal Control: Arrest
0.010
0.007
1.010
0.998
1.023
2
Pseudo R
0.334
Area Under ROC Curve
0.863
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(pseudo R2 = 0.006, lroc = 0.548). The baseline model analyzing the experimental manipulations
did not indicate any significance in the model. The experimental variable IP blocking settings
was significant in the fully controlled model (b = 0.659, p < 0.05), though the remaining
experimental variables were not. The control variables of education (b= 0.348, p < 0.01), street
code adherence (b = 0.857, p < 0.05), and concern about family and friends (b = 0.014, p < 0.05)
were all significant predictors of a willingness to offend (see Table 27; pseudo R2 = 0.334, lroc =
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0.863). These relationships can be interpreted as follows: using IP blocking browser settings is
associated with a 93.33% increase in the odds of being willing to commit the act of doxing; a
one-point increase in educational attainment level is associated with a 41.68% increase in odds
of being willing to offend; a one-point increase in street code adherence score is associated with
a 135.71% increase in odds of being willing to offend; and one-point increase in concern about
family and friends discovering their participation in doxing is associated with a 1.4% increase in
odds of being willing to commit doxing.
Hypothesis 2b. Interaction analyses between the experimental manipulations on the
willingness to dox did not identify and direct nor interactive effects in any of the two-way or
three-way models. Full details of the analysis are reported in Tables 28 through 31.
Table 28. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Two-way Interaction Fake/IP Block Model on Willingness to Dox (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.263
0.224
0.770
0.497 1.192
Account Information
Fake
-0.108
0.314
0.898
0.486 1.660
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.055
0.313
1.057
0.573 1.949
Interaction
Fake/IP Block
0.341
0.444
1.406
0.590 3.352
Pseudo R2
0.007
Area Under ROC Curve
0.543
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 29. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Two-way Interaction Fake/Unknown Model on Willingness to Dox (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
0.274
0.313
1.315
0.713 2.426
Account Information
Fake
0.551
0.299
1.735
0.968 3.113
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.192
0.224
1.211
0.782 1.877
Interaction
Fake/Unknown
-1.130
0.455
0.324
0.133 0.789
2
Pseudo R
0.019
Area Under ROC Curve
0.594
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 30. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Two-way Interaction Unknown/IP Block Model on Willingness to Dox (n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
-0.190
0.316
0.828
0.446
1.535
Account Information
Fake
0.058
0.223
1.059
0.686
1.637
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
0.297
0.295
1.346
0.756
2.398
Interaction
Unknown/IP Block
-0.167
0.447
0.847
0.353
2.030
Pseudo R2
0.006
Area Under ROC Curve
0.551
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 31. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Three-way Interaction Unknown/Fake/IP Block Model on Willingness to Dox
(n=374)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Victim/Respondent Relationship
Unknown
0.257
0.453
1.293
0.533 3.135
Account Information
Fake
0.265
0.420
1.303
0.574 2.963
Browser Settings
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.012
0.442
0.989
0.416 2.350
Interaction
Unknown/Fake
-0.859
0.636
0.424
0.123 1.472
Unknown/IP Block
0.056
0.627
1.058
0.310 3.607
Fake/IP Block
0.582
0.599
1.790
0.554 5.783
Unknown/Fake/IP Block
-0.592
0.915
0.554
0.093 3.324
Pseudo R2
0.021
Area Under ROC Curve
0.594
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Research Question 3
The third research question addresses the differences observed between the offense types.
Hypothesis H3 states that any impact on the willingness to offend associated with the anonymity
providing behaviors should lessen based on the seriousness of the offense. To begin, in the
original coding of the dependent variable, participants indicated a mean willingness to buy illicit
prescriptions of 24.6%, to sell of 13.1%, cyberbully of 15.3%, and dox 14.3%. The baseline
without considering the impact of anonymity providing behaviors implies participants are most
willing to purchase illicit prescriptions, followed by cyberbullying, then doxing, and finally
selling prescriptions illicitly. Through comparison of the model results, the experimental
variables of VPN and Bitcoin use were significant regarding the willingness to buy prescriptions
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illicitly; however, this effect was absent in the model regarding the sale of prescription
medications through illicit online markets, the more serious of the offenses. However, in
comparing the results between the acts of cyberbullying and doxing, the experimental variable of
the use of IP blocking software was only significant in the doxing model, the more serious
offense.
Goal 3: Informal and Formal Controls on the Willingness to Offend
The third goal of this dissertation is guided by the assumptions of contemporary
deterrence theory. Namely, it intends to assess the impact of perceived threat of consequences
from various formal and informal sources on the willingness to commit deviant acts. In the prior
analyses from research question 2, the moderating variables were utilized in the full logistic
regression models. None of the informal nor formal control variables were significant in vignette
1 (see Table 9). The family and friends variable was significant in the model for vignette 2 (b = 0.016, p < 0.05, OR 0.984) (see Table 15). Concern about discovery from an employer was
significant for both of third vignette’s outcomes, cyberbullying (b= 0.018, p <0.01, OR 1.018)
and doxing (b= -0.002, p <0.01, OR 0.999) (see Tables 21 and 27). However, in the
cyberbullying model, concern regarding employers operates in the opposite direction of the
hypothesized outcome.
Research Question 4
The fourth and final research question for this dissertation asks if informal and formal
controls moderate the effect of anonymity on the willingness to offend. To determine if a
moderation effect exists, the data were analyzed using interaction effects between the anonymity
providing behaviors and the various informal control variables (i.e., concern about family and
friends, employers, and account suspension) and the formal control of concern over arrest in
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alignment with contemporary deterrence theory. The independent variables in question here are
coded categorically, whereas the moderator variables are coded continuously. Therefore, a
moderation effect in these scenarios will be indicated by statistical differences in the group
means of the categories of the independent variable across the range of the moderating variable
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983). To determine this, the first step in the analysis is to include interaction
terms in the logistic regression model. Next, if significance is indicated in the regression model,
predicted probabilities were created using Stata’s “margins” command and margins plots are
used to visualize the data. These analyses and discussion of results are organized by deviance
type and hypothesis below. The associated hypotheses are as follows:
H4.a: Higher concern regarding formal controls will moderate the anonymizing
behaviors impact on the willingness to offend.
H4.b: Higher concern regarding informal will moderate the anonymizing behaviors
impact on the willingness to offend.
Vignette 1: Buying Illicit Prescriptions.
H4.a: Formal – Arrest. The first hypothesis of research question 4 stated that formal
controls would moderate the effect of the anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to
offend. In the interaction model of the first vignette, the experimental variable Bitcoin had a
significant direct effect (b = -0.997, p < 0.05, OR 0.370) on the willingness to offend. However,
none of the interaction effects were significant (see Table 32; pseudo R2 = 0.213, lroc = 0.799).
As the currency variable was the only experimental condition which indicated any effect,
predictive margins were calculated for the currency and arrest variables. The associated margin
plot (Figure 7) displays a similar slope between the conditions of the currency variable across the
values of the moderator, with both conditions indicating a decrease in willingness to offend as
the concern over arrest increases. However, the confidence intervals indicate a statistical
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Table 32. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Moderation Effect of Formal Control – Arrest on Willingness to Buy (n=339)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
VPN
-0.248
0.487
0.781
0.301
2.027
TOR
0.530
0.450
1.699
0.704
4.097
Bitcoin
-0.997
0.390
0.370
0.172
0.793
Escrow
0.089
0.390
1.093
0.510
2.343
Arrest
0.004
0.009
1.004
0.988
1.021
Moderator Interaction
VPN/Arrest
-0.010
0.009
0.991
0.974
1.007
TOR/ Arrest
-0.015
0.009
0.986
0.970
1.002
Bitcoin/ Arrest
-0.002
0.007
0.999
0.986
1.012
Escrow/ Arrest
0.007
0.007
1.007
0.994
1.021
Age
-0.033** 0.011
0.969
0.950
0.989
Educational Attainment
0.073
0.094
1.076
0.896
1.293
Never Married
-1.082** 0.350
0.339
0.171
0.673
Male
0.372
0.319
1.451
0.777
2.708
White
0.200
0.324
1.222
0.649
2.301
Risk Taking
0.131
0.237
1.139
0.717
1.811
Self-Control
0.589
0.322
1.802
0.961
3.381
Deviant Peer Association
0.316
0.291
1.371
0.777
2.422
Financial Strain
-0.029
0.150
0.973
0.726
1.303
Prior Online Victimization
0.161
0.341
1.174
0.603
2.288
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.226
0.345
1.253
0.638
2.462
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.314
0.166
0.731
0.528
1.012
Online RAT
0.255
0.244
1.290
0.800
2.080
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
-0.068
0.197
0.936
0.636
1.376
Social Media Legitimacy
0.193
0.178
1.212
0.857
1.715
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.003
0.005
1.003
0.993
1.012
Informal Control: Employer
0.002
0.006
1.002
0.991
1.012
2
Pseudo R
0.213
Area Under ROC Curve
0.799
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

difference across the values between 10 and 70 of the arrest variable on the willingness to
offend, indicating while there is no moderation effect, the strength of the direct effect varies
across the moderator.
H4.b: Informal – Family & Friends. The second hypothesis of research question 4 stated
that formal controls would moderate the effect of the anonymity providing behaviors on the
willingness to offend. The current model evaluates the moderating impact of the informal control
of family and friends on the willingness to offend. Like the arrest model, Bitcoin maintains a
significant direct effect (b = -1.012, p < 0.01, OR 0.364) on the willingness to offend. No other
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Figure 7. Predictive Margins Plot of Currency Type on Willingness to Offend – Buying Across Arrest Moderator

experimental variable was significant either independently or in interaction with the moderator
(see Table 33; pseudo R2 = 0.044, lroc = 0.793).
H4.b: Informal – Employer. The second informal control utilized in the analyses is the
concern over an employer discovering participation in the act of buying illicit prescriptions
online. Again, the only significant direct effect was the use of Bitcoin (b = -1.384, p < 0.000, OR
0.251) with no significance indicated on any of the interactions (Table 34; pseudo R2 = 0.21, lroc
= 0.793), indicating that the relationship is due to direct effects, not the moderating variable.
Predictive margins between currency type and the employer moderator were calculated and
plotted. As seen in Figure 8, the means and slopes of the conditions of the currency variables
differ over the range of the moderator, with the direct effect most significant for values of less
than 50 of the moderator. The use of PayPal or similar payment platforms are associated with a
decrease in willingness to offend when concern regarding employers increases, while the use of
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Bitcoin is associated with an increase in the willingness to offend as the value of the employer
variable increases.
Vignette 2: Selling Prescriptions. As with the previous vignette, each moderator was
evaluated in interaction with the experimental variables. Each iteration lacked significance in
either the direct or interactive effects. While the family-and-friends variable was significant in
the full model for vignette 2 (b = -0.016, p < 0.05, OR 0.984), this effect disappeared in the
interaction model. The full regression models are reported in Tables 35 through 37. It can be
concluded that there is no moderating effect from any of the formal or informal control variables
on the willingness to sell prescription drugs online illegally.
Table 33. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Family & Friends on Willingness to Buy
(n=339)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effects
VPN
-0.415
0.481
0.661
0.258
1.696
TOR
0.420
0.456
1.521
0.623
3.717
Bitcoin
-1.013** 0.384
0.364
0.172
0.771
Escrow
0.143
0.385
1.153
0.543
2.450
Family & Friends
0.008
0.010
1.008
0.990
1.026
Moderator Interaction
VPN/Family
-0.006
0.009
0.995
0.978
1.013
TOR/ Family
-0.013
0.009
0.988
0.971
1.005
Bitcoin/ Family
-0.002
0.008
0.999
0.985
1.014
Escrow/ Family
0.007
0.008
1.007
0.993
1.021
Age
-0.032** 0.011
0.969
0.950
0.989
Educational Attainment
0.064
0.094
1.066
0.888
1.281
Never Married
-1.099** 0.350
0.334
0.169
0.661
Male
0.373
0.317
1.451
0.781
2.697
White
0.22
0.324
1.246
0.662
2.347
Risk Taking
0.159
0.240
1.172
0.734
1.874
Self-Control
0.549
0.323
1.731
0.921
3.254
Deviant Peer Association
0.328
0.291
1.388
0.786
2.454
Financial Strain
-0.023
0.149
0.978
0.731
1.307
Prior Online Victimization
0.195
0.342
1.215
0.622
2.373
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.238
0.345
1.269
0.646
2.493
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.312
0.166
0.732
0.530
1.012
Online RAT
0.271
0.244
1.311
0.813
2.115
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
-0.051
0.198
0.952
0.647
1.400
Social Media Legitimacy
0.163
0.177
1.177
0.833
1.665
Informal Control: Employer
0.001
0.006
1.001
0.990
1.011
Formal Control: Arrest
-0.003
0.005
0.998
0.990
1.007
2
Pseudo R
0.210
Area Under ROC Curve
0.793
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 34. Logistic Regression of Vignette 1: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Employer on Willingness to Buy (n=339)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
VPN
-0.532
0.420
0.588
0.259
1.338
TOR
0.067
0.392
1.070
0.497
2.301
Bitcoin
-1.385*** 0.342
0.251
0.129
0.490
Escrow
0.454
0.336
1.575
0.817
3.036
Employ
-0.002
0.011
0.999
0.978
1.020
Moderator Interaction
VPN/Employ
-0.005
0.010
0.996
0.978
1.014
TOR/Employ
-0.006
0.009
0.995
0.979
1.013
Bitcoin/Employ
0.012
0.008
1.012
0.997
1.027
Escrow/Employ
-0.002
0.008
0.999
0.984
1.014
Age
-0.034** 0.011
0.968
0.948
0.988
Educational Attainment
0.061
0.094
1.063
0.885
1.277
Never Married
-1.052** 0.347
0.350
0.178
0.690
Male
0.351
0.319
1.420
0.761
2.651
White
0.279
0.323
1.322
0.702
2.487
Risk Taking
0.157
0.241
1.169
0.731
1.872
Self-Control
0.535
0.321
1.707
0.911
3.197
Deviant Peer Association
0.313
0.293
1.367
0.771
2.424
Financial Strain
-0.040
0.148
0.961
0.720
1.284
Prior Online Victimization
0.196
0.338
1.217
0.628
2.356
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.242
0.346
1.274
0.647
2.508
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.326* 0.166
0.722
0.522
1.000
Online RAT
0.281
0.244
1.325
0.822
2.135
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
-0.079
0.198
0.925
0.629
1.361
Social Media Legitimacy
0.205
0.177
1.227
0.868
1.736
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.004
0.005
1.004
0.994
1.013
Formal Control: Arrest
-0.002
0.005
0.999
0.990
1.008
2
Pseudo R
0.210
Area Under ROC Curve
0.793
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Vignette 3: Cyber Harassment & Cyberbullying.
H4.a: Formal – Arrest. The interaction model of the cyberbullying vignette between the
formal control of arrest and the experimental variables of victim/respondent relationship, use of
fake account, and use of IP blocking software is displayed in Table 38 (pseudo R2 = 0.337, lroc =
0.86). It did not identify any direct effects; however, the interaction between the moderator of
arrest and use of IP blocking software was significant (b = 0.018, p < 0.05, OR 0.008). Predictive
margins were calculated between the moderator and the IP software variable and plotted. Figure
9 does illustrate an overlap between the confidence intervals; however, this is a plot of predicted
probabilities across the spectrum of the moderating variable, not a depiction of the effect
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Figure 8. Predictive Margins Plot of Currency Type on Willingness to Offend – Buying Across Employer Moderator

difference. The moderation effect of arrest on IP blocking software is significant with enabled
systems displaying a positive relationship with willingness to cyberbully and disabled systems
displaying a negative relationship with cyberbullying.
H4.b: Informal – Account Suspension. Interaction analyses between the experimental
variable and concern over account suspension did not identify any direct or indirect effects of the
moderator (see Table 39; pseudo R2 = 0.328, lroc = 0.854). It can be concluded that account
suspension does not moderate the impact of anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to
commit cyberbullying.
H4.b: Informal – Family & Friends. The interaction model of the cyberbullying vignette
between the informal control of family and friends and the experimental variables is reported in
Table 40 (pseudo R2 = 0.342, lroc = 0.863). In this model, the moderator of family and friends
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Table 35. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Moderation Effect of Formal Control – Arrest on Willingness to Sell (n=337)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
VPN
0.640
0.730
1.896
0.455
7.913
TOR
0.233
0.749
1.263
0.291
5.478
Bitcoin
0.384
0.621
1.467
0.435
4.955
Escrow
0.628
0.617
1.874
0.560
6.267
Arrest
0.012
0.011
1.012
0.991
1.033
Moderator Interaction
VPN/Arrest
-0.001
0.010
1.000
0.981
1.020
TOR/ Arrest
-0.006
0.011
0.995
0.976
1.015
Bitcoin/ Arrest
-0.008
0.009
0.993
0.977
1.009
Escrow/ Arrest
-0.004
0.009
0.997
0.981
1.013
Age
-0.036** 0.013
0.966
0.943
0.990
Educational Attainment
0.004
0.118
1.004
0.797
1.264
Never Married
-1.623*** 0.449
0.198
0.082
0.476
Male
0.662
0.372
1.938
0.936
4.013
White
-0.307
0.360
0.737
0.364
1.491
Risk Taking
0.091
0.249
1.095
0.673
1.781
Self-Control
0.346
0.370
1.414
0.686
2.913
Deviant Peer Association
0.930** 0.314
2.534
1.371
4.683
Financial Strain
0.136
0.177
1.146
0.810
1.620
Prior Online Victimization
0.200
0.333
1.222
0.637
2.343
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.440
0.397
1.552
0.714
3.373
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.033
0.198
0.968
0.657
1.427
Online RAT
0.066
0.252
1.068
0.653
1.748
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
0.028
0.236
1.028
0.648
1.631
Social Media Legitimacy
0.550* 0.216
1.733
1.137
2.644
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.017* 0.007
0.985
0.972
0.998
Informal Control: Employer
0.014
0.007
1.014
1.000
1.028
2
Pseudo R
0.354
Area Under ROC Curve
0.868
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

was both significant directly (b = -0.022, p < 0.05, OR 0.979) and in interaction with the use of
IP blocking software (b = 0.023, p < 0.01, OR 1.023). Predictive margins were calculated and
plotted for interaction between the family-and-friends moderator and the use of IP blocking
software. The predictive margins plot (Figure 10) indicates a difference in direction of the
relationship between the experimental conditions, with IP blocking software being associated
with an increase in willingness over the range of the moderator and a lack of blocking software
being associated with a reduction in willingness to offend over the range of the moderator
variable. Again, this is a plot of predicted probabilities across the spectrum of the moderating
variable, not a depiction of the effect difference. It can be concluded that concern over family
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and friends discovering participation in the act of cyberbullying does moderate the effect of
anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to commit cyberbullying.
H4.b: Informal – Employer. As seen in Table 41 (pseudo R2 = 0.333, lroc = 0.859),
interaction analyses between the experimental variable and concern over employers did not
identify any direct or indirect effects of the moderator. However, the interaction between
employer and the use of IP blocking software does approach significance (b = 0.015, p = 0.051,
OR 1.016), so predictive margins were calculated for the employer and IP software variables. As
displayed in Figure 11, the slopes of both indicate an increase in willingness to commit
cyberbullying as the concern over employers increases, with the use of IP blocking software
Table 36. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Family & Friends on Willingness to Sell
(n=337)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effects
VPN
0.757
0.602
2.132
0.657
6.925
TOR
0.026
0.613
1.026
0.309
3.405
Bitcoin
0.574
0.510
1.775
0.654
4.821
Escrow
0.027
0.493
1.028
0.392
2.696
Family & Friends
-0.012
0.011
0.989
0.968
1.010
Moderator Interaction
VPN/Family
-0.003
0.010
0.998
0.979
1.017
TOR/ Family
-0.002
0.010
0.999
0.980
1.018
Bitcoin/ Family
-0.015
0.009
0.986
0.970
1.003
Escrow/ Family
0.009
0.009
1.009
0.993
1.024
Age*
-0.033* 0.013
0.969
0.945
0.993
Educational Attainment
0.006
0.118
1.006
0.799
1.266
Never Married
-1.607*** 0.445
0.201
0.084
0.480
Male
0.696
0.374
2.004
0.965
4.165
White
-0.399
0.364
0.672
0.329
1.370
Risk Taking
0.013
0.251
1.013
0.620
1.655
Self-Control
0.397
0.374
1.487
0.715
3.092
Deviant Peer Association
0.854** 0.309
2.349
1.284
4.299
Financial Strain
0.149
0.179
1.160
0.819
1.645
Prior Online Victimization
0.232
0.329
1.261
0.663
2.400
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.500
0.406
1.649
0.745
3.652
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.044
0.197
0.958
0.652
1.408
Online RAT
0.104
0.250
1.110
0.681
1.811
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
-0.064
0.240
0.939
0.588
1.501
Social Media Legitimacy
0.590** 0.215
1.803
1.185
2.744
Informal Control: Employer
0.013
0.007
1.013
0.999
1.026
Formal Control: Arrest
0.005
0.006
1.005
0.994
1.016
2
Pseudo R
0.361
Area Under ROC Curve
0.869
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 37. Logistic Regression of Vignette 2: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Employer on Willingness to Sell (n=337)
Variable
b
SE
Direct Effect
VPN
0.245
0.559
TOR
-0.517
0.605
Bitcoin
0.249
0.478
Escrow
0.811
0.491
Employ
0.017
0.011
Moderator Interaction
VPN/Employ
0.008
0.009
TOR/Employ
0.008
0.010
Bitcoin/Employ
-0.007
0.008
Escrow/Employ
-0.009
0.008
Age
-0.037** 0.013
Educational Attainment
-0.002
0.116
Never Married
-1.678*** 0.448
Male
0.669
0.370
White
-0.267
0.366
Risk Taking
0.093
0.255
Self-Control
0.320
0.374
Deviant Peer Association
0.928** 0.319
Financial Strain
0.123
0.175
Prior Online Victimization
0.220
0.335
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.414
0.402
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.029
0.197
Online RAT
0.081
0.257
Perceived Anonymity Shopping
0.024
0.237
Social Media Legitimacy
0.576** 0.214
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.017* 0.007
Formal Control: Arrest
0.003
0.006
Pseudo R2
0.358
Area Under ROC Curve
0.870
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

OR

OR 95% C.I.

1.278
0.596
1.283
2.250
1.017

0.427
0.182
0.502
0.860
0.996

3.821
1.951
3.277
5.887
1.039

1.008
1.008
0.993
0.991
0.964
0.998
0.187
1.953
0.766
1.098
1.377
2.529
1.131
1.246
1.512
0.972
1.084
1.024
1.779
0.984
1.003

0.989
0.989
0.978
0.976
0.940
0.795
0.078
0.945
0.374
0.666
0.661
1.353
0.802
0.646
0.688
0.661
0.656
0.644
1.170
0.971
0.992

1.027
1.027
1.008
1.007
0.988
1.253
0.450
4.033
1.568
1.811
2.868
4.726
1.595
2.405
3.325
1.428
1.792
1.628
2.705
0.997
1.014

indicating a stronger trend. It can be concluded that there is no moderation effect between the
employer variable and anonymity regarding the willingness to commit cyberbullying, though this
may be the result of a lack of statistical power due to an over representation of individuals above
the retirement age.
Vignette 3: Doxing.
H4.a: Formal – Arrest. The interaction model of the doxing between the formal control
of arrest and the experimental variables of victim/respondent relationship, use of fake account,
and use of IP blocking software is displayed in Table 42 (pseudo R2 = 0.352, lroc = 0.869). It did
not identify any direct effects; however, the interaction between the moderator of arrest and use
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of IP blocking software was significant (b = 0.016, p < 0.05, OR 1.016). Predictive margins were
calculated between the moderator and the IP software variable and plotted. As seen in Figure 12,
the slopes of both conditions of the IP blocking variable indicate an increase in willingness to
commit doxing as the concern over arrest increases, with the use of IP blocking software
indicating a stronger trend.
H4.b: Informal. Continuing with the established analytic methodology, each informal
moderator was evaluated in interaction with the experimental variables on a regression of the
willingness to commit doxing. The remaining results of the regression analyses are detailed in
Tables 43 through 45. While the employer variable was significant in the full regression model
Table 38. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Formal Control – Arrest on Willingness to Bully (n=341)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.691
0.421
0.502
0.220
1.144
Fake Account
-0.181
0.424
0.836
0.365
1.917
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.208
0.447
0.813
0.339
1.950
Arrest
-0.009
0.010
0.992
0.974
1.010
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Arrest
0.008
0.008
1.008
0.992
1.023
Fake/Arrest
0.006
0.009
1.006
0.990
1.022
Enabled/Arrest
0.018* 0.008
1.018
1.003
1.034
Age
-0.023* 0.012
0.978
0.957
1.000
Educational Attainment
0.244* 0.112
1.277
1.026
1.588
Never Married
-0.763
0.408
0.467
0.211
1.037
Male
0.659
0.353
1.933
0.969
3.857
White
0.266
0.336
1.305
0.676
2.518
Risk Taking
-0.296
0.275
0.745
0.435
1.276
Self-Control
0.447
0.365
1.564
0.765
3.196
Deviant Peer Association
0.656
0.391
1.926
0.897
4.140
Financial Strain
0.407
0.298
1.502
0.838
2.693
Prior Online Victimization
0.043* 0.173
1.044
0.745
1.464
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.857
0.337
2.354
1.217
4.554
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.488* 0.189
0.615
0.426
0.889
Online RAT
0.297
0.240
1.346
0.842
2.152
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.112
0.237
1.118
0.704
1.777
Social Media Legitimacy
0.181
0.207
1.199
0.800
1.796
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.010
0.007
0.991
0.979
1.004
Informal Control: Employer
0.019** 0.006
1.020
1.008
1.031
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.003
0.006
0.998
0.988
1.009
Pseudo R2
0.337
Area Under ROC Curve
0.860
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 9. Predictive Margins Plot of IP Blocking Type on Willingness to Offend – Cyberbully Across Arrest Moderator

(b= -0.002, p <0.01, OR 0.999), the effect disappeared in the interaction model (see Table 45;
pseudo R2 = 0.35, lroc = 0.867). It can be concluded that there is no moderating effect from any
of the informal control variables on the willingness to dox.
Chapter Summary
This chapter supplied the detailed descriptive statistics of the study sample as well as
detailed the statistical analyses utilized to address the four research questions outlined in chapter
four. The findings from the analyses and their implications will be covered in the following
chapter.
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Figure 10. Predictive Margins Plot of IP Blocking Type on Willingness to Offend – Cyberbully Across Family & Friends
Moderator

Figure 11. Predictive Margins Plot of IP Blocking Type on Willingness to Offend – Cyberbully Across Employer Moderator
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Figure 12. Predictive Margins Plot of IP Blocking Type on Willingness to Offend – Doxing Across Arrest Moderator
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Table 39. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Account Suspension on Willingness to
Bully (n=341)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.369
0.465
0.692
0.279
1.721
Fake Account
0.113
0.463
1.119
0.453
2.768
IP Blocking Enabled
0.041
0.477
1.042
0.410
2.652
Arrest
-0.006
0.009
0.995
0.979
1.011
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Arrest
-0.001
0.008
1.000
0.985
1.015
Fake/Arrest
-0.002
0.008
0.999
0.984
1.014
Enabled/Arrest
0.011
0.008
1.011
0.997
1.026
Age
-0.021
0.012
0.981
0.959
1.003
Educational Attainment
0.245* 0.110
1.277
1.031
1.582
Never Married
-0.666
0.401
0.514
0.235
1.127
Male
0.620
0.347
1.858
0.942
3.667
White
0.273
0.332
1.314
0.686
2.518
Risk Taking
-0.228
0.270
0.797
0.470
1.350
Self-Control
0.457
0.363
1.580
0.776
3.217
Deviant Peer Association
0.440
0.306
1.552
0.853
2.826
Financial Strain
0.032
0.173
1.032
0.737
1.446
Prior Online Victimization
0.852* 0.337
2.345
1.212
4.534
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.731
0.388
2.076
0.972
4.435
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.487** 0.187
0.615
0.427
0.887
Online RAT
0.319
0.241
1.375
0.858
2.205
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.156
0.233
1.168
0.741
1.844
Social Media Legitimacy
0.111
0.205
1.117
0.749
1.668
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.009
0.007
0.992
0.980
1.004
Informal Control: Employer
0.019** 0.006
1.020
1.008
1.031
Formal Control: Arrest
0.006
0.006
1.006
0.995
1.017
2
Pseudo R
0.328
Area Under ROC Curve
0.854
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 40. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Family & Friends on Willingness to Bully
(n=341)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.411
0.406
0.664
0.300
1.469
Fake Account
-0.123
0.408
0.886
0.398
1.969
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.267
0.421
0.767
0.337
1.747
Family
-0.022* 0.010
0.979
0.960
0.998
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Family
0.001
0.009
1.001
0.985
1.018
Fake/Family
0.005
0.009
1.005
0.989
1.021
Enabled/Family
0.023** 0.009
1.023
1.007
1.040
Age
-0.024
0.012
0.978
0.956
1.000
Educational Attainment
0.254* 0.112
1.289
1.037
1.603
Never Married
-0.757
0.409
0.470
0.211
1.046
Male*
0.718
0.356
2.049
1.020
4.117
White
0.330
0.339
1.391
0.717
2.699
Risk Taking
-0.200
0.272
0.819
0.482
1.394
Self-Control
0.493
0.367
1.637
0.799
3.356
Deviant Peer Association
0.385
0.298
1.470
0.820
2.634
Financial Strain
0.068
0.173
1.070
0.763
1.502
Prior Online Victimization
0.893** 0.340
2.441
1.255
4.748
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.607
0.391
1.835
0.854
3.944
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.475* 0.191
0.623
0.429
0.904
Online RAT
0.291
0.240
1.338
0.837
2.139
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.146
0.236
1.158
0.729
1.837
Social Media Legitimacy
0.160
0.206
1.173
0.784
1.755
Informal Control: Employer
0.020** 0.006
1.020
1.009
1.032
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.002
0.006
0.999
0.989
1.010
Formal Control: Arrest
0.005
0.006
1.005
0.994
1.017
2
Pseudo R
0.342
Area Under ROC Curve
0.863
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 41. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Employer on Willingness to Bully (n=341)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.455
0.416
0.635
0.281
1.434
Fake Account
-0.204
0.424
0.816
0.356
1.872
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.071
0.438
0.933
0.396
2.198
Employ
0.008
0.009
1.008
0.990
1.025
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Employ
0.002
0.008
1.002
0.987
1.018
Fake/Employ
0.005
0.008
1.005
0.990
1.021
Enabled/Employ
0.016
0.008
1.016
1.000
1.032
Age
-0.023* 0.012
0.978
0.957
1.000
Educational Attainment
0.248* 0.111
1.281
1.032
1.590
Never Married
-0.727
0.402
0.484
0.221
1.064
Male
0.678
0.349
1.970
0.996
3.897
White
0.293
0.337
1.341
0.694
2.592
Risk Taking
-0.200
0.272
0.820
0.482
1.397
Self-Control
0.432
0.365
1.540
0.754
3.146
Deviant Peer Association
0.670
0.390
1.953
0.910
4.194
Financial Strain
0.421
0.297
1.524
0.853
2.723
Prior Online Victimization
0.056* 0.172
1.057
0.756
1.480
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.849
0.334
2.337
1.215
4.497
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.477* 0.187
0.622
0.431
0.896
Online RAT
0.305
0.239
1.356
0.849
2.165
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.124
0.232
1.132
0.719
1.782
Social Media Legitimacy
0.113
0.204
1.120
0.752
1.667
Informal Control: Family & Friends
-0.008
0.007
0.993
0.981
1.006
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.002
0.006
0.999
0.989
1.010
Formal Control: Arrest
0.006
0.006
1.006
0.995
1.017
Pseudo R2
0.333
Area Under ROC Curve
0.859
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 42. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Formal Control – Arrest on Willingness to Dox (n=338)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.335
0.465
0.716
0.289
1.779
Fake Account
-0.908
0.476
0.404
0.159
1.025
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.115
0.487
0.892
0.344
2.314
Arrest
-0.006
0.010
0.995
0.976
1.015
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Arrest
-0.003
0.008
0.998
0.982
1.013
Fake/Arrest
0.016
0.008
1.016
1.000
1.032
Enabled/Arrest
0.016* 0.008
1.016
1.001
1.032
Age
-0.025* 0.012
0.977
0.954
1.000
Educational Attainment
0.368** 0.119
1.445
1.146
1.821
Never Married
-0.167
0.401
0.847
0.387
1.856
Male
0.227
0.361
1.255
0.619
2.544
White
0.258
0.338
1.294
0.668
2.507
Risk Taking
0.337
0.248
1.400
0.863
2.273
Self-Control
0.496
0.372
1.641
0.793
3.397
Deviant Peer Association
0.210
0.314
1.234
0.668
2.280
Financial Strain
0.007
0.179
1.007
0.709
1.430
Prior Online Victimization
0.378
0.328
1.459
0.767
2.774
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.853* 0.412
2.347
1.048
5.254
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.045
0.186
0.957
0.666
1.375
Online RAT
0.470
0.245
1.599
0.991
2.581
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.129
0.232
1.138
0.723
1.790
Social Media Legitimacy
-0.062
0.205
0.941
0.631
1.403
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.015* 0.007
1.015
1.001
1.028
Informal Control: Employer
-0.003
0.007
0.998
0.986
1.011
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.005
0.007
0.996
0.983
1.008
Pseudo R2
0.352
Area Under ROC Curve
0.869
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 43. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Account Suspension on Willingness to
Dox (n=338)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.132
0.460
0.877
0.356
2.159
Fake Account
-0.859
0.471
0.424
0.169
1.067
IP Blocking Enabled
-0.024
0.478
0.977
0.384
2.488
Suspend
-0.018
0.010
0.983
0.965
1.001
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Suspend
-0.008
0.008
0.993
0.978
1.009
Fake/Suspend
0.015
0.008
1.015
0.999
1.031
Enabled/Suspend
0.014
0.008
1.014
0.999
1.030
Age
-0.025
0.013
0.976
0.953
0.999
Educational Attainment
0.362** 0.118
1.436
1.140
1.808
Never Married
-0.170
0.398
0.845
0.388
1.842
Male
0.240
0.359
1.271
0.630
2.566
White
0.191
0.338
1.210
0.625
2.346
Risk Taking
0.317
0.247
1.373
0.848
2.224
Self-Control
0.472
0.371
1.604
0.776
3.315
Deviant Peer Association
0.233
0.314
1.263
0.684
2.332
Financial Strain
-0.001
0.180
1.000
0.703
1.422
Prior Online Victimization
0.377
0.326
1.457
0.770
2.759
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.829* 0.410
2.291
1.028
5.106
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.073
0.187
0.931
0.645
1.343
Online RAT
0.475
0.244
1.607
0.997
2.591
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.158
0.232
1.172
0.745
1.843
Social Media Legitimacy
-0.076
0.205
0.928
0.622
1.386
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.016* 0.007
1.016
1.002
1.030
Informal Control: Employer
-0.002
0.007
0.999
0.987
1.011
Formal Control: Arrest
0.010
0.007
1.011
0.998
1.023
2
Pseudo R
0.350
Area Under ROC Curve
0.867
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 44. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Family & Friends on Willingness to Dox
(n=338)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
0.033
0.434
1.033
0.442
2.416
Fake Account
-0.248
0.446
0.782
0.327
1.870
IP Blocking Enabled
0.169
0.454
1.184
0.487
2.879
Family
0.017
0.011
1.017
0.997
1.037
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Family
-0.015
0.008
0.987
0.971
1.002
Fake/Family
-0.003
0.009
0.998
0.982
1.014
Enabled/Family
0.013
0.008
1.013
0.998
1.029
Age
-0.021
0.012
0.980
0.958
1.003
Educational Attainment
0.359** 0.118
1.431
1.136
1.802
Never Married
-0.055
0.396
0.948
0.437
2.057
Male
0.149
0.356
1.161
0.578
2.330
White
0.257
0.334
1.293
0.673
2.485
Risk Taking
0.395
0.242
1.484
0.924
2.383
Self-Control
0.477
0.375
1.610
0.773
3.353
Deviant Peer Association
0.243
0.312
2.214
0.994
4.932
Financial Strain
0.023
0.178
1.275
0.692
2.349
Prior Online Victimization
0.465
0.325
1.023
0.723
1.448
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.795
0.409
1.592
0.843
3.007
Computer Skill Self-Eval
0.008
0.186
1.008
0.700
1.451
Online RAT
0.483* 0.244
1.621
1.007
2.609
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.177
0.232
1.194
0.758
1.880
Social Media Legitimacy
-0.073
0.204
0.931
0.625
1.385
Informal Control: Employer
-0.002
0.007
0.999
0.987
1.012
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.007
0.007
0.994
0.981
1.006
Formal Control: Arrest
0.010
0.007
1.010
0.997
1.023
2
Pseudo R
0.347
Area Under ROC Curve
0.866
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 45. Logistic Regression of Vignette 3: Moderation Effect of Informal Control – Employer on Willingness to Dox (n=338)
Variable
b
SE
OR
OR 95% C.I.
Direct Effect
Unknown Relation
-0.051
0.429
0.951
0.411
2.201
Fake Account
-0.735
0.449
0.480
0.200
1.157
IP Blocking Enabled
0.314
0.453
1.369
0.564
3.322
Employ
-0.007
0.010
0.994
0.976
1.013
Moderator Interaction
Unknown/Employ
-0.010
0.008
0.991
0.976
1.005
Fake/Employ
0.012
0.008
1.012
0.996
1.027
Enabled/Employ
0.007
0.008
1.007
0.992
1.022
Age
-0.022
0.012
0.980
0.957
1.002
Educational Attainment
0.357** 0.118
1.429
1.136
1.797
Never Married
-0.097
0.398
0.909
0.417
1.981
Male
0.149
0.356
1.161
0.579
2.328
White
0.266
0.336
1.304
0.676
2.518
Risk Taking
0.402
0.245
1.494
0.926
2.413
Self-Control
0.427
0.371
1.533
0.741
3.170
Deviant Peer Association
0.249
0.312
1.283
0.698
2.360
Financial Strain
0.034
0.178
1.034
0.731
1.464
Prior Online Victimization
0.449
0.327
1.566
0.826
2.970
Street Oriented Beliefs
0.853* 0.406
2.346
1.060
5.194
Computer Skill Self-Eval
-0.019
0.186
0.983
0.683
1.414
Online RAT
0.453
0.244
1.573
0.976
2.536
Perceived Anonymity Social Media
0.148
0.230
1.159
0.740
1.816
Social Media Legitimacy
-0.054
0.205
0.948
0.635
1.416
Informal Control: Family & Friends
0.017* 0.008
1.017
1.003
1.031
Informal Control: Account Suspend
-0.008
0.007
0.993
0.981
1.006
Formal Control: Arrest
0.009
0.007
1.009
0.997
1.022
Pseudo R2
0.345
Area Under ROC Curve
0.865
Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION

Introduction
The current study used a factorial survey experimental design on a sample of 374
American adults, to achieve three goals: (1) contribute to cybercrime/deviance literature by
identifying correlates predicting perceptions of online anonymity and legitimacy, (2) examine the
impact of individual anonymity providing behaviors on the willingness to offend, both
independently and in interaction with each other, across various acts of cybercrime/deviance, net
of other factors, and (3) expand on existing deterrence literature in relation to
cybercrime/deviance to gain a better understanding of the influence of informal and formal
controls on the willingness to commit four different acts of cybercrime and deviance.
The first three sections of this chapter summarize the study’s noteworthy findings as
related to these research goals seated in the context of prior research and discusses potential
explanations for the outcomes. The following section will address the overall implications of this
study. It will then transition to a discussion the limitations of the study and end with some final
thoughts regarding the study.
Goal 1: Correlates of Perceived Anonymity and Legitimacy
Perceptions of Anonymity, Technological Skill, & Online RAT
The analytical results regarding the relationship between technological skill and online
routine activities and perceptions of anonymity did not support the existence of the hypothesized
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quadratic relationships. Additionally, when tested for a linear relationship, these variables were
not correlated. It appears that general familiarity with computers or online environments is not
necessarily related to trust in anonymity. Prior research by Park (2011) did indicate that privacy
behaviors are impacted by knowledge; however, the skills a respondent may have would
potentially have little impact since the anonymity providing technique was assigned.
Another possible explanation for the lack of findings may be the ambiguity of the
scenarios. In each scenario, the respondents were told they are using an alias (in both scenarios)
and a gift card (in the shopping scenario). According to Hite and colleagues (2014), the
measurement instrument is situationally specific. While this study’s measures of perceived
anonymity were internally reliable, the scenarios were vague. Additionally, while the scenarios
used for these measures were similar to the later vignettes, they were not directly reflective of the
assigned conditions in the experiment. In work by Wu and Atkin (2018) using the same
measurement instrument, technological anonymity was predictive of perceptions of anonymity,
which was then predictive of willingness to post personal opinions on news discussions. If this
study were replicated in the future research, it would be beneficial to ask respondents their
perceptions of anonymity regarding the individually assigned experimental vignettes to
determine differences across groups.
Perception of Legitimacy, Technological Skill, & Online RAT
The hypothesis of a positive linear relationship between technological skill and online
routine activities and perceived legitimacy of social media was partially supported the analyses.
In particular, higher reported levels of routine activities online were positively correlated with
perceived legitimacy of social media providers. There was no correlation indicated between
technological skill and legitimacy.
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As mentioned in earlier chapters, there is little research in the area of legitimacy as it
related to online entities. However, research on legal socialization may help contextualize the
findings found in this study. Overall, perceptions of legitimacy and legal cynicism are predicted
by exposure to positive and negative interactions with law enforcement, either directly or
indirectly (Dirikx et al., 2013; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Pauwels & De Waele, 2014; Tyler et al.,
2014). Reflective of this is the correlation between online routine activities and perceived
legitimacy of social media. Users with higher exposure to these platforms, as long as those
experiences were positive, should have a higher perception of legitimacy of the providers. In
legal cynicism research, the concept of legitimacy is such that those with high perceptions of the
legitimacy of law enforcement entity, analogous to the social media provider as an authority
figure in this research, will be more likely to display compliance behaviors even if they are
morally opposed (Dirikx et al., 2013). However, when the legitimacy variable was included in
the full analyses, it was not a significant predictor of the willingness to commit acts of
cyberbullying or doxing through social media. While online routine activities do inform the
perceptions of legitimacy, the role of legitimacy is not as apparent in an online context.
Other Correlates of Perceptions
While not included in the hypothesis of this study, several correlates of perceptions social
media of anonymity and legitimacy were identified. Particularly, perceptions of anonymity and
legitimacy were negatively related to participant age. In other words, older users had lower
perceptions than younger users. This may reflect the differences in perceptions of digital
immigrants versus digital natives (Prensky, 2001).
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Goal 2: Anonymity and Willingness to Offend
General Willingness to Offend
Before discussing the analyses regarding the impact of anonymity providing behaviors on
the willingness to offend, the general trends regarding the willingness to offend are discussed
here. Examination of the original coding of the dependent variables indicated a mean willingness
to buy illicit prescriptions was 24.6%, selling was 13.1%, cyberbullying was 15.3%, and doxing
was 14.3%. The baseline without considering the impact of anonymity providing behaviors
indicates participants are most willing to purchase illicit prescriptions, followed by
cyberbullying, doxing, and finally selling prescriptions illicitly. When observing this from the
recoded version of the dependent variables, the act of cyberbullying had the largest proportion of
participants identifying they would have some willingness to offend (59%), followed by buying
illicit prescriptions (36%), doxing (32%), and selling illicit prescriptions (31%).
This trend is noteworthy in that buying was expected to have a lower general willingness
compared to cyberbullying and doxing as the more severe offense. While research has supported
the concept that perceived seriousness is a function of perceived consequences, this is not the
only factor that has been shown to impact the overall perceived severity of the offense
(Stylianou, 2003). Warr (1989) investigated the impacts of perceptions of wrongfulness versus
harmfulness on the perception of crime severity and found that perceptions of seriousness are
based on the dominant interpretation of the act. In other words, participants were asked to
interpret how wrongful and harmful an act was, but the overall severity was not a combination of
both interpretations. Rather, it was reflective of whichever category was identified as the most
dominant. In the case of interpersonal crimes such as cyberbullying and doxing, these may be
interpreted as more harmful as someone is directly hurt by the act. However, the purchase of

131

prescription medication that is approved to have, but not from an illicit source, may be
interpreted as more wrongful than harmful.
This finding could also be the result of neutralization techniques, such as denial of injury
or defense of necessity (Coleman, 1994; Sykes & Matza, 1957) Research on neutralization
techniques and prescription drug use has illustrated the common defense that illicit use is
justified as not harmful (Cutler, 2014; Desantis et al., 2008; Varga, 2012), supporting the
possibility that participants may be more willing to commit the act of buying illicit prescriptions
than other crimes because they may perceive it as a less serious offense.
Impact of Anonymity Providing Behaviors
The second research question addresses the impact of anonymity providing behaviors on
the willingness to commit four specific acts of cybercrime and deviance: the purchase of illicit
prescriptions online, the illicit sale of prescriptions online, cyberbullying, and doxing. Research
question three focuses on the differences in the effect of anonymity as it relates to the seriousness
of the offense. For the sake of parsimony, discussions of these results are organized by vignette
so the scenarios using the same experimental manipulations can be compared directly.
Vignettes 1 and 2 Summary. The anonymity providing behaviors used in the first two
vignettes were the use of anonymizing browsers (VPN and Tor), the use of Bitcoin, and the use
of escrow services in the monetary transaction. In the buying scenario, the direct effects of a
VPN and Bitcoin were both significant, though there were no interactive effects detected.
Notably, both variables, while significant, operated in opposition to the hypothesized
relationship. One explanation for this reversed relationship could simply be a lack of knowledge
of how the technology works (Prensky, 2001). However, based on the results from the second
vignette (discussed below), a better explanation comes from information systems theory, the
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Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and electronic commerce (Pavlou, 2003). Based off the
work of Davis (1989), the model predicts the decision-making process explaining the reasoning a
user chooses to adopt a particular technology. Trust informs the variables of risk perception,
perceived usefulness, and ease of use, which in turn informs the intentions of the user (Pavlou,
2003). Application of this model to Bitcoin identified several pitfalls which may hinder adoption
of the currency, such as its association with illicit activity, price volatility, and the complexity of
trading (Folkinshteyn & Lennon, 2016). Under this framework and considering the sample’s
general inexperience with some of these technologies, respondents may be uncomfortable with
the technology and prefer the use of technologies more familiar to them.
In the selling scenario, on the other hand, there was no direct relationship between the
anonymity providing behaviors and the willingness to offend; however, a three-way interaction
between the use of VPN, Bitcoin, and the use of escrow was determined to have a significant
positive relationship with the willingness to offend in comparison to the scenario with the lowest
anonymity provided. This does support hypothesis 2.b, in that when multiple anonymity
providing behaviors are used, there will be an increased willingness to offend. Calling back to
the TAM model, trust is the first component of model, feeding into the rest of the perceptions
(Pavlou, 2003). Rather than an ignorance of the capabilities of these anonymity providing
technologies, these results seem to support the idea that this is more of an issue of trust. If the
offense seriousness is low enough, respondents may prefer to use technologies that are more
familiar. However, with the higher seriousness offense, the greater the need for more protections
in place, even if they are unfamiliar, before considering the offense.
Other correlates found for the first two outcomes were age, marriage status, and deviant
peer association (in the selling model). Age is again consistent with the concept of digital
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immigrants being less likely to be familiar with or use newer technologies (Prensky, 2001). The
significance of the marriage status was unexpected considering the correlation was a negative
relationship between the relationship status of never being married and the willingness to commit
either offense as compared to those who had either been married previously or were currently
married. This appears to be in contradiction of theories of social bonds or life course turning
points like marriage acting as a deterrent to offending (Hirschi, 1969; Laub & Sampson, 1993).
Deviant peer association was positively correlated with the willingness to sell prescription drugs
illicitly online. This is in line with the theories of differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and
social learning theory (Akers, 1973) as well as research on other forms of cybercrime and
deviance (Holt et al., 2012). However, the selling model was the only crime analyzed with this
outcome.
Vignette 3 Summary. The anonymity providing behaviors and circumstances used in the
third vignette included the lack of a relationship between the victim and the respondent, the use
of a fake user account, and the use of IP blocking software. Of these, only IP blocking was
identified as significant predictor of a willingness to offend, but only in the doxing scenario.
Unlike the VPN and Bitcoin variables, the IP blocking variable did operate in the hypothesized
predicted direction. Returning again to the TAM model, IP blocking software may be associated
with a low perception of risk, higher level of perceived usefulness, and a high perception of ease
of use (Pavlou, 2003) as compared to the more advanced technologies from the first two
vignettes.
Unlike the prior vignettes, age was not identified as a correlate of willingness to offend.
This reiterates the concept that the first two scenarios may have been beyond existing
knowledge, familiarity, and comfort for the digital immigrants in the sample; the interpersonal
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deviance scenario involved two methods of communication anonymity (Scott, 1998) and only
one technology-based method. Educational attainment was also positively correlated with the
willingness to cyberbully and dox.
Each offense outcome was also correlated with a single theoretical variable, victimization
strain (cyberbullying) and code of the streets (doxing). The victimization strain variable
consisted of measures of prior victimization experiences of cyberbullying, which were positively
related to the willingness to cyberbully. This aligns with existing literature on the cyberbullying
victim/offender overlap (Chen et al., 2019; Schultze-Krumbholz et al., 2015; Weulen
Kranenbarg et al., 2019). Street code adherence was determined to be positively related to the
willingness to dox, which also lines up with prior literature (Henson et al., 2016), though it is
notable that it was only significant on the more serious of the interpersonal forms of
cyberdeviance used in this study. The core of the code of the street can be summarized as the
“importance of publicly achieving, maintaining, and protecting reputation, status, and respect,”
(Henson et al., 2016, p. 2). It is not surprising then that an act originally developed as a form of
retaliation is the most associated with street code adherence (Honan, 2014).
Variation of Impact of Anonymity Between Offense Types. Though the variation in
general willingness to offend was already discussed earlier in this chapter, research hypothesis
H3 addressed the impact of the anonymity behaviors across the offenses, specifically suggesting
that any impact the behaviors may have will weaken as the severity of the offense increases.
Since the experimental behaviors used in the buying and selling vignettes matched and vignette 3
was used for both the cyberbullying and doxing outcomes, the comparisons regarding offense
severity will be paired with selling and doxing representing the more severe offense in their
respective pairs.
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In the comparison of the buying and selling vignettes, hypothesis 3 is technically
supported, though not as anticipated. The experimental manipulations did not directly impact
willingness in the selling vignette whereas the use of Bitcoin had a significant direct effect in all
six models with willingness to buy as the outcome, and VPN had a significant direct effect in
three iterations of the model. This would indicate that the impact of anonymity was weaker for
the more serious offense. Recall, however, that the relationship between these anonymity
providing behaviors and the willingness to offend in the first vignette was in the opposite
direction as hypothesized in H2.a; the assignment of these behaviors was associated with a lower
willingness to offend. While the effect of these behaviors did weaken between offenses, the
effect in question was associated with a lower willingness to offend. Additionally, the only
significant interaction effect identified in these analyses was the three-way interaction in the
more serious scenario, cofounding this discussion. As for the interpersonal acts of cyberbullying
and doxing, the willingness to cyberbully was invariant across the experimental manipulations
while the use of IP blocking software is positively related to the willingness to dox, invalidating
hypothesis 3. It appears that general users will favor technologies that are familiar when the
seriousness of the offense is lower, but the more serious offenses may require more protections
to be in place in order to be willing to commit the act.
Goal 3: Moderation Effect of Informal & Formal Controls
Formal – Arrest
Of the acts of cybercrime and deviance, concern about arrest only had a significant
moderating impact on the relationship between the use of IP blocking software and the
willingness to cyberbully and dox. Both models indicated significant interactions between the
use of IP disabling software and the concern over arrest. In both models, when IP blocking
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software was enabled, the willingness to offend increased as the concern over arrest increased.
Whereas, in the cyberbullying model, the lack of IP blocking software was associated with a
decrease in the willingness to offend as concern increased. This relationship was constant in the
doxing model.
The perceived threat of formal sanction should result in a lower willingness to participate
in that act (Akers et al., 2017; Beccaria, 1764/1963; Bentham, 1781/2000; Bernard et al., 2010;
Kubrin et al., 2009). However, the interpersonal acts of cybercrime and deviance did not behave
in the same way when protections were available. Individuals assigned scenarios where IP
blocking was disabled were less likely to commit acts as their concern over formal sanction
increased, which again is in line with traditional deterrence theory (Akers et al., 2017; Beccaria,
1764/1963; Bentham, 1781/2000; Bernard et al., 2010; Kubrin et al., 2009). However, while not
significant, the IP blocking groups displayed an increasing willingness to offend as their concern
over formal sanctions increase. This could be an artifact of the survey instrument, as the
questions regarding concern over sanctions came second to their responses regarding the
willingness to offend. That said, these questions came after at least two prior vignettes asking
similar questions. It is more likely that the commitment to the act is informing the concern rather
than the concern informing the willingness to act.
Informal – Family & Friends
The family and friends moderator had significant direct effects while also interacting with
the use of IP blocking software in the cyberbullying model. Visual inspection of the relationship
between concern over family and friends and the willingness to cyberbully by IP blocking status
displayed similar results as with the arrest moderator; the IP blocking condition is associated

137

with an increase in willingness as concern increases while the opposite relationship is found in
the IP blocking disabled group.
Informal – Employer
The only notable findings regarding concern over employers occurred in association with
the buying scenario, where Bitcoin’s direct effects are significant, though no moderation is
indicated. Visual inspection shows that the use of PayPal or similar payment platforms were
associated with a decrease in willingness to offend when concern regarding employers increases,
while the use of Bitcoin is associated with an increase in the willingness to offend as the value of
the employer variable increases. Bitcoin is still associated with a lower willingness to offend
overall, but in this case, concern over employment appears to encourage the use of the
technology, similar to the effects of IP blocking in the interpersonal deviance scenarios.
Overall, formal and informal controls appear to have a non-significant deterrent effect on
offending when respondents were not engaged in anonymity providing behaviors. This remains
true for most of the anonymity providing behaviors, with the exception of IP blocking software
as it relates to interpersonal deviance.
Implications
While rational choice and deterrence were not fully supported by the results of this study,
there is some evidence of the responses being informed by rational choice. More serious offenses
were found to have statistically significant relationships with different combinations of
technologically provided anonymity behaviors in the expected direction, indicating that
participants were responding considering the risks involved with offending. The variation of
results between each offense is supported by Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) concept of the criminal
event, the specific circumstances of the potential crime. It is apparent, however, that other factors
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that influence respondents’ feelings towards the manipulations were not captured in the model.
Future research should incorporate measures from the Pavlou’s (2003) TAM model, including
trust, perceived risk, perceived usefulness, and ease of use in addition to Hite and colleagues
(2014) measure of perceived anonymity specific to the scenario.
Another consideration in contemporary deterrence literature is the sensitivity to threats of
sanctions. That is, are some people more likely to be impacted by the elements of deterrence than
others. In 2002, Pogarsky posited that people subjected to threats of legal sanctions land on a
continuum of sensitivity and insensitivity to these threats. On one end are the acute conformists,
who comply with the law due to the influences of extralegal forces that encourage conformity.
On the other end are the incorrigible; individuals who do not respond to legal-sanction threats
and are committed to offending. In between these two extremes are the deterrable; individuals
who may or may not offend depending on the presence or absence of a legal-sanction threat
(Pogarsky, 2002). This may apply to the current discussion in that many of study participants
reported having no intention to offend (41.1% for buying, 68.7% for selling, 64.4% for
cyberbullying, and 67.11% for doxing). These participants may be insensitive to the risk
reduction role of anonymity and the threat of sanctions, as their baseline behavior may be
conformist.
Regarding the role of formal and informal sanctions impact on the willingness to offend,
the results were mixed. The role of these variables was not consistent across multiple types of
cybercrime. What is apparent is the sources of informal sanction appear to matter. Concern over
family and friends and concern over employment were not consistent with each other and
behaved differently in the models. However, several studies of the impact of perceived informal
sanctions on cybercrime combine these concepts, or disregard the role of employment entirely
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(Bossler, 2021; Bossler, 2019; Holt & Bossler, 2016). Future research could benefit from the
inclusion of non-traditional sources of sanctions, especially those that may threaten not only
shame but also monetary losses.
Limitations
While the methodological design was selected to improve on prior research, there are
several limitations that exist in this study regarding the generalizability of the design as well as in
the conceptualization of some of the theoretical variables. These are discussed below.
While the use of experimental methodologies increased the internal validity of the study,
there are several issues regarding the sampling process that threaten the external validity of the
study. Participants were recruited from Qualtrics’ available respondent pool, a panel of
individuals who have agreed to participate in research on an ongoing basis (Qualtrics, 2021). The
lack of random selection and the use of a potentially biased response pool is a concern regarding
the generalizability of the findings generally. This self-selection bias is compounded when it is
considered that participants self-selected to take an anonymous survey about anonymity while
answering questions regarding sensitive subject matter. This implies that an implicit trust in
anonymity online already exists for participants, which may not be true for non-participants in
the population of interest.
As mentioned in Chapter Six, participants were recruited through a process stratified
demographically. However, participation it the survey was on a first come, first serve basis. In
other words, though Qualtrics recruited participants in an attempt to meet demographic quotas,
there was no guarantee the participants who would complete the survey were going to match the
demographics desired. One area where this issue may be problematic is the above average age of
the participants. Almost half of the participants were born prior to 1970, categorizing most
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participants as digital immigrants (Prensky, 2001). On one side, this does allow for comparisons
between both groups, and age was identified as a consistent correlate of offending. However, as
the younger participants are more likely to commit these acts generally, it may be prudent to
utilize samples of digital natives in future research to identify trends in the more at-risk group.
Another issue with the age bias involves the employer moderator, namely that it implies that
participants are currently employed. Approximately 34% of the sample was age 65 or older. It is
very likely that participants are retired, potentially confounding the responses. If this study were
to be replicated, the question should be reworded or a question regarding employment status
should be included in the first section of the survey.
Another weakness of this study is ambiguity of the conceptualizations of benefits and
offense severity. While this study utilizes a framework of rational choice and deterrence, the
focus remained on the risk reduction component of the rational calculus model. Participants were
assigned scenarios in the vignettes which vaguely implied the benefit of participating in the
various acts, such as the expense of buying a prescription through legitimate means, but the
scenarios were otherwise left up to the interpretation of the participant. Prior research has
identified rewards as a consistent positive predictor of offending (Baker & Piquero, 2010). While
this study did not set out to test the impact of benefits on the willingness to offend, it is an
important aspect of discussions of deterrence and rational choice that was not captured here. As
discussed earlier in this chapter, the analytical plan regarding the impact of offense severity was
based off objective interpretations of the legal definitions and sanctions. While the ranking of the
acts is factually supported, this did not appear to be reflective of the perceptions of participants.
Future research in this area would benefit from including measures of offense severity in
connection to the vignettes.
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Conclusion
This dissertation sought to expand upon existing cybercrime literature on anonymity
providing behaviors impact on offending through a theoretical lens of rational choice and
deterrence theories. This was achieved through a factorial survey experiment testing the impact
of encrypted browsers, cryptocurrency, and escrow systems on cybercrimes of illicit drug trading
as well as the impact of victim/respondent relationships, pseudonymity, and IP blocking software
on interpersonal cybercrime and deviance. Results suggest that respondents were utilizing
rational choice calculous to determine their willingness to commit various acts of cybercrime and
deviance; however, the use of technologically provided anonymity methods were only significant
when the seriousness of the offense was higher. This implies that only high-risk scenarios will
motivate users to utilize more complicated, and potentially risky, behaviors. Users show
preference towards basic technologies in lower risk scenarios. This is potentially the result of a
lack of familiarity and trust in more complicated technologies, but confirmation of this is beyond
the scope of the current study.
Results also suggest that concern over sources of formal and informal sanctions may have
a deterrent effect on the willingness to offend, but the moderating impact is minimal and
situationally specific. Future research should expand the model to include measures derived from
TAM modeling in order to capture the perceptions of the anonymity providing behaviors in order
to structurally model the impact of these behaviors on the willingness to offend.
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Appendix A: Qualtrics Full Survey
Anonymity and Cyberdeviance Study
Start of Block: Informed Consent
IC Informed Consent to Participate in Research
Information to Consider Before Taking Part in this Research Study
Title: Anonymizing Behaviors Impact on Cyber Deviance
Study #002357
Overview: You are being asked to take part in a research study. The information in this
document should help you to decide if you would like to participate. The sections in this
Overview provide the basic information about the study. More detailed information is provided
in the remainder of the document.
Study Staff: This study is being led by Cassandra Dodge who is a doctoral candidate at the
University of South Florida. This person is called the Principal Investigator. She is being guided
in this research by Dr. George Burruss. Other approved research staff may act on behalf of the
Principal Investigator.
Study Details: This study is being conducted at the University of South Florida and is sponsored
by the Association of Doctoral Programs in Criminology and Criminal Justice. The purpose of
the study is to examine the impact of various forms of anonymizing behaviors on cyber deviance.
The research questionnaire will be carried out through Qualtrics and will take approximately 20
to 25 minutes to complete.
Participants: You are being asked to take part because we are interested in adults’ attitudes,
opinions, and behavioral responses to anonymity as well as testing theories to explain variation
among adult respondents ages 18 and older.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to participate and may
stop your participation at any time. There will be no penalties or loss of benefits or opportunities
if you do not participate or decide to stop once you start.
Benefits and Risk: We do not know if you will receive any benefit from your participation. This
research is considered minimal risk. Minimal risk means that study risks are the same as the risks
you face in daily life. Some portions of the questionnaire could be upsetting to subjects,
particularly questions asking about prior victimization. You may choose not to answer sensitive
questions.
Confidentiality: Even if we publish the findings from this study, we will keep your study
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information private and confidential. Anyone with the authority to look at your records must
keep them confidential.
Why are you being asked to take part?
The purpose of this research is to understand the influence of anonymity on Americans’
behavior online.
Study Procedures
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to complete a one-time online survey which will
take up to 25 minutes. The data is collected anonymously through Qualtrics.
Alternatives / Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal
You do not have to participate in this research study.
Benefits and Risks
We are unsure if you will receive any benefits by taking part in this research study. This
research is considered to be minimal risk.
Compensation
You will be compensated according to your agreement with your panel provider.
Privacy and Confidentiality
We will do our best to keep your records private and confidential. We cannot guarantee absolute
confidentiality. Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. Certain people
may need to see your study records. The only people who will be allowed to see these records
are: Principal Investigators, their research team, and the University of South Florida Institutional
Review Board (IRB).
It is possible, although unlikely, that unauthorized individuals could gain access to your
responses because you are responding online. Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree
permitted by the technology used. No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data
sent via the Internet. However, your participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a
person’s everyday use of the Internet. If you complete and submit an anonymous survey and later
request your data be withdrawn, this may or may not be possible as the researcher may be unable
to extract anonymous data from the database.
Data collected for this research will be stored at the stored online using USF Box Sync.
Additional research procedures (e.g., data storage, analysis, and manuscript preparation) will be
conducted at the University of South Florida Department of Criminology.
Contact Information
If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this study, call Cassandra Dodge at
813-239-XXXX. If you have questions about your rights, complaints, or issues as a person
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taking part in this study, call the USF IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact the IRB by email at
RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.
We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not let anyone know your
name. We will not publish anything else that would let people know who you are. You can print
a copy of this consent form for your records.
I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by proceeding with this
survey, I am agreeing to take part in research and I am 18 years of age or older.

End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: Demographic Questions
Q1 What was your household income from last year?

o Less than $10,000 (1)
o $10,000 - $19,999 (2)
o $20,000 - $29,999 (3)
o $30,000 - $39,999 (4)
o $40,000 - $49,999 (5)
o $50,000 - $59,999 (6)
o $60,000 - $69,999 (7)
o $70,000 - $79,999 (8)
o $80,000 - $89,999 (9)
o $90,000 - $99,999 (10)
o $100,000 - $149,999 (11)
o More than $150,000 (12)
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Q2 What is the highest level of education you obtained?

o Did not graduate high school (1)
o High school diploma/GED (General Education Development) (2)
o Some college, no degree (3)
o Associate's degree (two-year program) (4)
o Bachelor's degree (four-year program) (5)
o Master's degree (6)
o Advanced degree (Ph.D., M.D., J.D., etc.) (7)

Q3 What is your current relationship status?

o Married (1)
o Widowed (2)
o Divorced (3)
o Separated (4)
o Never married (5)
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Q4 Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino/Latina?

o Yes (1)
o No (0)
Q5 What race do you consider yourself (check all that apply)?

▢
▢
▢
▢

White (1)
Black (2)
Asian (3)
Other (4)

Q6 What is your sex?

o Male (1)
o Female (2)

Q7 What year were you born?
________________________________________________________________
Skip To: End of Block If Condition: What year were you born? Is Greater Than 2003. Skip To:
End of Block.
End of Block: Demographic Questions
Start of Block: Demographics Part 2
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Q8 At the time of this survey, what state are you in?
▼ Alabama (1) ... Other, not listed (52)

Q9 We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Below is a seven-point scale
on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

o Extremely liberal (1)
o Liberal (2)
o Slightly liberal (3)
o Moderate, middle of the road (4)
o Slightly conservative (5)
o Conservative (6)
o Extremely conservative (7)
End of Block: Demographics Part 2
Start of Block: Risk Taking
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Q10 We would like you to rate what you think about a few risky behaviors. For each behavior
below, rate what you think is the balance of risks and benefits for you by clicking the
response which most closely matches what you think.
Risks are
Risks are the
Benefits are
much greater
same as
much greater
2 (2)
4 (4)
than benefits
benefits
than risks
1 (1)
3 (3)
5 (5)
Sex without a
condom (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Riding in a
car driven by
someone who
had been
drinking (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Trying a new
drug that you
know nothing
about (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Breaking into
a store at
night and
stealing
something
that you
really want
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

Driving over
90 miles per
hour on the
highway at
night (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Betting a
day’s income
at the horse
races (6)

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Risk Taking
Start of Block: Self-control (small scale)
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Q11 Please consider whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about
yourself.
Strongly
Strongly agree
Disagree (2)
Agree (3)
disagree (1)
(4)
I don't think
about how what
I do will affect
other people. (1)

o

o

o

o

I often do things
that other people
think are
dangerous. (2)

o

o

o

o

There is nothing
I can do to
control my
feelings when
someone hassles
me. (3)

o

o

o

o

I often get hurt
by things that I
do. (4)

o

o

o

o

I have trouble
following the
rules at work or
in school. (5)

o

o

o

o

I have goals in
life that I try to
reach. (6)

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Self-control (small scale)
Start of Block: Street Oriented Beliefs
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Q12 Please consider whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about
yourself.
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Strongly
Disagree (1)

Disagree (2)

Agree (3)

Strongly Agree
(4)

When someone
disrespects you,
it is important
that you use
physical force or
aggression to
teach him or her
not to disrespect
you (1)

o

o

o

o

If someone uses
violence against
you, it is
important that
you use violence
against him or
her to get even
(2)

o

o

o

o

People will take
advantage of you
if you don’t let
them know how
tough you are
(3)

o

o

o

o

People do not
respect a person
who is afraid to
fight physically
for his/her rights
(4)

o

o

o

o

Sometimes you
need to threaten
people in order
to get them to
treat you fairly
(5)

o

o

o

o

It is important to
show others that
you cannot be
intimidated (6)

o

o

o

o
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People tend to
respect a person
who is tough and
aggressive (7)

o

o

o

o

It is okay to
attack
someone’s
reputation online
if they call you a
dirty name.
Otherwise I will
look weak and
like a pushover
to others. (8)

o

o

o

o

In order to gain
respect from
your online
peers it is
sometimes
necessary to
threaten others’
reputation and
threaten the use
of violence
online. (9)

o

o

o

o

It is okay to post
demeaning or
damaging photos
of someone if
they have
insulted you
online. (10)

o

o

o

o

Appearing tough
or aggressive is
a good way to
keep others from
messing with
you online. (11)

o

o

o

o

If I appear tough
online, people
will be more
likely to respect
me offline. (12)

o

o

o

o
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End of Block: Street Oriented Beliefs
Start of Block: Deviant Peer Association
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Q13 In the past 12 months, how many of your friends engaged in the following acts?
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None (1)

Very few (2)

About half
(3)

More than
half (4)

All of them
(5)

Downloaded
entertainment
media
(movies,
music)
without
paying for
them (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Downloaded
computer
software
without
paying it (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Viewed
sexual
explicit
material
between
consenting
adults online
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

Followed an
ex-romantic
partner on
social media
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

Pestered
people on
social media
they found
annoying (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Accessed
another’s
account or
computer
without
permission
(6)

o

o

o

o

o
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Posted
theories
alternative to
mainstream
media about
governments
or politicians
on social
media (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Followed
groups on
social media
opposed to
mainstream
news media,
government,
or politicians
(8)

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Deviant Peer Association
Start of Block: Strain
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Q14 Please consider whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about
yourself.
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Strongly
disagree (1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I often think
about my
current
financial
situation (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Due to my
financial
situation, I
have
difficulties
paying for
my home and
utilities (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Please select
the
"Somewhat
agree (4)"
response for
this item (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Due to my
financial
situation, I
have to save
considerably
on food (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Due to my
financial
situation, I
have
difficulties
paying for
health care
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

Due to my
financial
situation, I
am restricted
in my leisure
activities (6)

o

o

o

o

o
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Skip To: End of Block If Please consider whether you agree or disagree with the following
statements about yourself. != Please select the "Somewhat agree (4)" response for this item [
Somewhat agree ]
Q15 During the previous 12 months, how frequently have you experienced the following:
Never (1)
Rarely (2)
Sometimes (3)
Often (4)
Been the target
of ‘mean’ text
messages (1)

o

o

o

o

Received
threatening or
hurtful
statements or
pictures in an
email or text
message (2)

o

o

o

o

Been made fun
of on the
Internet (3)

o

o

o

o

Had personal
information
made public
without my
consent (4)

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Strain
Start of Block: Knowledge of technology (1-5 Likert Scale & 1-4 Frequency Scale)
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Q16 How knowledgeable are you on these technological issues on a range from very low (1) to
very high (5)?
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Very
low
1 (1)

Below
average
2 (2)

Average
3 (3)

Above
average
4 (4)

Very
high
5 (5)

Dealing with
software
problems (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Removing
malware from
your
computing
devices (e.g.,
computer
viruses) (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Dealing with
computer
hardware
problems (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Identifying if
your
computer is
infected with
malware (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Modifying
the firewall
on your
computing
devices (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Establishing a
virtual private
network
(VPN) on
your
computing
devices (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Identifying a
phishing email (a fake
e-mail from
unknown
sender). (7)

o

o

o

o

o
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Identifying
misleading or
false
information
online using
validated
sources (8)

o

o

o

o

o

Securing
digital
information
(files,
documents)
through
encryption
(9)

o

o

o

o

o

Surfing the
web through
anonymous
browsers
(e.g., TOR)
(10)

o

o

o

o

o

Please select
the "Average
(3)" response
for this item
(11)

o

o

o

o

o

Skip To: End of Block If How knowledgeable are you on these technological issues on a range
from very low (1) to very high... != Please select the "Average (3)" response for this item [
Average 3 ]
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Q17 During the previous 12 months, how frequently have you done the following:
Never (1)
Rarely (2)
Sometimes (3)
Often (4)

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Stored digital
information on a
cloud-based
platform (e.g.,
Dropbox,
Onedrive, Box,
iCloud). (4)

o

o

o

o

Used
cryptocurrency
(e.g. Bitcoin) to
make purchases
(5)

o

o

o

o

Surfed on the
Darkweb (6)

o

o

o

o

Browsed the
Internet (1)
Used social
media (2)
Purchased items
online (3)

End of Block: Knowledge of technology (1-5 Likert Scale & 1-4 Frequency Scale)
Start of Block: Routine Activities Online
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Q18 Think about the number of hours in an average week you currently spend on the following
activities:
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Not at
all (1)

Less
than 5
hours
(2)

5-10
hours
(3)

11-15
hours
(4)

16-20
hours
(5)

21-25
hours
(6)

More
than 25
hours
(7)

Sending/responding
to email (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Social networking
(e.g. Facebook,
Twitter, TikTok)
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Communicating
through instant
messaging (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Video chatting
(e.g., FaceTime,
Zoom) (4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Blogging (reading
or writing) (5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Downloading
media (music,
films, podcasts) (6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Communicating in
chat rooms of
forums (7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Streaming TV or
Film (e.g.
YouTube, Netflix)
(8)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Participating in
online discussions
(e.g., commenting
on news sites) (9)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Visiting
pornographic
websites (10)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Playing online
video games (11)

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

Using online dating
apps (12)
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End of Block: Routine Activities Online
Start of Block: Legitimacy
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Q19 Please consider whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about social
media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok) platforms:
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Strongly
disagree (1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

Social media
platforms
treat people
fairly (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Social media
platforms
make
decisions
based on
facts (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Social media
platforms
treat people
with respect
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

I have
confidence in
social media
platforms (4)

o

o

o

o

o

I trust social
media
platforms (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Most social
media
platforms do
their job well
(6)

o

o

o

o

o

Social media
platforms
generally can
be trusted to
make
decisions that
are right for
your
community
(7)

o

o

o

o

o
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Social media
platforms
moderate
content
differently
depending on
the political
affiliation of
the content
creator (8)

o

o

o

o

o

Social media
platforms
should be
allowed to
moderate
content
however they
see fit (9)

o

o

o

o

o

I am
obligated to
follow the
community
guidelines of
social media
platforms I
use even if I
do not agree
with them
(10)

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Legitimacy
Start of Block: Perceived Anonymity General Online Behaviors
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Q20
If you were to buy a product or service online using an online alias with a gift card, please
indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following:

186

Strongly
Disagree (1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I am
confident that
others do not
know who I
am (1)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe that
my personal
identity
remains
unknown to
others (2)

o

o

o

o

o

I am easily
identified as
an individual
by others (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Others are
likely to
know who I
am (4)

o

o

o

o

o

My personal
identity is
known to
others (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Someone
with
technical
skills could
easily find
out my true
identity (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Someone
with
technical
skills could
easily find
out sensitive
information
about me (7)

o

o

o

o

o
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Q21 If you used an online alias name for posting on an online forum or social media account,
please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement about the following:
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Strongly
Disagree (1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I am
confident that
others do not
know who I
am (1)

o

o

o

o

o

I believe that
my personal
identity
remains
unknown to
others (2)

o

o

o

o

o

I am easily
identified as
an individual
by others (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Others are
likely to
know who I
am (4)

o

o

o

o

o

My personal
identity is
known to
others (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Someone
with
technical
skills could
easily find
out my true
identity (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Someone
with
technical
skills could
easily find
out sensitive
information
about me (7)

o

o

o

o

o
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End of Block: Perceived Anonymity General Online Behaviors
Start of Block: Vignette #1 (Property – Buying)
Transition Next, you will be shown brief scenarios about online behavior to consider. The
questions will ask you to put yourself in the same situation as described in the scenarios.

V1 ADF You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome, Safari). The vendor uses the
same. The vendor only accepts payments via secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal,
Venmo). You would need to send the payment directly to the vendor, and the transaction will be
recorded as a direct payment between you and the vendor. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is
it that you would purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 ADG You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome, Safari). The vendor uses the
same. The vendor only accepts payments via secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal,
Venmo). The vendor uses a third-party escrow service to process payments. There will be no
record of direct payment between you and the vendor. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it
that you would purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 AEF You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome, Safari). The vendor uses the
same. The vendor only accepts payments via cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money
unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash).
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You would need to send the payment directly to the vendor, and the transaction will be recorded
as a direct payment between you and the vendor. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that
you would purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and
no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 AEG You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome, Safari). The vendor uses the
same. The vendor only accepts payments via cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money
unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash).
The vendor uses a third-party escrow service to process payments. There will be no record of
direct payment between you and the vendor. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and no
decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 BDF You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through a virtual private network (VPN), which can hide your computer’s real
location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via secure electronic
payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). You would need to send the payment directly to the
vendor, and the transaction will be recorded as a direct payment between you and the vendor.
On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this
vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 BDG You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through a virtual private network (VPN), which can hide your computer’s real
location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via secure electronic
payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). The vendor uses a third-party escrow service to
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process payments. There will be no record of direct payment between you and the vendor. On a
scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this vendor?
(Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 BEF You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through a virtual private network (VPN), which can hide your computer’s real
location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via cryptocurrency, a
digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can be used
anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). You would need to send the payment directly to the vendor,
and the transaction will be recorded as a direct payment between you and the vendor. On a scale
from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this vendor?
(Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 BEG You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through a virtual private network (VPN), which can hide your computer’s real
location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via cryptocurrency, a
digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can be used
anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). The vendor uses a third-party escrow service to process
payments. There will be no record of direct payment between you and the vendor. On a scale
from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this vendor?
(Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 CDF You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your online activities and hides
your computer’s location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via
secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). You would need to send the payment
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directly to the vendor, and the transaction will be recorded as a direct payment between you and
the vendor.
On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this
vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 CDG You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your online activities and hides
your computer’s location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via
secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). The vendor uses a third-party escrow
service to process payments. There will be no record of direct payment between you and the
vendor. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription
through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 CEF You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your online activities and hides
your computer’s location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via
cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can
be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). You would need to send the payment directly to the
vendor, and the transaction will be recorded as a direct payment between you and the vendor.
On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this
vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 CEG You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate and their participation was not exposed to anyone they did not want. You
access the vendor through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your online activities and hides
your computer’s location. The vendor uses the same. The vendor only accepts payments via
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cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can
be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). The vendor a uses third-party escrow service to
process payments. There will be no record of direct payment between you and the vendor. On a
scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would purchase the prescription through this vendor?
(Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 DV2 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your family and other
friends finding out if you were to purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 DV3 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your employer finding out if
you were to purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and
no decimals
________________________________________________________________

V1 DV4 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about being arrested if you were
to purchase the prescription through this vendor? (Please use only whole numbers and no
decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V1 REAL How realistic did you find the above scenario?

o Not at all realistic (1)
o A little realistic (2)
o Somewhat realistic (3)
o Very realistic (4)
End of Block: Vignette #1 (Property – Buying)
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Start of Block: Vignette 1 Attention Check
V1 AC How much did the scenario state the prescription cost?

o It was very expensive (1)
o It was not very much (2)
o It didn't say anything about the cost (3)
End of Block: Vignette 1 Attention Check
Start of Block: Vignette #2 (Property - Selling)
Q103 Now consider the situation in reverse.
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p> You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was ... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 ADF You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome,
Safari). All users access the market in this way. The marketplace only arranges payments via
secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). You would receive the payment
directly from the buyer, resulting in a transaction record between you and the buyer.
On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the prescription through this
marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 ADG You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome,
Safari). All users access the market in this way. The marketplace only arranges payments via
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secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). The marketplace requires the use of a
third-party escrow service to process payments. There will be no record of direct payment
between you and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the
prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 AEF You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome,
Safari). All users access the market in this way. The marketplace only arranges payments via
cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can
be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). You would receive the payment directly from the
buyer, resulting in a transaction record between you and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how
likely is it that you would sell the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole
numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 AEG You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through your usual web browser (i.e., Chrome,
Safari). All users access the market in this way. The marketplace only arranges payments via
cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or country’s currency that can
be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). The marketplace requires the use of a third-party
escrow service to process payments. There will be no record of direct payment between you and
the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the prescription through
this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 BDF You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through a virtual private network (VPN), which can
hide your computer’s real location. All users access the market in this way. The marketplace
only arranges payments via secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). You
would receive the payment directly from the buyer, resulting in a transaction record between you
and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the
prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 BDG You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through a virtual private network (VPN), which can
hide your computer’s real location. All users access the market in this way. The marketplace
only arranges payments via secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal, Venmo). The
marketplace requires the use of a third-party escrow service to process payments. There will be
no record of direct payment between you and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it
that you would sell the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 BEF You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through a virtual private network (VPN), which can
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hide your computer’s real location. All users access the market in this way. The marketplace
only arranges payments via cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or
country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). You would receive the
payment directly from the buyer, resulting in a transaction record between you and the buyer.
On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the prescription through this
marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If <o:p></o:p>You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying
the prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was le... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 BEG You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through a virtual private network (VPN), which can
hide your computer’s real location. All users access the market in this way. The marketplace
only arranges payments via cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to any bank or
country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). The marketplace requires
the use of a third-party escrow service to process payments. There will be no record of direct
payment between you and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell
the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate an... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 CDF You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your
online activities and hides your computer’s location. All users access the market in this way. The
marketplace only arranges payments via secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal,
Venmo). You would receive the payment directly from the buyer, resulting in a transaction
record between you and the buyer.
On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the prescription through this
marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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Display This Question:
If If You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate an... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 CDG You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your
online activities and hides your computer’s location. All users access the market in this way. The
marketplace only arranges payments via secure electronic payment platforms (i.e., PayPal,
Venmo). The marketplace requires the use of a third-party escrow service to process payments.
There will be no record of direct payment between you and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100,
how likely is it that you would sell the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate an... Text Response Is Displayed

V2 CEF You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your
online activities and hides your computer’s location. All users access the market in this way. The
marketplace only arranges payments via cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to
any bank or country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). You would
receive the payment directly from the buyer, resulting in a transaction record between you and
the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would sell the prescription through
this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
Display This Question:
If If You have a prescription, but it is very expensive. A friend suggests buying the
prescription from an online non-approved vendor they have used before. Your friend said the
product was legitimate an... Text Response Is Displayed
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V2 CEG You have left over prescription medication and a friend suggested selling it through an
online marketplace that is not authorized by U.S. medical or pharmaceutical boards. You are not
authorized to resell. You access the market through TOR, a special browser that encrypts your
online activities and hides your computer’s location. All users access the market in this way. The
marketplace only arranges payments via cryptocurrency, a digital file used as money unrelated to
any bank or country’s currency that can be used anonymously (i.e., Bitcoin, Zcash). The
marketplace requires the use of a third-party escrow service to process payments. There will be
no record of direct payment between you and the buyer. On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it
that you would sell the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V2 DV2 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your family and other
friends finding out if you sold the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole
numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V2 DV3 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your employer finding out if
you sold the prescription through this marketplace? (Please use only whole numbers and no
decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V2 DV4 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about being arrested if you sold
the medications through this website? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V2 REAL How realistic did you find the above scenario?

o Not at all realistic (1)
o A little realistic (2)
o Somewhat realistic (3)
o Very realistic (4)
End of Block: Vignette #2 (Property - Selling)
Start of Block: Vignette 2 Attention Check
V2 AC In the previous scenario, what are you trying to sell?

o It was not mentioned in the scenario (1)
o Prescription drug (2)
o Marijuana (3)
Skip To: End of Block If In the previous scenario, what are you trying to sell? != Prescription
drug
End of Block: Vignette 2 Attention Check
Start of Block: Vignette #3 (Interpersonal – Cyberbullying/Threat)
Q122 The following scenarios deal with social interactions online. The questions will ask you to
put yourself in the same situation as described in the scenarios.

V3 ACE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, but you
know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used your real name and
identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is not set up to block your IP address
(the digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them personally
(not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V3 ACF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, but you
know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used your real name and
identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is set up to block your IP address (the
digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them personally
(not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 ADE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, but you
know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used a fake name and false
identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is not set up to block your IP address
(the digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them personally
(not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 ADF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, but you
know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used a fake name and false
identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is set up to block your IP address (the
digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them personally
(not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V3 BCE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, and you
do not know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used your real name and
identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is not set up to block your IP address
(the digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them personally
(not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 BCF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, and you
do not know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used your real name and
identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is set up to block your IP address (the
digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you
would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them personally
(not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 BDE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone whose account is set up to be confidential, and you
do not know them personally. When you set up your user account, you used a fake name and
false identifying information (sex, race, age). Your computer is not set up to block your IP
address (the digital code that identifies your computer). On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it
that you would respond with to the person by posting a derogatory statement directed at them
personally (not just debating their points)? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 BDF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform that has a discussion
board on various topics. You are scrolling through the discussion board and see a post that you
find extremely offensive made by someone you do not know personally. When you set up the
user account, you used a fake name and false identifying information (sex, race, age). Your
computer is set up to block your IP address (the digital code that identifies your computer). On
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a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would respond with to the person by posting a
derogatory statement directed at them personally (not just debating their points)? (Please use
only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 DV2 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your family and friends
finding out what you said if you responded with a derogatory statement? (Please use only whole
numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 DV3 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your employer finding out
what you said if you responded with a derogatory statement? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 DV4 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be of having your account suspended
for bullying if you were to respond with a derogatory statement? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3 DV5 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be of being arrested for harassment if
you were to respond with a derogatory statement? (Please use only whole numbers and no
decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3.1 DV1
Now imagine you have identifying information on the person who made the offensive post
(name, address, employer, family).
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On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it that you would respond by posting their personal
information publicly? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3.1 DV2 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your family and friends
finding out what you did if you were to respond by posting their personal information? (Please
use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3.1 DV3 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be about your employer finding out
what you did if you were to respond by posting their personal information? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3.1 DV4 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be of having your account
suspended for harassment if you were to respond by posting their personal information? (Please
use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V3.1 DV5 On a scale from 0-100, how concerned would you be of being arrested for harassment
if you were to retaliate by posting their personal information? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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Q52 How realistic did you find the above scenario?

o Not at all realistic (1)
o A little realistic (2)
o Somewhat realistic (3)
o Very realistic (4)
End of Block: Vignette #3 (Interpersonal – Cyberbullying/Threat)
Start of Block: Vignette 3 Attention Check
V3 AC In the previous scenario, where did you see the post?

o In a discussion board (1)
o On the poster's personal page (2)
o This was not described in the scenario (3)
End of Block: Vignette 3 Attention Check
Start of Block: Vignette #4 (Perception of Threat)

V4 ACE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses your real name and picture. Other personal information (i.e.,
location, employer, family) is listed on your profile. The other user’s account has their real name
and picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a scale
from 0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 ACF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses your real name and picture. Other personal information (i.e.,
location, employer, family) is listed on your profile. The other user’s account has a fake name
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and picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a scale
from 0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 ADE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses your real name and picture. Other personal information (i.e.,
location, employer, family) is not listed on your profile. The other user’s account has their real
name and picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a
scale from 0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use
only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 ADF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses your real name and picture. Other personal information (i.e.,
location, employer, family) is not listed on your profile. The other user’s account has a fake
name and picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a
scale from 0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use
only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 BCE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses a fake name and picture. Other personal information (i.e., location,
employer, family) is listed on your profile. The other user’s account has their real name and
picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a scale from
0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V4 BCF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses a fake name and picture. Other personal information (i.e., location,
employer, family) is listed on your profile. The other user’s account has a fake name and picture.
The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a scale from 0-100,
how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use only whole
numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 BDE Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses a fake name and picture. Other personal information (i.e., location,
employer, family) is not listed on your profile. The other user’s account has their real name and
picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a scale from
0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 BDF Imagine you have registered for an online social-media platform where you made a
politically charged post publicly. It has gotten a strong negative response from another user. The
account you posted from uses a fake name and picture. Other personal information (i.e., location,
employer, family) is not listed on your profile. The other user’s account has a fake name and
picture. The interaction results in the user threatening you with physical harm. On a scale from
0-100, how seriously do you take the threat of personal harm against you? (Please use only
whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 DV2 On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it you will report the user’s account for
harassment/bullying? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V4 DV3 On a scale from 0-100, how likely is it you will report the user to legal authorities?
(Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V4 REAL How realistic did you find the above scenario?

o Not at all realistic (1)
o A little realistic (2)
o Somewhat realistic (3)
o Very realistic (4)
End of Block: Vignette #4 (Perception of Threat)
Start of Block: Vignette 4 Attention Check
V4 AC In the previous scenario, what kind of post did you make?

o Private (1)
o Political (2)
o This was not described in the scenario (3)
End of Block: Vignette 4 Attention Check
Start of Block: Vignette #5 (Social Media Security & Political/Social Movements)

V5 ACE Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from an
acquaintance indicating they were present at a recent Black Lives Matter protest that had
devolved into a riot that included damage to federal property. While you know they were
present, you have no evidence they participated in the property damage. You have their personal
identifying information (i.e., name, location, employer). On a scale from 0-100, what is the
likelihood you would report this person to the FBI? (Please use only whole numbers and no
decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V5 ACF Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from an
acquaintance indicating they were present at a recent Black Lives Matter protest that had
devolved into a riot that included damage to federal property. They included a video of them
attempting to break a window at the federal building. You have their personal identifying
information (i.e., name, location, employer). On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you
would report this person to the FBI? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 ADE Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from an
acquaintance indicating they were present at the Capitol Building riot in Washington D.C. on
January 6th. While you know they were present, you have no evidence they participated in the
property damage. You have their personal identifying information (i.e., name, location,
employer). On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you would report this person to the
FBI? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 ADF Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from an
acquaintance indicating they were present at the Capitol Building riot in Washington D.C. on
January 6th. They included a video of them attempting to break a window at the Capitol. You
have their personal identifying information (i.e., name, location, employer). On a scale from 0100, what is the likelihood you would report this person to the FBI? (Please use only whole
numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 BCE Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from a
stranger indicating they were present at a recent Black Lives Matter protest that had devolved
into a riot that included damage to federal property. While you know they were present, you have
no evidence they participated in the property damage. You obtained their personal identifying
information (i.e., name, location, employer). On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you
would report this person to the FBI? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________
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V5 BCF Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from a
stranger indicating they were present at a recent Black Lives Matter protest that had devolved
into a riot that included damage to federal property. They included a video of them attempting to
break a window at the federal building. You obtained their personal identifying information (i.e.,
name, location, employer). On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you would report this
person to the FBI? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 BDE Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from a
stranger indicating they were present at the Capitol Building riot in Washington D.C. on January
6th. While you know they were present, you have no evidence they participated in the property
damage. You obtained their personal identifying information (i.e., name, location, employer).
On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you would report this person to the FBI? (Please
use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 BDF Imagine you are browsing through social media when you see a public post from a
stranger indicating they were present at the Capitol Building riot in Washington D.C. on January
6th. They included a video of them attempting to break a window at the Capitol. You obtained
their personal identifying information (i.e., name, location, employer). On a scale from 0-100,
what is the likelihood you would report this person to the FBI? (Please use only whole numbers
and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 DV2 On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you would report this person to their
employer? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

211

V5 DV3 On a scale from 0-100, what is the likelihood you would share this person’s information
on social media? (Please use only whole numbers and no decimals)
________________________________________________________________

V5 REAL How realistic did you find the above scenario?

o Not at all realistic (1)
o A little realistic (2)
o Somewhat realistic (3)
o Very realistic (4)
End of Block: Vignette #5 (Social Media Security & Political/Social Movements)
Start of Block: Vignette 5 Attention Check
V5 AC In the previous scenario, was the post you saw published publicly?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o This was not described in the scenario (3)
Skip To: End of Block If In the previous scenario, was the post you saw published publicly? !=
Yes
End of Block: Vignette 5 Attention Check
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